Caseflicks

Appellate Court of Illinois • 2000

Emanuel v. Hernandez

728 N.E.2d 1249 | 313 Ill. App. 3d 192 | 245 Ill. Dec. 892 | 2000 Ill. App. LEXIS 297

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that an implied easement must be grounded in the parties' circumstances and presumed intent at the severance of title; later convenience or necessity alone is not enough.

Background

Wayne and Katherine Emanuel owned 920 Pearl Street in Belvidere, immediately south of Jose and Lisa Hernandez's property at 914 Pearl Street. A driveway ran along the boundary between the lots, but most of it lay on the Hernandezes' land. The driveway provided the only vehicular route to the garage at the rear of the Emanuels' house. After the Hernandezes blocked the driveway with railroad ties and began constructing a boundary fence, the Emanuels sought declaratory relief.

The Emanuels alleged an easement by prescription in count I and an easement by implication in count II. On count II, they submitted evidence that the driveway had long served both residences, that prior owners shared maintenance costs, and that the garage could not be reached by car without crossing the Hernandezes' land. Chain-of-title evidence showed that common ownership of the two parcels ended in 1890. The evidence did not show that a driveway, garage, or comparable use existed at that time.

The trial court granted the Emanuels summary judgment on count II. Relying on Deem v. Cheeseman, it held that severance of title plus current necessity or substantial benefit was enough to establish an implied easement, even without proof of a pre-severance use or landlocked property. The Hernandezes appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Emanuels established an easement by necessity over the Hernandezes' portion of the driveway.

Holding

No. The Emanuels did not prove an easement by necessity because their property was not landlocked when the common ownership was severed in 1890.

Reasoning

An easement by necessity may arise when a common owner conveys or retains an interior parcel that is left entirely surrounded by the grantor's remaining land or by land of strangers. The doctrine rests on the presumed intent of the parties at the moment title is severed, not on later convenience or hardship.

Nothing in the record suggested that the parcel now owned by the Emanuels lost access to Pearl Street when Benjamin Brock conveyed it in 1890. Because the property retained frontage on a public road, the severance did not leave it landlocked. The later need for driveway access to a garage could not supply the required necessity at the time of severance.

Issue #2

Whether the Emanuels established an easement implied from a preexisting use.

Holding

No. They failed to produce evidence that, before the 1890 severance, the common owner made an apparent, continuous, and permanent use of one parcel for the benefit of the other.

Reasoning

An easement implied from preexisting use requires three elements: common ownership followed by severance; a pre-severance use by the common owner that was apparent, obvious, continuous, and permanent; and necessity and benefit to the enjoyment of the conveyed or retained parcel. These elements matter because an implied easement is an effort to infer the parties' unexpressed intent at the conveyance that divided title.

The Emanuels proved common ownership and severance, and their evidence showed that the driveway was useful to the modern use of their garage. But they offered no direct or circumstantial evidence that the driveway, garage, or a comparable arrangement existed in 1890, or that Brock used what became the retained parcel to benefit the conveyed parcel before the conveyance.

The available historical evidence tended against the claimed inference. The garage did not appear to have existed until at least the 1920s, and automobile access would not likely have been necessary in 1890. Thus, there was no basis to infer that Brock intended to grant Bassett, the 1890 grantee, a continuing right to cross Brock's remaining land.

Issue #3

Whether present-day necessity, together with severance of title, can establish an implied easement without proof of a preexisting use or the strict necessity required for an easement by necessity.

Holding

No. Present-day necessity cannot create an implied easement that did not arise when title was severed; to the extent Deem v. Cheeseman suggested otherwise, it was unsound and would not be followed.

Reasoning

The trial court read Deem to allow an easement based merely on severance of common title and a current need to use the claimed route without disproportionate effort or expense. That reading improperly eliminates the preexisting-use element from the established three-part test for an easement implied from prior use.

The controlling principle is that an implied easement, if it exists, arises at the instant common ownership ends. Later changes in the property's use, even changes that make an easement highly desirable, cannot retrospectively establish an intent that the parties to the earlier conveyance did not demonstrate through the circumstances existing at that time.

The court concluded that Deem's discussion of Miller v. Schmitz mistakenly treated language about necessity as permitting an easement without prior use. Properly understood, necessity can support an easement without prior use only where the circumstances at severance establish a true easement by necessity, such as where the severance landlocks the property.

The Restatement likewise focuses on the circumstances of the conveyance. Its reference to an easement based on necessity alone means necessity existing when title is severed, not a present-day need arising decades later. Because the Emanuels relied on current conditions rather than conditions in 1890, they were not entitled to summary judgment.