Caseflicks

Supreme Court of New Jersey • 1976

Goss v. Allen

360 A.2d 388 | 70 N.J. 442 | 1976 N.J. LEXIS 208

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that ordinary recreational skiing by a 17-year-old is not an adult activity as a matter of law, so the minor is judged by the care of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience.

Background

Jacqueline Goss, an experienced skier serving on the ski patrol at Vermont's Mad River Glen resort, was standing with a friend in a flat area beyond the end of a beginner slope. Steven Allen, then 17 and on his first downhill-skiing outing, skied down a short lower portion of the beginner slope. At an abrupt turn near the bottom, he lost control, saw the two women too late, and collided with Goss.

The trial court instructed the jury to assess Allen's conduct by the care reasonably expected of a 17-year-old with his experience and background, rather than by an adult standard. The jury found Allen not negligent. Although Goss appealed on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the Appellate Division sua sponte held that the instruction was plain error. It reasoned that skiing was an adult, potentially hazardous activity and ordered a new trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the defense verdict.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a 17-year-old beginner skier must be held to an adult standard of care because skiing is an adult or inherently hazardous activity.

Holding

No. A minor skiing on a beginner slope is generally judged by the standard applicable to minors, not by the adult standard of care.

Reasoning

The ordinary rule for a minor's negligence is the conduct reasonably expected of a person of like age, intelligence, and experience under similar circumstances. The nature of the activity remains one of the relevant circumstances in applying that standard.

An adult standard may be appropriate when a minor undertakes an activity so hazardous that adult competence is ordinarily required, such as driving a motor vehicle, operating a motorboat, or hunting. Those activities commonly involve licensing requirements that require a minor to demonstrate adult competence before participating.

The record did not support treating ordinary recreational skiing as an activity normally undertaken only by adults or one requiring adult qualifications. The Court took judicial notice that skiing, apart from limited hazardous forms of the sport, is enjoyed by people of all ages.

Allen's effort to negotiate the bottom of a beginner slope was especially ill-suited to classification as an adult activity as a matter of law. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the jury should have been instructed to apply an adult standard.

Issue #2

Whether the child standard of care applies when a minor is accused of primary negligence causing injury to another, rather than contributory negligence.

Holding

Yes. The same reasonable-minor standard applies to both a child's primary negligence and contributory negligence.

Reasoning

Many cases concerning the child standard arise in the contributory-negligence setting, but the Court found a rational basis for applying the same standard when a child's conduct allegedly injures another person.

Using one standard avoids further complication in an already difficult area of tort law. The practical need for a workable, uniform rule outweighed any proposed distinction between a child as plaintiff and a child as defendant.

Issue #3

Whether the trial court correctly applied the minor standard to a 17-year-old defendant and whether its omission of the word "intelligence" required reversal.

Holding

Yes. The trial court's charge was adequate on the facts of this case, and a 17-year-old remained subject to the minor standard.

Reasoning

Although New Jersey's later-enacted age-of-majority statute made persons 18 and older adults, this accident occurred before that statute took effect. The Court nevertheless concluded that 18 is the appropriate general line at which a person should be held to adult responsibility in tort matters.

Any age line creates a difference between persons immediately below and above it. The Court considered 18 reasonable because it corresponded to the age at which New Jersey generally treated a person as criminally responsible as an adult.

The trial court's supplemental instruction referred to Allen's age, experience, and background but did not expressly mention intelligence. The Court held that the omission caused no prejudice when the charge was viewed as a whole and in light of the case's facts. Goss had not objected on that ground, and the Appellate Division had not relied on it.

Issue #4

Whether the jury's finding that Allen was not negligent was against the weight of the evidence.

Holding

No. The evidence presented a jury question, and the defense verdict was supported by the record.

Reasoning

The evidence did not compel the conclusion that Allen acted negligently under the applicable standard. His limited experience, the short beginner run, the abrupt turn, and his attempts to regain control permitted the jury to assess whether his conduct met the standard of reasonable care for a person of his age and experience.

Because the proofs supported a genuine factual dispute over negligence, the jury's finding for Allen was not against the weight of the evidence. The Court therefore reinstated the trial court's judgment for the defendant.

Dissents

Justice Schreiber

Reasoning

Justice Schreiber would have affirmed the Appellate Division's order for a new trial. He first concluded that the jury instruction was defective even under the majority's chosen rule because it omitted intelligence, a factor central to evaluating a child's judgmental capacity. In his view, the repeated and inconsistent references to a "17-year-old beginner skier" did not tell the jury to compare Allen with a reasonable child of the same age, intelligence, and experience.

He also rejected the majority's general rule as unrealistic and unfair to innocent victims. The majority gave no satisfactory criterion for deciding which activities are sufficiently "potentially hazardous" to trigger an adult standard, and licensing is an inadequate proxy because many dangerous activities require no license.

In Justice Schreiber's view, a minor engaged in an activity normally performed by adults should ordinarily bear the adult standard of reasonable care. Skiing, like golf, cycling, motor-vehicle operation, and boating, can seriously injure third persons when performed carelessly; the injured person's loss does not become less serious because the actor is a minor.

He would go further by holding every person age 16 or older to an adult standard regardless of the activity. For minors between 7 and 16, he would presumptively apply the adult standard when the child undertook an activity usually performed by adults, subject to proof that adult judgmental capacity was not warranted for that activity. Outside adult activities, he would apply the reasonable-child standard.