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Washington Supreme Court • 2008

Adams v. King County

192 P.3d 891

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Takeaway

In short, an undesignated anatomical gift under the former Act could be accepted only by a hospital; unauthorized removal could still support common-law claims, even though the Act itself provided no damages remedy.

Background

Jesse Smith signed an organ donor card giving “any organ” but naming no recipient. After his unexpected death, a pathologist at the King County Medical Examiner’s office asked his mother, Nancy Adams, to donate brain tissue to the Stanley Medical Research Institute. Adams says she agreed to a small sample, not Jesse’s entire brain. The medical examiner retained the whole brain after the autopsy and sent it to the institute, along with other samples.

After learning what had been taken, Adams sued the county and the institute. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing all her claims. The Washington Supreme Court reviewed that ruling on appeal.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Jesse’s organ donor card authorized the research institute to accept his anatomical gift.

Holding

No. Under the former Washington Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, only a hospital could accept a gift that named no donee.

Reasoning

The Act listed several kinds of recipients for anatomical gifts but specifically provided that, when a donor named no recipient, “any hospital” could accept the gift. By naming hospitals in that provision and omitting the other eligible recipients, the legislature limited who could accept an undesignated gift.

Jesse named no recipient on his donor card, and the research institute was not a hospital. His card therefore did not authorize the institute to take his brain. Directing undesignated gifts to hospitals also fit the legislature’s concern with making organs available for transplantation.

Jesse’s gift did not prevent his mother from making a further gift after his death. Whether she authorized removal of the entire brain or only a sample was a disputed fact that could not be resolved on summary judgment.

Issue #2

Whether Adams could pursue relief for the alleged removal of Jesse’s brain beyond the scope of her consent.

Holding

She could pursue common-law claims for tortious interference with a dead body and conspiracy, but the Act supplied no independent damages claim. Her privacy and fraud claims were properly dismissed.

Reasoning

The Act did not expressly create a civil remedy, and the Court declined to imply one. Its purpose was to increase anatomical gifts, not to grant families a new right to damages; families already had interests in the treatment of a relative’s body protected by common law.

Washington common law permits recovery for mental suffering caused by willful misuse of a dead body. Retaining Jesse’s entire brain for research without authorization could qualify. Adams’s complaint gave adequate notice of that claim, but she still had to prove it at trial.

The agreement to procure tissue for research was not itself unlawful. But Adams’s allegation that the respondents agreed to procure Jesse’s brain without consent raised a factual question sufficient to preserve her conspiracy claim.

The privacy claim lacked an allegation that private information was published. The fraud claim alleged a broken promise about what would be taken, not a false representation of an existing fact. Neither claim could proceed.