Whether Falconer's post-agreement boilerplate limitation on consequential damages became part of the parties' contract under U.C.C. § 2-207.
Holding
No. Although AGM could not establish surprise, the limitation materially altered the oral agreement because it would impose substantial economic hardship on AGM without its express assent.
Reasoning
Under U.C.C. § 2-715, a buyer may recover consequential losses resulting from needs of which the seller had reason to know at contracting, so long as the losses could not reasonably be avoided. When AGM and Falconer made their oral agreement, Falconer knew or had reason to know that defective glass could delay AGM's time-sensitive construction work and cause substantial added expense. Because the parties did not initially agree to exclude consequential damages, AGM began with the Code's default right to seek them.
Falconer's next-day confirmation introduced an additional term: replacement as the exclusive remedy and an exclusion of consequential damages. Because both parties were merchants, § 2-207(2) would ordinarily incorporate that additional term unless it materially altered the prior agreement. A term materially alters an agreement when its inclusion without the other party's express awareness would result in surprise or hardship.
The court treated surprise and hardship as distinct inquiries, following Trans-Aire International. On surprise, AGM showed that it did not actually know the content of Falconer's fine print. But the evidence also showed that commercial-glass suppliers routinely used restrictive terms on their forms and that AGM knew suppliers commonly placed terms and conditions on their form backs. The court therefore concluded that AGM should have anticipated an attempted limitation of consequential damages and had not proved surprise.
Hardship led to the opposite conclusion. The limitation would shift a substantial foreseeable economic risk from Falconer to AGM: AGM could incur thousands of dollars in labor, removal, reinstallation, and delay-related costs if Falconer's glass was defective. Falconer had every opportunity to negotiate that allocation of risk when the contract was made, but instead attempted to accomplish it through inconspicuous boilerplate sent after the parties' oral agreement.
A boilerplate clause cannot, through § 2-207 alone, transfer a major legal and economic burden to a nonassenting party. Because Falconer's limitation would impose substantial economic hardship on AGM, it materially altered the agreement and did not become a contractual term. Falconer therefore remained liable for consequential damages proximately caused by its defective product, notwithstanding its good-faith efforts to provide replacements.