Caseflicks

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania • 1988

Commonwealth v. Turner

544 A.2d 927 | 518 Pa. 491 | 1988 Pa. LEXIS 212

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Takeaway

In short, this case establishes the Turner/Finley procedure: appointed collateral-review counsel need not satisfy Anders, but may withdraw after a documented independent review and the court's agreement that the claims are meritless.

Background

Geary Turner was convicted of second-degree murder after a bench trial and received a five-to-twenty-year sentence. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unanimously affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in 1976, and his later federal habeas petition was denied.

Turner then filed a pro se state habeas petition, which appointed counsel amended under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA). The PCHA court dismissed the petition when Turner, then on parole, failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. After reopening the matter to determine whether Turner had notice, the court found that he had been properly notified and reinstated the dismissal. Counsel's later appeal was untimely and was quashed.

Turner filed a second PCHA petition. His seventh appointed lawyer concluded that it was frivolous and withdrew under the Anders and McClendon procedures. The PCHA court denied relief without a hearing. An eighth appointed attorney likewise found no meritorious appellate issue and sought leave to withdraw. The Superior Court affirmed the denial and allowed withdrawal after concluding that counsel had complied with Anders, McClendon, and its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Finley. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review to clarify the proper Pennsylvania procedure for appointed counsel seeking to withdraw in collateral proceedings.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Anders and McClendon govern appointed counsel's withdrawal from representation in collateral PCHA proceedings.

Holding

No. Anders and McClendon apply to direct appeals from criminal convictions, not to collateral attacks under the PCHA.

Reasoning

The Court explained that Anders and McClendon impose demanding procedures designed for direct criminal appeals. Those procedures were not the appropriate measure for collateral PCHA litigation, so the Superior Court erred insofar as it treated compliance with Anders and McClendon as necessary before counsel could withdraw.

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Finley established that the federal constitutional right to appointed counsel does not extend to collateral attacks on criminal convictions. Because the federal constitutional premise for the Anders procedure is absent in PCHA proceedings, Pennsylvania was not required to import Anders's more cumbersome requirements into those proceedings.

Issue #2

What procedure Pennsylvania law requires when appointed counsel concludes that a PCHA petition or appeal has no merit.

Holding

Counsel may withdraw after conducting an independent review, explaining in a no-merit letter the review undertaken and the petitioner's claims and why they lack merit, and obtaining the court's agreement that the matter is meritless.

Reasoning

Although a PCHA petitioner's right to counsel arises under Pennsylvania procedural rules rather than the federal Constitution, that rule-based right includes the protection of an independent review by competent counsel. The Court adopted the procedure described in the Superior Court's Finley decision as sufficient to safeguard that right.

Under that procedure, counsel must submit a no-merit letter identifying the nature and extent of counsel's review, listing the issues the petitioner wants raised, and explaining why each issue is meritless. The reviewing PCHA court must independently examine the record and concur that the petition lacks merit before allowing counsel to withdraw.

Once counsel has completed that review and the court agrees that the claims are meritless, the petitioner may proceed pro se, retain private counsel, or choose not to continue. The same less-rigid procedure applies at every stage of collateral litigation, in either the trial court or an appellate court.

Concurrences

Justice Papadakos

Reasoning

Justice Papadakos concurred only in the result. The opinion provides no separate explanation of his reasoning or an alternative legal analysis.