Caseflicks

California Court of Appeal • 1968

People v. Weisberg

265 Cal. App. 2d 476 | 71 Cal. Rptr. 157 | 1968 Cal. App. LEXIS 1641

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that evidence of similar injuries to another child in the defendant’s care may show a pattern of abuse and negate accident, while repeated severe injuries to an infant can support implied malice and second-degree murder.

Background

Muriel Weisberg was charged with murdering her seven-week-old son, David. David died after suffering a massive intracranial hemorrhage caused by two skull fractures. Medical evidence also showed older injuries: a chip fracture in his leg and fractures of several ribs near the spine. Doctors testified that an infant could not have inflicted these injuries on himself and that the explanations given—that David had bumped himself against crib slats—were inadequate.

The prosecution also introduced evidence concerning injuries to David’s older sister, Sharon. Sharon had a broken femur and an earlier, partly healed chip fracture near her knee. Witnesses described defendant’s statements that Sharon’s leg was caught in or injured by her crib, as well as defendant’s admissions and conduct suggesting harsh treatment and neglect of Sharon. Medical testimony indicated that a child Sharon’s age was unlikely to have caused her own injuries.

After a bench trial, the Los Angeles Superior Court found Weisberg guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced her to state prison. She appealed, arguing that the evidence of Sharon’s injuries was improperly admitted and that the evidence did not establish malice aforethought.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence that David’s sister, Sharon, had suffered injuries and had been mistreated.

Holding

No. The evidence of Sharon’s injuries and defendant’s treatment of her was properly admitted.

Reasoning

The evidence did more than portray defendant as a person of bad character. David and Sharon were very young children in defendant’s care, and both had sustained injuries that medical evidence indicated they could not have inflicted on themselves. This evidence supported an inference of a distinctive pattern of abuse and helped identify defendant as the person responsible for David’s injuries.

The evidence was also relevant to rebut an innocent-accident explanation. Defendant attributed both children’s injuries to crib-related accidents, but the medical evidence undermined those accounts. Prior assaults or injuries involving a child may be admitted when they tend to establish a material element of the charged offense, including intent, and when they tend to negate accident or legitimate discipline.

Defendant repeatedly relied on matters contained in the preliminary-hearing transcript, but that transcript was not part of the appellate record. The trial record did not show that it had been before the trial court except for a limited impeachment purpose, so it supplied no basis for finding evidentiary error.

Issue #2

Whether substantial evidence supported a finding of malice aforethought and thus a conviction for second-degree murder.

Holding

Yes. The evidence supported an inference that defendant acted at least with an intent to inflict serious bodily injury, which is sufficient malice for murder.

Reasoning

Malice aforethought does not require proof of personal hatred, a preexisting plan to kill, or even an express intent to kill. It may be implied where the defendant intends to inflict great bodily injury or acts in wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable risk to human life.

The evidence showed that David had suffered injuries at different times: an older leg fracture, multiple rib fractures, and fatal skull fractures. A factfinder could reasonably conclude from this pattern of severe, non-self-inflicted injuries to a seven-week-old child that defendant intended to cause serious injury.

On appeal, the court does not reweigh the evidence or choose between competing inferences. It asks whether substantial evidence could support the factfinder’s conclusion, while assuming every fact reasonably deducible in favor of the judgment. Under that deferential standard, the evidence supported the conclusion that defendant killed David without provocation or justification and with the implied malice required for second-degree murder.