Caseflicks

California Court of Appeal • 1988

Whorton v. Dillingham

202 Cal. App. 3d 447 | 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 | 1988 Cal. App. LEXIS 576

Full access

Unlock the video and quiz

The written brief is free to read below. Subscribe to watch the video explainer and take the quiz.

Create an account Log in

Takeaway

In short, this case holds that an express cohabitation agreement is not wholly void merely because it includes sexual services: independently compensable and severable business services may support enforceable property and financial promises.

Background

Donnis Whorton and Benjamin Dillingham began living together in 1977 and entered an oral agreement governing their relationship and economic affairs. Whorton promised, among other things, to leave school after receiving his associate degree and to serve full-time as Dillingham’s chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, real-estate investment partner and counselor. He also agreed to be Dillingham’s companion, confidant, social and traveling companion, and lover. In return, Dillingham allegedly promised lifetime financial support, access to accounts and credit, and a one-half interest in jointly acquired real estate and property later acquired by Dillingham.

The agreement expressly provided that any legally unenforceable provision would be severable from the remainder. Whorton alleged that he performed until 1984, when Dillingham excluded him from the premises and refused to provide the promised property and financial benefits.

Whorton sued for breach of express and implied contract and equitable relief. The trial court sustained Dillingham’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the agreement was expressly and inseparably based on sexual services and therefore unenforceable. Whorton appealed from the ensuing judgment of dismissal.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether an oral cohabiters’ agreement that expressly includes sexual services is entirely unenforceable when it also requires business and personal services.

Holding

No. The complaint stated a claim because the alleged business services could constitute consideration independent of sexual services, and the unlawful sexual component could be severed.

Reasoning

Under Marvin v. Marvin, adults who voluntarily cohabit may contract concerning property and earnings. A contract is invalid only to the extent it rests on illicit consideration for sexual services; it is not invalid merely because the parties contemplated or maintained a sexual relationship.

Marvin permits enforcement of a severable portion of an agreement supported by lawful, independent consideration. Civil Code section 1599 likewise allows a contract with distinct lawful and unlawful objects to remain valid as to its lawful portions. The question at the demurrer stage was therefore whether Whorton’s allegations foreclosed, as a matter of law, a finding that his nonsexual contributions independently supported Dillingham’s promises.

Whorton alleged that he worked as Dillingham’s chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, and real-estate investment partner and counselor. Those are services with ordinary monetary value, for which compensation would normally be expected. They are materially different from companionship, affection, or other services that ordinarily flow from a sexual cohabiting relationship.

The court distinguished Jones v. Daly, where the plaintiff alleged only services such as lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper, and cook. In Jones, no alleged service independently supported the property-sharing and support promises apart from the plaintiff’s role as a lover. Whorton, by contrast, alleged distinct business-related services that could supply independent consideration.

The agreement also contained an express severability provision. Taking the pleaded facts as true, the court could not conclude at the pleading stage that the sexual promises were inseparable from the economic promises. Whorton could not recover for the termination of the sexual relationship itself, but he could attempt to prove that his compensable services supported an enforceable claim for property or financial relief.

Issue #2

Whether the statute of frauds barred enforcement of the alleged oral agreement.

Holding

No. Whorton’s allegations were sufficient to invoke estoppel against reliance on the statute of frauds at the demurrer stage.

Reasoning

Dillingham argued that the agreement had to be in writing because it allegedly could not be performed within one year and involved interests in real property. But California recognizes that estoppel may prevent a party from using the statute of frauds to perpetrate fraud or impose an unconscionable injury after inducing serious reliance or accepting the benefits of the other party’s performance.

Whorton alleged that he curtailed his education and worked in Dillingham’s business ventures in reliance on promises of support and property sharing. Those allegations, if proved, could establish detrimental reliance and unjust enrichment sufficient to estop Dillingham from asserting the statute of frauds.

Issue #3

Whether the complaint showed on its face that Whorton’s claims were untimely.

Holding

No. The pleading did not establish a limitations bar.

Reasoning

A contract claim generally accrues at breach, and a Marvin-type agreement is breached when one partner ends the relationship. Whorton alleged that Dillingham ended the arrangement in the latter part of 1984, and Whorton filed suit in June 1986.

Because an action on an unwritten contract carries a two-year limitations period, the complaint did not facially show that the contract claim was late. Nor did it establish that any fraud-based claim was barred by its three-year period. Equitable claims could also be subject to a four-year residual limitations period.

Issue #4

Whether Labor Code section 2922 made the agreement terminable at will and defeated Whorton’s claims.

Holding

No. The at-will employment statute did not govern this cohabiters’ property agreement.

Reasoning

Labor Code section 2922 concerns employment contracts without a specified term. This case involved an alleged agreement between nonmarital partners about the management of their economic affairs, property rights, and financial obligations, not an ordinary employment relationship governed by that statute.

Although either partner remained free to end the personal relationship, ending it did not resolve whether the departing partner had breached enforceable economic promises. The remaining question was whether the facts supported a monetary or property award for Whorton.