Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2011

Kentucky v. King

131 S. Ct. 1849 | 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 | 563 U.S. 452 | 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that police do not “create” an exigency merely by lawfully knocking and announcing themselves; absent an actual or threatened Fourth Amendment violation, they may rely on a genuine risk that evidence will be destroyed.

Background

Lexington police arranged a controlled purchase of crack cocaine outside an apartment complex. After the suspected dealer ran into the building, uniformed officers entered its breezeway, heard a door close, and smelled a strong odor of burning marijuana. The officers did not know which of two apartments the dealer had entered. Although the dealer had actually entered the apartment on the right, the marijuana odor led the officers to the apartment on the left, where Hollis King was present.

The officers banged loudly on the left apartment's door and announced that they were police. They then heard people moving inside and sounds they believed were consistent with the destruction of drugs. The officers announced that they would enter, forced open the door, conducted a protective sweep, and saw marijuana and cocaine in plain view. A later search uncovered additional drugs, cash, and paraphernalia.

The trial court denied King's suppression motion, finding probable cause and exigent circumstances based on the apparent risk that evidence was being destroyed. King entered a conditional guilty plea, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed. Assuming that an exigency existed, it held that police could not invoke it because it was reasonably foreseeable that knocking and announcing their presence would prompt occupants to destroy evidence.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether police impermissibly create an exigency, and therefore may not rely on the exigent-circumstances exception, when their lawful knock and announcement of identity foreseeably lead occupants to destroy evidence.

Holding

No. Police may rely on exigent circumstances unless they created the exigency by engaging in, or threatening to engage in, conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.

Reasoning

Warrantless home searches are presumptively unreasonable, but the Fourth Amendment ultimately asks whether a search is reasonable. A recognized exception permits entry when an exigency, including the imminent destruction of evidence, makes obtaining a warrant impracticable. The police-created-exigency doctrine must therefore be tied to the constitutional reasonableness of the officers' conduct before the exigency arose.

The Court adopted an objective rule: officers may make a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence if they did not create the exigency through an actual or threatened Fourth Amendment violation. This approach parallels the plain-view doctrine, under which officers may seize evidence they expect to find so long as they lawfully reached the vantage point from which they saw it.

The Court rejected a bad-faith test because Fourth Amendment reasonableness generally does not depend on an officer's subjective motive. It also rejected a reasonable-foreseeability test because police activity often causes suspects to fear detection, and courts could not reliably determine how foreseeable destruction of evidence was in rapidly unfolding encounters.

The Court further rejected rules that fault police for failing to obtain a warrant as soon as probable cause exists or for using tactics a court later considers inconsistent with ideal police practice. Officers have no constitutional duty to stop investigating at the first moment probable cause arises; they may seek information, ask for consent, gather stronger evidence, or preserve an investigation's confidentiality.

King's proposed rule—that police create an exigency whenever their manner of knocking or speaking would make a reasonable person believe entry was imminent—was also too vague and impractical. Officers may knock forcefully and identify themselves loudly without violating the Fourth Amendment, and residents remain free not to answer the door or consent to entry.

Issue #2

Whether the officers' conduct before entering King's apartment amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation or threat that would bar reliance on any ensuing exigency.

Holding

No. Assuming an exigency existed, the officers did not impermissibly create it because they merely knocked loudly and announced that they were police before hearing the sounds that suggested evidence was being destroyed.

Reasoning

The unrebutted testimony showed that the officers banged on the door and announced, “Police” or “This is the police.” A police officer who approaches a residence, knocks, and seeks to speak with occupants does no more than a private citizen may do, and that conduct is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

The record did not establish that the officers demanded entry or threatened to break down the door before the suspected exigency developed. Their statement that they would enter came only after they heard movement they believed signaled the destruction of evidence, so that statement could not have caused the exigency.

Accordingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court erred by treating the foreseeable consequences of the lawful knock-and-announce encounter as police-created exigency. If there was a genuine risk of imminent destruction of evidence, the officers could invoke that exigency despite having prompted the occupants' response through lawful conduct.

Issue #3

Whether the Supreme Court itself should decide if the sounds inside the apartment established a genuine exigency justifying entry.

Holding

No. The Court assumed an exigency for purposes of resolving the police-created-exigency question and remanded for the Kentucky Supreme Court to address whether a genuine exigency actually existed.

Reasoning

A warrantless entry still requires a real, objectively supported exigency; the new rule does not permit entry merely because officers knock and hear ordinary movement inside. The Kentucky Supreme Court had expressly questioned whether the sounds were sufficient to show that evidence was being destroyed, but it had not decided that question.

Because the state court had resolved the case solely on the erroneous theory that police could not rely on a foreseeable exigency, the Court reversed and remanded. On remand, the state court could determine whether the facts actually supported a reasonable belief that evidence was in imminent danger of destruction.

Dissents

Justice Ginsburg

Reasoning

Justice Ginsburg maintained that the decision weakens the Fourth Amendment's central protection for the home. In her view, the warrant requirement ordinarily requires police to obtain neutral judicial approval whenever doing so is practical, and exceptions for emergencies must remain narrow and carefully defined.

She reasoned that the relevant emergency must exist when police arrive, not arise only after police choose tactics that predictably provoke a suspect's fear of discovery. Here, police had probable cause from the marijuana odor and could have secured the premises while obtaining a warrant; nothing made a warrant impracticable before they knocked.

Relying on Johnson v. United States, Justice Ginsburg argued that the smell of drugs and noises from inside a dwelling do not permit officers to bypass a magistrate simply because an expedient knock may cause occupants to conceal or destroy evidence. The majority's rule, she warned, effectively permits officers in drug cases to knock, listen for movement, and forcibly enter despite having had time to obtain a warrant.