Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2013

Burt v. Titlow

134 S. Ct. 10 | 187 L. Ed. 2d 348 | 2013 U.S. LEXIS 8039 | 82 U.S.L.W. 4007 | 571 U.S. 12 | 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 475

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Takeaway

In short, this case reinforces that federal habeas courts must give substantial deference to both state-court factfinding and defense counsel’s presumed competence; an ambiguous or silent record will not establish ineffective assistance during plea bargaining.

Background

Vonlee Titlow and her aunt, Billie Rogers, were charged with murdering Billie’s husband. With her original lawyer, Richard Lustig, Titlow agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter, receive a 7-to-15-year sentence, and testify against Billie. At the plea hearing, Titlow acknowledged that Lustig had reviewed the State’s evidence with her and that the evidence could support a first-degree-murder conviction.

Three days before Billie’s trial, Titlow retained Frederick Toca. Titlow sought a lower sentence while retaining the agreement to plead guilty and testify, but the prosecutor refused. Titlow then withdrew her plea, knowing that the first-degree-murder charge would be reinstated. Without Titlow’s testimony, Billie was acquitted. Titlow later went to trial, was convicted of second-degree murder, and received a 20-to-40-year sentence.

On direct appeal, Titlow argued that Toca was ineffective for advising withdrawal of the plea without adequately investigating the case or appreciating the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected that claim, reasoning that Toca acted reasonably in light of Titlow’s assertions of innocence. A federal district court denied habeas relief under AEDPA, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. It deemed the state court’s finding about Titlow’s asserted innocence unreasonable and concluded that the record did not show Toca had adequately advised her. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Sixth Circuit could reject the Michigan Court of Appeals’ factual finding that Titlow withdrew her plea after proclaiming her innocence to Toca.

Holding

No. The state court’s finding was reasonable on the record, so AEDPA did not permit the Sixth Circuit to replace it with its own debatable interpretation.

Reasoning

AEDPA permits federal habeas relief based on a state court’s factual determination only when that determination was unreasonable in light of the state-court record. A federal court’s mere disagreement with a state court’s view of the facts is not enough. The petitioner also bears the burden of rebutting state factual findings with clear and convincing evidence.

The record supported the Michigan court’s conclusion that Titlow had second thoughts about admitting guilt and asserted innocence to Toca. Titlow had passed a polygraph denying involvement, spoke with a jailer who advised her not to plead guilty if she was innocent, hired Toca shortly before she was to testify against her aunt, and later maintained her innocence at trial.

The Sixth Circuit relied principally on Toca’s statement at the withdrawal hearing that the proposed sentence exceeded the applicable Michigan sentencing guidelines. But a defendant may simultaneously claim innocence and reject a plea carrying an above-guidelines sentence. The state court knew of Toca’s explanation and reasonably concluded that it did not contradict a finding that Titlow had also proclaimed innocence.

Issue #2

Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably rejected Titlow’s claim that Toca provided deficient performance under Strickland by advising withdrawal of the plea agreement.

Holding

No. Given AEDPA’s deference to the state court and Strickland’s presumption that counsel acted reasonably, Titlow did not establish that Toca’s advice was constitutionally deficient.

Reasoning

An ineffective-assistance claim on federal habeas review receives “doubly deferential” review. The federal court must defer both to the state court’s adjudication under AEDPA and to counsel’s professional judgment under Strickland. Relief is available only when the state court’s rejection of the claim was beyond the bounds of fairminded disagreement.

A client’s assertion of innocence does not eliminate counsel’s ordinary duty to provide competent advice, but it can properly affect the advice counsel gives. Titlow was days away from making self-incriminating testimony under a plea that included a sentence above the guidelines. Accepting the state court’s finding that she asserted innocence, it was not unreasonable for the Michigan court to conclude that Toca’s advice satisfied Strickland.

The Sixth Circuit improperly treated the absence of evidence about Toca’s advice as proof that his advice was inadequate. Strickland instead strongly presumes that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and the defendant bears the burden of showing deficient performance. A silent record does not itself overcome that presumption.

Toca’s failure to obtain Lustig’s file before the plea withdrawal did not establish ineffective assistance. The record did not reveal what information Toca obtained from other sources, and Titlow had already stated in open court that Lustig had explained the evidence and that it could support a first-degree-murder conviction. Toca could reasonably rely on that admission in concluding that Titlow understood the risks of abandoning the plea.

The Court acknowledged that Toca’s conduct was far from exemplary, including conduct that may have violated professional rules. But ethical lapses do not automatically establish a Sixth Amendment violation, and those concerns did not answer the narrow question whether the state court reasonably found that Titlow had been adequately advised. Because the Court found no deficient performance, it did not reach prejudice or the propriety of the Sixth Circuit’s remedy.

Concurrences

Justice Sotomayor

Reasoning

Justice Sotomayor joined the Court in full but emphasized the limited basis for the decision. In her view, Titlow lost because she failed to develop evidence showing what Toca did or failed to do during the few days between his retention and the plea withdrawal. She therefore failed to overcome both the Strickland presumption of effective assistance and AEDPA’s presumption that the state court ruled correctly.

Justice Sotomayor stressed that an assertion of innocence never relieves counsel of the duty to investigate the relevant facts and law and to give informed advice about the risks of trial. The client has ultimate authority over whether to plead guilty, but counsel must first provide competent and fully informed advice. The Court’s observation that innocence may affect counsel’s advice means only that sound advice reflects the objectives of a properly informed client.

She further cautioned that the decision does not establish that a lawyer acts effectively whenever a client claims innocence shortly before withdrawing a plea. Had Titlow shown that Toca failed to learn the facts of the case before recommending withdrawal, she might have prevailed. The outcome rested on Titlow’s inadequate evidentiary showing, not on any categorical rule approving Toca’s conduct.

Justice Ginsburg

Reasoning

Justice Ginsburg concurred only in the judgment. She found the Michigan Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Toca acted reasonably in light of Titlow’s protestations of innocence doubtful. Toca took the case on the recommendation of the deputy sheriff to whom Titlow had professed innocence, had little time to assess the case, did not consult the lawyer who negotiated the plea, and allegedly told Titlow that she could win at trial before the plea was withdrawn three days later.

Justice Ginsburg concluded that the proper judgment nevertheless was reversal because the original plea bargain depended on Titlow’s promise to testify against her aunt. Once Titlow withdrew her plea and did not testify, her aunt was acquitted and later died. The prosecution therefore could not be compelled to renew an agreement whose essential consideration—Titlow’s testimony—was no longer available. Titlow’s later conviction followed a trial free of reversible error.