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Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama • 1989

Cains v. State

555 So. 2d 290

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Takeaway

In short, this case upholds a brief, uniformly applied DUI checkpoint and confirms that visible signs of intoxication can justify further detention, while a failed sobriety test can supply probable cause for arrest and chemical testing.

Background

Clayton Cains was stopped at a State Trooper roadblock on Alabama Highway 59. Troopers had established the checkpoint, with supervisory approval, to check drivers’ licenses, equipment violations, DUI offenses, and other legal violations. They stopped every vehicle in both directions, briefly checked each driver’s license, and allowed motorists without apparent problems to proceed.

When Trooper McGlothlin asked Cains for his license, he observed extremely bloodshot eyes, sluggish behavior, and signs of intoxication. McGlothlin directed Cains to pull aside for further investigation. After seeing Cains stagger while walking to a patrol car and noticing a strong alcohol odor, thick speech, and difficulty understanding him, the trooper administered an alco-sensor field test. Cains failed the test, was arrested for DUI, and was taken to police headquarters. An Intoxilyzer 5000 test reported a blood-alcohol concentration of .20%.

Cains was convicted of driving under the influence under § 32-5A-191(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975, and fined $500. He appealed, arguing that he was illegally arrested when diverted from the traffic line and that the State had not laid a proper foundation for admission of the Intoxilyzer result.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the initial stop of Cains’s vehicle at the roadblock was a reasonable Fourth Amendment seizure.

Holding

Yes. The checkpoint was constitutionally reasonable because it was conducted under neutral, objective criteria, served the substantial public interest in highway safety, and imposed only a minimal intrusion on motorists.

Reasoning

A traffic stop and detention of a vehicle’s occupants are Fourth Amendment seizures. Ordinarily, an investigatory seizure requires individualized reasonable suspicion. A checkpoint is different because it necessarily stops motorists without individualized suspicion; therefore, its validity depends on whether it operates under a plan that meaningfully limits the discretion of officers in the field.

The court applied the balancing principles derived from Martinez-Fuerte, Delaware v. Prouse, Texas v. Brown, and Brown v. Texas. The public interest in detecting and removing impaired drivers from the highways is exceptionally strong. Drunk driving creates an obvious and serious danger to motorists and the public at large.

The checkpoint sufficiently advanced that public interest. Troopers selected the area because they had experienced problems there, and the location—a well-traveled route north of the beach at the end of a spring weekend—reasonably suggested that impaired drivers might be present. The State did not need statistical proof of the number of DUI arrests produced by the checkpoint; removing even one impaired driver and deterring others could advance highway safety.

The intrusion on ordinary motorists was slight. Every vehicle in both lanes was stopped, each driver was asked for a license, and drivers without apparent problems were released within approximately five to ten seconds. Because the procedure applied uniformly to all vehicles, it avoided the standardless, selective discretion that made random roving-patrol stops unconstitutional in Prouse.

Although field officers selected the checkpoint’s site, time, and duration, they obtained their supervisor’s approval, and the supervisor later inspected the operation. More importantly, the officers’ discretion in carrying out the stop was constrained by the neutral rule that every approaching vehicle would be stopped briefly. The court concluded that this was not a pretextual or arbitrary roadblock.

Issue #2

Whether directing Cains to the side of the road for further inquiry amounted to an arrest without probable cause.

Holding

No. The diversion to secondary inspection was a lawful Terry-type investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion; probable cause to arrest arose after additional observations and Cains’s failed field sobriety test.

Reasoning

Trooper McGlothlin’s initial observations gave him specific, articulable grounds to suspect that Cains was driving under the influence. Cains had extremely bloodshot eyes, appeared sluggish, and looked intoxicated during the brief license check. Those facts justified a limited further detention under Terry v. Ohio and § 15-5-30 of the Alabama Code.

The secondary inquiry did not itself constitute an arrest. The trooper merely asked Cains to pull aside, leave his car, and walk to a nearby patrol car so the officer could investigate the signs of impairment observed during the checkpoint stop.

The officer’s subsequent observations strengthened the basis for arrest. Cains staggered while walking, was unsteady on his feet, smelled strongly of alcohol, spoke thickly, and was difficult to understand. When he also failed the alco-sensor field sobriety test, the trooper had probable cause to arrest him for DUI and transport him for chemical testing.

Issue #3

Whether the State had to prove, apart from the chemical-test result, that Cains’s alcohol consumption impaired his ability to drive safely under § 32-5A-191(a)(2).

Holding

No. Because Cains’s blood-alcohol test showed .20%, the State could rely on the statutory presumption of intoxication; the rule discussed in Buckner for cases without a blood-alcohol test did not govern this case.

Reasoning

The court distinguished Buckner v. City of Huntsville, which held that when no blood-alcohol test is given in a prosecution under § 32-5A-191(a)(2), the State must prove that the accused was under the influence to the extent that alcohol affected safe operation of the vehicle.

Here, however, the Intoxilyzer test showed a .20% blood-alcohol concentration. The State relied on the statutory presumption in § 32-5A-194(b)(3) to establish that Cains was under the influence, making the no-test rule from Buckner inapplicable.

Issue #4

Whether the State established the required predicate for admitting Cains’s Intoxilyzer 5000 test result.

Holding

Yes. Trooper McGlothlin’s testimony established the required predicate, and Cains’s general objection did not identify any specific deficiency.

Reasoning

Under Bush v. City of Troy, the State must show that the law-enforcement agency adopted the particular testing method used, that the test was performed according to State Board of Health-approved methods, and that the test administrator possessed a valid State Board of Health permit.

McGlothlin’s testimony supplied those elements. It established that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was the adopted test, that he followed the applicable approved procedures in administering it, and that he was authorized by a valid permit to conduct the test.

Cains objected only on the general ground that the State had failed to lay a proper predicate. Because a predicate had in fact been laid, a nonspecific objection was insufficient. A specific objection would have alerted the State to any claimed defect and permitted it to cure the problem at trial.