Whether New York had general personal jurisdiction over Brenner, Krauth, and the German GREASE entities under CPLR § 301.
Holding
No. The plaintiffs did not show that the GREASE defendants were doing business in New York with the permanence, continuity, and substantiality required for general jurisdiction.
Reasoning
Because the case rested on diversity jurisdiction, the court applied New York personal-jurisdiction law. After jurisdictional discovery but without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiffs had to make a prima facie showing through facts that, if credited, would establish jurisdiction. Although factual disputes were construed in the plaintiffs' favor, the court treated the completed discovery record as the plaintiffs' full jurisdictional proof.
CPLR § 301 permits general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only where it conducts continuous, permanent, and substantial New York business. The standard is demanding because a defendant subject to general jurisdiction may be sued in New York even on claims unrelated to its in-state conduct.
Brenner's and Krauth's occasional New York trips to watch theater, negotiate for theatrical rights, attend auditions, hire talent, and purchase production supplies did not meet that standard. Those activities merely helped them obtain goods and services for their core European theater business; they did not establish a sustained New York business presence. Neither individual maintained a New York office, residence, bank account, telephone listing, or comparable indicium of permanence.
The plaintiffs could not convert the defendants' efforts to obtain rights to plays into a sufficient solicitation-plus theory. Seeking rights to produce shows was not the kind of solicitation contemplated by that doctrine, and, in any event, the defendants' contacts were sporadic and incidental rather than systematic and continuous.
The plaintiffs also failed to establish that Sundance or BB Promotion was a 'mere department' of the German defendants. The essential common-ownership element was absent as to Krauth and GREASE GmbH, and the evidence did not show financial dependence, disregard of corporate formalities, shared operational control, or a unified enterprise. The entities were separately incorporated and capitalized, maintained separate records and accounts, hired separately, and generally dealt with one another at arm's length.
Shared addresses, one shared management-level employee, and credit-card notations allocating mistaken charges among affiliated persons and companies did not demonstrate pervasive control or commingling. To the contrary, the notations and prompt reimbursements supported the conclusion that the companies kept their financial obligations separate.
Nor did the record support jurisdiction through agency. Sundance arranged New York auditions and retained a lawyer during separate Chicago negotiations, but it was reimbursed and paid for those services, made no artistic or hiring decisions, and lacked authority to bind GREASE GmbH. Similarly, consultant Roseanne Kirk performed discrete New York work on Harlem Gospel Singers, a show not performed in New York, and lacked authority to contract for Brenner Holding. These activities did not amount to doing all the business the foreign entities would conduct through their own officials in New York.