Caseflicks

California Court of Appeal • 1978

People v. Fuller

86 Cal. App. 3d 618 | 150 Cal. Rptr. 515 | 1978 Cal. App. LEXIS 2109

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Takeaway

In short, this case shows that California's then-controlling first degree felony-murder rule reached an accidental death during flight from any burglary, even though the court believed that result was unjustified; the same driving also independently supported a possible implied-malice murder charge.

Background

After allegedly burglarizing four locked Dodge vans at a Fresno car lot and removing spare tires, Fuller and his codefendant fled in a Plymouth when a cadet police officer became suspicious. The officer pursued them for about seven miles over 10 to 12 minutes. During the chase, the defendants allegedly drove at high speeds, narrowly missed several vehicles and police cars, ran red lights, and ultimately struck another car after entering an intersection against a red light. The other driver died.

The defendants were charged with murder and multiple burglary counts. On a Penal Code section 995 motion, the trial court dismissed the murder count and substituted vehicular manslaughter based on grossly negligent driving. The People appealed the dismissal of the murder charge.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether an unintentional death caused during a high-speed flight after a nonviolent burglary of unattended vehicles can support a first degree felony-murder prosecution.

Holding

Yes. Binding California precedent required application of the first degree felony-murder rule because burglary is an enumerated felony and the fatal flight could be found to be part of the same continuous transaction.

Reasoning

Penal Code section 189 classifies a murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary as first degree murder. Under California's felony-murder rule, malice is imputed and the prosecution need not prove that the killing was intentional, negligent, or even more than accidental.

California precedent treats every burglary within Penal Code section 459 as sufficient for first degree felony murder. Unlike the rule for unenumerated felonies supporting second degree felony murder, the court could not ask whether this particular type of burglary was inherently dangerous to human life.

A killing need not bear a strict causal relationship to the underlying felony. It is enough that the felony and killing are parts of one continuous transaction. Flight remains part of that transaction until the felons reach a place of temporary safety, and whether they have reached such safety is ordinarily a jury question.

The court rejected the defendants' proposed distinction between flight from robbery and flight from burglary. Escape with stolen property can be important to completing either offense, and authorities in other jurisdictions had applied felony murder to unintended killings during flight from burglary.

The court candidly concluded that applying the rule here was irrational as a matter of policy, but held that precedent controlled. An unarmed daylight theft from unattended vehicles is not dangerous in the abstract, and treating later flight as part of the burglary risks converting any accidental death during escape from even a minor theft into first degree murder. The court reasoned that this result does not sensibly advance the rule's stated purpose of deterring negligent or accidental killings, but it lacked authority to carve automobile burglary out of section 189.

Issue #2

Whether the defendants could also be prosecuted for ordinary second degree murder rather than only vehicular manslaughter.

Holding

Yes. The alleged manner of driving presented a factual question whether the defendants acted with implied malice and thus could support second degree murder.

Reasoning

Ordinary second degree murder requires malice aforethought, which may be implied when a defendant deliberately engages in conduct with a high probability of causing death while acting with wanton disregard for human life. This theory differs from felony murder because it rests on the defendant's actual dangerous conduct rather than an imputation of malice from the burglary.

The court emphasized allegations that the defendants sped through major Fresno streets, drove on the wrong side of the road, forced oncoming cars to evade a head-on collision, ran red lights, approached police vehicles blocking their route without slowing, and then struck a vehicle after running another red light. Those facts permitted an inference that serious injury or death was foreseeable and that the defendants consciously disregarded that risk.

Vehicular manslaughter did not displace a possible murder charge merely because it specifically covers unlawful killings caused by grossly negligent driving. The alleged conduct could exceed gross negligence and demonstrate the wanton and reckless disregard required for implied malice. Supreme Court authority had also recognized that a high-speed flight from police may establish second degree murder even though automobile theft itself cannot serve as an inherently dangerous felony for second degree felony murder.

Concurrences

Judge Ginsburg

Reasoning

Judge Ginsburg concurred only in the reversal of the dismissal. He did not provide a written explanation of his narrower agreement or state whether he joined the majority's analysis of felony murder and second degree murder.