Whether OneBeacon established mutual mistake sufficient under Massachusetts law to reform an unambiguous insurance policy.
Holding
Yes. The undisputed evidence fully, clearly, and decisively showed that OneBeacon and LAI intended to cover long-term lessees only when they applied for and were approved for coverage under the OneBeacon program.
Reasoning
Massachusetts permits reformation when a writing fails to express the actual agreement of both contracting parties because of their mutual mistake about the writing’s contents or effect. Reformation does not interpret an agreement; it changes the writing to conform to the parties’ intended agreement. Thus, even unambiguous policy language does not bar consideration of extrinsic evidence, and the parol-evidence rule does not restrict that inquiry.
The relevant distinction is between a mistaken writing and a mistaken bargain. Reformation may correct a document that inaccurately states the parties’ intended terms, but it may not repair an agreement that accurately states the intended terms but rests on an erroneous factual assumption. OneBeacon claimed the former: that boilerplate language extended coverage beyond what both OneBeacon and LAI intended to provide.
LAI’s lease documents strongly demonstrated that LAI meant to shift liability-insurance responsibility to its long-term lessees. The standard lease required each lessee, at its own cost, to maintain specified liability insurance and to name LAI as an additional insured. The separate insurance supplement showed that LAI would provide coverage only for specifically identified vehicles, with the lessee paying the premium through increased rent.
Affidavits from the insurance broker’s vice chairman and OneBeacon’s underwriter confirmed the operating arrangement reflected in the lease forms. A lessee had to submit driver and vehicle information, undergo underwriting, receive approval, and be included on monthly reports before coverage was provided under the OneBeacon policy. Capform did none of those things, and it paid no OneBeacon premium.
Travelers offered no contrary evidence about OneBeacon’s or LAI’s intent. Because it had jointly represented that no material factual dispute required trial, Travelers could challenge the weight of OneBeacon’s evidence but could not create a factual dispute simply by attacking the affiants’ credibility or knowledge. The affiants’ roles gave them adequate personal knowledge, and their testimony was corroborated by the lease forms and insurance procedures.
LAI’s approved agreement for judgment was also relevant evidence of its understanding of the insurance arrangement. Travelers was not bound by that agreement, but LAI was bound by its own representations. Those representations, together with the documentary evidence, supported the conclusion that neither contracting party intended automatic coverage for every long-term lessee.
The court rejected the district court’s view that reformation required OneBeacon to identify a particular accidental clause, endorsement, or scrivener’s error. A transcription error is a classic basis for reformation, but it is not a prerequisite. Mutual mistake may arise through the parties’ inadvertence, including the failure to include limiting language needed to reflect their shared agreement.