Whether a business open to the public owes a duty to permit use of an accessible telephone when a person in good faith seeks to summon police assistance for an imminent threat of physical harm to another.
Holding
Yes. Under the limited circumstances alleged, the Circle Inn bartender owed Soldano a duty either to allow the patron to call police using the accessible telephone or to make the call himself.
Reasoning
The traditional common-law rule distinguishes misfeasance from nonfeasance: ordinarily, a person who did not create the danger has no affirmative duty to rescue another absent a special relationship or an undertaking. The court acknowledged that neither the Circle Inn nor its bartender had a conventional special relationship with Soldano or with the Happy Jack’s patron who sought to call police.
The case was not simply about compelling the bartender to become a rescuer. The patron from Happy Jack’s had chosen to render aid by contacting police, and the bartender allegedly obstructed that effort by refusing access to a telephone. This placed the case close to Restatement Second of Torts section 327, which imposes liability on one who negligently prevents a third person from providing aid necessary to avert physical harm.
The Rowland v. Christian duty factors supported recognizing a narrow duty. The threatened harm was foreseeable and imminent because the bartender was told a man had been threatened; Soldano’s injury and death were certain; and a factfinder could find a close causal connection if a timely police call could have led to intervention before the shooting.
The bartender’s alleged refusal could be regarded as morally blameworthy because it required no personal risk, effort, or expense to permit an emergency call that might save a life. Recognizing the duty would also further the policy of preventing violence by allowing willing citizens to summon police assistance rather than obstructing them.
The burden of the rule was deliberately limited. It applies to a business open to the public, during business hours, and to a telephone in an area ordinarily accessible to the public. It does not require private citizens to admit strangers into their homes, does not require anyone personally to rescue another, and arises only when an imminent danger of physical harm is clearly conveyed rather than merely asserted as a vague emergency.
California statutes and public policy also reflected the social importance of citizen involvement in crime prevention and of telephone access for emergency services. Although those statutes did not themselves establish negligence per se, they supported a modest common-law expansion beyond the general no-duty-to-rescue rule.