Caseflicks

Texas Supreme Court • 1986

Cain v. Bain

709 S.W.2d 175 | 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 214 | 1986 Tex. LEXIS 934

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Takeaway

In short, Cain v. Bain confirms that factual-sufficiency review requires weighing all the evidence and overturning a jury verdict only when it is clearly wrong and unjust—not demanding evidence that points unerringly to the verdict.

Background

James and Karen Bain bought a 20-year-old house in 1976 from George and Carroll Banks through a real-estate agent employed by James Cain Company. When the Bains later tried to sell the house in 1978, they were unable to do so because of an alleged substantial foundation defect. They sued Cain under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

The evidence showed that after moving in, the Bains observed a bulge below a window, a crack in a kitchen wall, a sticking door, and, within six or seven months, a crack in the foundation near the patio. Karen Bain testified that in spring or summer 1977 she was told that the house might have a slab problem. The Bains offered contrary evidence: in April 1978, a foundation expert told them there was no substantial foundation defect, and the visible conditions could also have resulted from ordinary Houston-area subsidence, age, dampness, or weathering.

The trial court submitted a jury question asking whether, by October 13, 1977, the Bains either knew of the substantial defect or had notice of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate and discover it. The jury answered yes. The trial court granted Cain's directed-verdict motion and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence did not point “unerringly” to a substantial foundation defect and was too slight and indefinite to support constructive notice.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard when reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's constructive-notice finding.

Holding

No. The court of appeals used an improperly demanding standard and had to reconsider the insufficiency challenge under the proper factual-sufficiency test.

Reasoning

A court of appeals reviewing a jury finding for factual sufficiency must consider and weigh all of the evidence, both supporting and contrary to the finding. It may set the finding aside only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.

The court of appeals instead required the evidence to point “unerringly” to the conclusion that the Bains were on notice of a substantial foundation defect. That formulation incorrectly demanded near-conclusive proof rather than asking whether the jury's preponderance-based finding was clearly wrong and unjust.

There was some evidence supporting the jury's answer. The Bains had observed multiple physical conditions in the home, including wall and foundation cracks, and Karen Bain had been told that the house might have a slab problem before the relevant October 1977 date. The contrary explanations and the expert's later opinion were evidence for the jury to weigh; they did not justify imposing an “unerring” proof requirement.