Takeaway
In short, this case holds that a grantor may retain an easement implied from an obvious, continuous, and permanent prior use when that use is reasonably necessary or important to the retained land’s beneficial enjoyment; absolute necessity is not required.
Granite Properties and its predecessors owned parcels A, B, and E as a single ownership until 1982, when Granite conveyed undeveloped parcel B to Larry and Ann Manns. Granite retained parcel A, containing a shopping center, and parcel E, containing an apartment complex. Long before the sale, Granite had used two visible, permanent driveways across what became parcel B: one permitted delivery trucks to reach and circle behind the shopping center, and the other provided the sole access from Rou des Chateaux Street to the apartment complex’s rear parking lot.
After buying parcel B, the Mannses obtained a survey, found no recorded easements, and demanded that Granite stop using both driveways. Granite sought a permanent injunction, claiming easements implied by the preexisting uses. The circuit court initially rejected both claims. On Granite’s posttrial motion, it granted relief for the apartment-complex driveway because that access was highly convenient and reasonably necessary, but it continued to deny relief for the shopping-center driveway as merely convenient. Both sides appealed. The appellate court held that Granite had implied easements over both driveways. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the Mannses’ petition for leave to appeal.
Issue #1
Whether Illinois recognizes an easement implied by prior use in favor of a grantor who retains land after conveying the servient parcel.
Holding
Yes. Illinois recognizes implied reservations as well as implied grants when the circumstances of the conveyance support an inference that the parties intended the preexisting use to continue.
Reasoning
The Mannses argued that Granite, as the grantor of parcel B, could not claim an easement that derogated from its own grant. The Court rejected that categorical position. Illinois precedent treats the doctrine reciprocally: when a seller has openly imposed a burden on the parcel sold for the benefit of retained land, the buyer takes subject to that burden if its visible condition gives notice of it.
The Court acknowledged that the claimant’s status as conveyor matters. Under the Restatement approach, a grantor seeking an implied reservation ordinarily must make a stronger showing of necessity than a grantee seeking an implied grant. But that factor does not eliminate implied reservations; it is one circumstance bearing on whether the parties probably intended the servitude to survive the conveyance.
Issue #2
What degree of necessity is required for an easement implied from a preexisting use.
Holding
The claimant need show reasonable necessity or importance to beneficial enjoyment, not absolute necessity, particularly where the prior use was apparent, continuous, permanent, and known to the purchaser.
Reasoning
The Court distinguished an easement by necessity from an easement implied from preexisting use. An easement by necessity rests principally on the inference that parties did not intend to leave land unusable, so necessity itself supplies the inference of intent. An easement based on prior use instead rests on evidence that the parties likely intended an existing, apparently permanent arrangement to continue after severance.
For an easement implied from prior use, Illinois requires common ownership followed by severance; a pre-severance use by one portion of the property for the benefit of another that was apparent, continuous, and permanent; and a use necessary and beneficial to enjoyment of the retained or conveyed parcel. The necessity inquiry is flexible because strong evidence of an obvious and established prior use itself strengthens the inference of intent.
The Court adopted the principle that the stronger and more pronounced the apparent, continuous preexisting use, the less demanding the required showing of necessity. Thus, a use may qualify when it is reasonably convenient or important to fair and beneficial enjoyment of the land, even if alternatives are theoretically possible.
Issue #3
Whether Granite established an implied easement over parcel B for access to the rear of the shopping center.
Holding
Yes. Granite proved an implied easement for the shopping-center driveway.
Reasoning
Before Granite conveyed parcel B, the driveway along the boundary of parcels A and B had long been used as part of the delivery route behind the shopping center. Its gravel or rock surface made the use permanent and readily apparent, and Manns admitted that he saw the driveway before buying the property. Those facts strongly supported an inference that the parties conveyed parcel B with the established circulation pattern in mind.
The driveway was also sufficiently important to the shopping center’s beneficial use. Delivery trucks, including semitrailers, regularly supplied the stores through rear entrances. The limited fifty-foot area behind the center made turning around difficult, and at times impossible when several trucks were present. The long-standing practice was for trucks to circle the center by using driveways on both sides.
The possibility of front-door deliveries or requiring trucks to reverse their route did not defeat the easement. The evidence showed that front deliveries would be disruptive and impractical for large palletized goods, while reversing or turning trucks behind the center was difficult and sometimes impossible. Granite did not have to prove the precise cost of every possible reconstruction or alternative route when the existing, visible use was so well established and important.
Issue #4
Whether Granite established an implied easement over parcel B for access to the apartment complex’s rear parking lot.
Holding
Yes. Granite proved an implied easement for the apartment-complex driveway.
Reasoning
The driveway across the southwestern portion of parcel B had provided the apartment complex’s only access to its rear parking lot for more than fifteen years before the severance. It was physically apparent to the Mannses, existed as part of the developed layout of the complex, and was continuously used while the parcels remained under common ownership.
The evidence supported the finding that continued use was reasonably necessary and highly convenient to the complex’s enjoyment. The spaces between the apartment buildings could not safely and practically accommodate a new driveway to the rear lot because of the buildings’ layout and basement-apartment stairways. Constructing a front parking area would yield only about thirty spaces, far fewer than the existing seventy-two spaces serving the thirty-six-unit complex.
Because the driveway was a visible and longstanding feature that supplied the only functional access to the existing parking lot, the trial court properly found an implied easement. The Supreme Court therefore upheld that determination as well.