Whether a purchaser of Torrens property who has actual knowledge of a prior unregistered interest may qualify as a good-faith purchaser under Minn. Stat. § 508.25.
Holding
No. A purchaser with actual knowledge of a prior unregistered interest is not a good-faith purchaser under section 508.25.
Reasoning
The Torrens Act generally makes registration with the registrar of titles the operative act that conveys or affects registered land. Thus, M & I's mortgage and foreclosure documents did not become registered encumbrances merely because they were filed with the county recorder. But that conclusion did not end the case, because section 508.25 protects only a subsequent purchaser who receives a certificate of title both in good faith and for valuable consideration.
The Court gave independent force to the statutory phrase "in good faith." Reading the statute to disregard actual knowledge would render that requirement meaningless. Although the legislature did not define good faith, the Court concluded that Minnesota precedent had long understood the term to include a notice or knowledge component.
In In re Juran, the Court had stated that the Torrens system eliminates constructive notice from unregistered instruments but does not eliminate the legal effect of actual notice. That statement was part of Juran's operative reasoning, not dicta: actual notice determined the priority of the later-registered judgment in that case. Later Minnesota cases and real-estate practice had continued to accept Juran's rule that actual knowledge of an unregistered interest defeats good-faith purchaser status.
Collier had actual knowledge in the strongest sense. He learned of M & I's foreclosure through the sheriff's published notice, personally approached M & I to purchase its interest, and then purchased from Conley only after discovering M & I had failed to register its documents. He therefore knew of M & I's prior claimed interest when he acquired and registered his own deed.
The Court declined to overturn Juran under stare decisis. No compelling reason justified abandoning a rule that Minnesota courts and Torrens practitioners had relied upon for decades. Applying that rule also prevents a purchaser from deliberately exploiting a known gap between a transaction and its registration to obtain priority.