Takeaway
In short, this case strictly construes the Township Open Space Act: a township cannot evade the Act's protection for agricultural land by condemning only development rights, while a postjudgment request for condemnation-related fees remains within the trial court's jurisdiction during an appeal.
Libertyville Township brought a condemnation action under the Township Open Space Act to acquire a less-than-fee interest in a 46.073-acre parcel held in trust for Mario and Blanche Egidi. The Township characterized the interest as a conservation easement that would eliminate future development rights while leaving the existing agricultural use intact. It sought the easement as part of an open-space plan approved by referendum, asserting scenic, environmental, and rural-preservation benefits.
The parties stipulated that the underlying fee qualified for farmland assessment and would be exempt from condemnation under the Act. The Township did not stipulate that the future development rights themselves were used for farming or qualified for the agricultural exemption. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Act's farmland exemption protected both the fee and lesser interests in the property. It also concluded that land condemned under the Act had to consist of at least 50 acres.
After the Township appealed the dismissal, the landowners applied for attorney fees and costs under section 7-123(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The circuit court ruled that the pending appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to consider that request. The Township appealed the dismissal, and the landowners cross-appealed the jurisdictional ruling.
Issue #1
Whether the circuit court misunderstood the parties' stipulation by treating the proposed conservation easement itself as farmland.
Holding
No. Although the trial judge described the stipulation imprecisely, the record showed that he understood the Township's position.
Reasoning
The Township consistently maintained that the stipulation covered only the underlying fee interest: the land was presently used for farming and qualified for farmland assessment. It did not concede that the separately identified future development rights were themselves being used for agriculture.
Read in context, the trial judge recognized that distinction. His ruling did not rest on a mistaken belief that the Township had stipulated that the development rights independently qualified for the agricultural exemption; instead, it rested on his legal interpretation that the exemption applied to the land and all interests in it.
Issue #2
Whether the Township Open Space Act authorizes a township to condemn a conservation easement that eliminates development rights in land currently used for farming or agricultural purposes.
Holding
No. The Act exempts agricultural land, including lesser rights or interests in that land, from condemnation.
Reasoning
A governmental body possesses eminent-domain authority only to the extent the legislature has granted it, and courts strictly construe grants of that power in favor of protecting private property. Thus, the Township needed clear statutory authority to condemn the proposed conservation easement on farmland.
Section 4.02 permits acquisition of the fee or a lesser interest in open land, but excludes from condemnation real estate qualifying for agricultural or farming use. The court read the phrase describing real estate "used for farming or agricultural purposes" as identifying the exempt land, not as requiring each separate property interest to be presently used for farming.
The Township's contrary reading would allow it to bypass the farmland exemption simply by condemning a lesser interest, such as future development rights, rather than the fee. Nothing in the statutory language expressly authorizes that result, and strict construction of eminent-domain legislation foreclosed implying such authority.
The legislative history reinforced this reading. The relevant amendment was adopted because legislators believed the bill's condemnation power was too broad and sought to shield active farms from it. The debates contained no indication that the legislature intended to permit condemnation of lesser interests in protected farmland.
Issue #3
Whether the Act requires a township to condemn open land in units of at least 50 acres.
Holding
The court did not decide the issue because the agricultural-land exemption independently required dismissal of the condemnation complaint.
Reasoning
The circuit court had ruled that the parcel to be condemned had to contain at least 50 acres. But once the appellate court affirmed dismissal on the ground that the property was exempt agricultural land, resolving the separate acreage question could not affect the outcome.
Accordingly, the court left unresolved whether the Act's definition of open land or open space requires a condemned parcel itself to be at least 50 acres, or permits the parcel to be counted together with surrounding open land.
Issue #4
Whether the Township's notice of appeal deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction to decide the landowners' application for attorney fees and costs under section 7-123(a).
Holding
No. The fee-and-cost application was a collateral matter that the circuit court retained jurisdiction to hear despite the pending appeal.
Reasoning
The landowners' application was not a posttrial motion attacking the judgment. It therefore did not nullify the Township's notice of appeal under the rules governing postjudgment motions.
Ordinarily, a notice of appeal divests the circuit court of jurisdiction over the judgment being appealed. But the court retains authority over matters collateral or supplemental to that judgment, including matters that arise after judgment and lie outside the issues on appeal.
A section 7-123(a) request for fees and costs can be made only after a final judgment determines that the condemning plaintiff cannot acquire the property. The request concerns litigation expenses rather than the merits of the condemnation judgment, and the statute supplies no deadline requiring it to be resolved before an appeal.
Because the fee request was collateral to the merits judgment, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to consider it. The appellate court therefore reversed the order refusing to hear the application and remanded for a determination of fees and costs.