Caseflicks

Court of Appeals of Maryland • 1985

Young v. State

493 A.2d 352 | 303 Md. 298 | 1985 Md. LEXIS 607

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Takeaway

In short, this case adopted Maryland’s substantial-step test for criminal attempt and held that an armed, disguised suspect who tried to enter a bank had crossed the line from preparation to attempted armed robbery.

Background

Police conducting surveillance after a series of bank robberies watched Raymond Young drive around and observe several banks in Prince George’s County. Young wore a police-band scanner and eventually parked behind the Fort Washington branch of the First National Bank of Southern Maryland. He then put on sunglasses, a knit cap, white gloves, and a black eyepatch, turned up his collar, and approached the bank with his right hand in the pocket containing a loaded revolver.

Young tried to open the bank’s front door shortly after the bank had closed. Finding it locked, he ran back to his car and drove away. Police stopped him almost immediately. They recovered the loaded handgun, disguise items, and scanner, and Young asked how much time a person could receive for attempted bank robbery.

A jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County convicted Young of attempted armed robbery and transporting a handgun. The court imposed a twenty-year sentence for the attempt and a consecutive three-year handgun sentence. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported per curiam opinion. The Court of Appeals granted review solely on whether the evidence legally sufficed to establish attempted armed robbery.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Maryland should define the act element of criminal attempt through a substantial-step test rather than the existing, general formulation requiring an overt act beyond mere preparation.

Holding

Yes. A person commits criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a crime, the person engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward that crime, and the conduct must strongly corroborate the person’s criminal intent.

Reasoning

Maryland’s common-law offense of attempt requires specific intent to commit a particular underlying crime and an act in furtherance of that intent that goes beyond mere preparation. Prior cases had established that failure to complete the intended crime is not an element, but they had not supplied a sufficiently precise standard for separating preparation from a punishable attempt.

The distinction matters because the law must protect individuals from punishment for criminal thoughts or preliminary planning while also allowing police to intervene before a planned crime is completed. Simply repeating that an act must be “beyond mere preparation” identifies the problem but does not tell courts, juries, or police where preparation ends and perpetration begins.

The Court considered the principal alternatives: proximity tests, which focus on how close the defendant came to completing the crime; the probable-desistance test, which asks whether an ordinary person with the same intent would likely have stopped; and the equivocality test, which requires conduct explainable only as commission of the offense. Each approach has practical and conceptual weaknesses, including excessive emphasis on the final steps of a criminal plan or difficulty applying the test across varied circumstances.

The Court adopted the substantial-step approach reflected in the Model Penal Code and Maryland’s proposed criminal code. Under that approach, conduct must be strongly corroborative of criminal purpose. Examples that may qualify include lying in wait, following or seeking a victim, unusual and alarming reconnaissance of the intended crime scene, unlawful entry, and possession of crime-related materials near the intended location when they serve no lawful purpose under the circumstances.

The new formulation preserves the rule that attempt is complete once the requisite substantial step has occurred. Thus, voluntary abandonment before a substantial step creates no attempt liability because no offense has yet been completed; abandonment after that point does not erase liability for the already completed attempt.

Issue #2

Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove that Young took a substantial step toward armed robbery and therefore committed attempted armed robbery.

Holding

Yes. Young’s conduct, especially his disguised and armed approach to the bank and his attempt to open its door, strongly corroborated an intent to commit armed robbery and constituted a substantial step beyond mere preparation.

Reasoning

The evidence supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Young specifically intended to commit armed robbery. Intent could properly be inferred from his methodical surveillance of banks, his police scanner, his disguise, gloves, concealed loaded revolver, efforts to conceal his identity, rapid retreat when he found the bank closed, and his later question about the penalty for attempted bank robbery.

Young’s conduct did not remain at the stage of abstract intent or remote preparation. Police saw him case banks, park behind the selected bank, disguise himself immediately before approaching it, conceal a loaded handgun in his pocket, and move toward the entrance while attempting to hide his face.

Most importantly, Young reached the bank’s front door and tried to enter. That act was a direct movement toward carrying out the planned armed robbery and strongly corroborated the criminal intent established by the surrounding circumstances. Even if all earlier conduct were treated as preparation, trying the door was itself a substantial step.

The door-trying conduct would satisfy not only the substantial-step test but also the more demanding proximity, probable-desistance, and equivocality approaches. A rational jury could therefore conclude that Young had committed attempted armed robbery, so the evidence was legally sufficient and the conviction was affirmed.