Caseflicks

Washington Supreme Court • 1989

State v. Komok

783 P.2d 1061 | 113 Wash. 2d 810 | 1989 Wash. LEXIS 142

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Takeaway

In short, State v. Komok holds that Washington theft by taking requires intent to deprive, but not the common-law intent to deprive permanently.

Background

Sixteen-year-old Joseph Komok accompanied his fourteen-year-old sister into a Lamonts department store without money. A store security manager watched Komok hand his sister a baseball cap and later saw her conceal the cap, leggings, and a T-shirt beneath her sweatshirt. She left without paying, while Komok remained inside. When detained, Komok said that he and his sister had come for school clothes and asked the manager to give them a break.

The Juvenile Department of King County Superior Court found Komok guilty of aiding and abetting third-degree theft. Its written findings stated that he intended to deprive Lamonts of its property, but did not find an intent to deprive the store permanently. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that permanent deprivation is not an element of theft under RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a). The Washington Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether theft by taking under RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a) requires proof that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of property.

Holding

No. The statute requires an intent to deprive, not an intent to permanently deprive.

Reasoning

The Legislature has authority to define crimes, and a statutory definition can displace a common-law element. RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a) defines theft as wrongfully obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over another's property with intent to deprive that person of the property. Its text contains no permanence requirement.

The statutory definition of “deprive” does not restore the common-law phrase. Apart from expanding theft to cover certain intellectual-property uses, RCW 9A.56.010(5) leaves “deprive” with its ordinary meaning: to take something away from someone or keep that person from having or enjoying it. That ordinary meaning does not itself require a permanent taking.

The statute's drafting history confirmed the textual conclusion. Earlier versions of the proposed criminal-code revision used the phrase “intent permanently to deprive” and expressly referred to common-law theft concepts. The enacted version deliberately omitted both formulations. Because the theft statute was part of a comprehensive revision designed to simplify the old common-law scheme, the omission showed legislative intent not to retain permanent deprivation as an element.

The court rejected reliance on State v. Burnham, which had treated permanent deprivation as an element largely on the basis of secondary common-law authorities. Burnham did not overcome the enacted text and the legislative history showing that the Legislature chose different language. Nor did legislative inaction after Burnham establish legislative acquiescence where the statutory history itself demonstrated the Legislature's original contrary intent.

Because permanent deprivation is not an element of statutory theft, the information was adequate when it charged Komok in the statute's terms, and the trial court's finding that he intended to deprive Lamonts was sufficient. The court therefore had no need to decide his separate constitutional notice argument or his request for additional findings concerning permanent deprivation.