Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2010

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

558 U.S. 310 | 130 S. Ct. 876 | 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 | 2010 U.S. LEXIS 766 | 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 73 | 78 U.S.L.W. 4078

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Takeaway

In short, Citizens United held that the First Amendment bars bans on independent political expenditures by corporations and unions, while allowing disclosure and disclaimer rules that inform voters about who is funding election-related speech.

Background

Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation funded primarily by individual donations but also by some for-profit corporate contributions, produced Hillary: The Movie, a 90-minute film sharply critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton during the 2008 Democratic presidential primary. It planned to make the film available through cable video-on-demand within 30 days of primary elections and to run television advertisements promoting the film.

Federal law, as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), barred corporations and unions from using general-treasury funds for independent expenditures expressly advocating a candidate's election or defeat and for certain electioneering communications close to elections. Corporations could instead finance such speech through a separate segregated fund, or PAC. BCRA also required disclaimers on certain televised communications and disclosures of electioneering expenditures and contributors.

Fearing civil and criminal penalties, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia denied a preliminary injunction and granted summary judgment to the FEC. It held that Hillary was the functional equivalent of express advocacy against Clinton and that the expenditure restriction and BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer provisions were constitutional under McConnell v. FEC. The Supreme Court reversed as to the corporate-expenditure restriction but affirmed as to disclosure and disclaimer requirements.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether BCRA's corporate-funding restriction covered Hillary's planned video-on-demand distribution.

Holding

Yes. Hillary qualified as an electioneering communication under the statute and regulations.

Reasoning

The planned video-on-demand transmission was a cable communication that referred to a clearly identified federal candidate and would occur within 30 days of a primary. The fact that viewers selected the film individually did not take it outside the regulation's definition of public distribution.

The relevant question was whether the cable system could reach 50,000 or more people in a State holding a primary, not whether 50,000 people would request or watch a particular transmission. Because the proposed system had tens of millions of subscribers, Hillary was capable of reaching the required audience.

The Court rejected an interpretation requiring a speaker to predict how many eligible voters would actually view the communication. A rule requiring demographic research, legal advice, or advance litigation before speaking on political issues would itself chill protected speech.

Issue #2

Whether Hillary was the functional equivalent of express advocacy under Wisconsin Right to Life.

Holding

Yes. The film was susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton.

Reasoning

Under the controlling test from Wisconsin Right to Life, a communication is the functional equivalent of express advocacy when it can reasonably be understood only as an appeal to vote for or against a particular candidate.

Although Citizens United characterized Hillary as a documentary, the Court viewed its sustained focus on Clinton's character, fitness for office, and prospective presidency as a feature-length negative campaign advertisement. Its narrative and closing message urged viewers to consider why Clinton should not become President.

Issue #3

Whether the Court could resolve the case on narrower statutory or as-applied grounds without reconsidering Austin and McConnell.

Holding

No. The narrower alternatives did not provide a sound resolution, and the Court could consider the constitutionality of the corporate-expenditure prohibition despite Citizens United's earlier dismissal of a facial count.

Reasoning

The Court declined to distinguish among media or technologies, such as conventional television and video-on-demand. Judicial efforts to decide which delivery systems pose sufficient political danger would require unstable, technology-dependent lines and extensive litigation that would chill speech during time-sensitive campaigns.

The Court also rejected an expanded nonprofit exemption. Citizens United did not qualify for the existing Massachusetts Citizens for Life exemption because it accepted corporate funds, and the Government's proposed de minimis approach would require case-by-case determinations while leaving speakers uncertain whether their speech was criminally prohibited.

Citizens United had preserved its First Amendment claim, and the District Court had passed on the facial validity of the statute under then-controlling precedent. The Court concluded that the facial and as-applied labels did not prevent it from granting the broader relief necessary to decide the preserved constitutional claim.

The Court emphasized that the statutory scheme's complexity, potential criminal sanctions, and need for rapid campaign speech created a substantial nationwide chilling effect. In those circumstances, postponing the central constitutional question would prolong uncertainty rather than reflect judicial restraint.

Issue #4

Whether the Government may prohibit corporations and unions from using general-treasury funds for independent political expenditures.

Holding

No. The prohibition violated the First Amendment; the Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the portion of McConnell v. FEC that upheld BCRA's corporate electioneering-communication restriction.

Reasoning

The Court characterized the prohibition as a direct ban on core political speech backed by criminal penalties. The PAC option did not eliminate the burden because a PAC is a separate entity subject to substantial organizational, reporting, and administrative requirements and may not be available in time for a current campaign.

Political speech receives the fullest First Amendment protection. The Court reaffirmed the principle from Buckley and Bellotti that the Government generally may not suppress political speech because of the speaker's identity, including the speaker's corporate form.

Austin's antidistortion rationale—that corporate wealth could distort the political marketplace—was incompatible with Buckley's rejection of governmental equalization of speakers' relative influence. The State may not restrict speech simply because the speaker accumulated resources through the corporate form or is thought to have a powerful voice.

The Government's asserted anticorruption interest did not justify the ban. The Court limited the relevant corruption interest to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance and concluded that truly independent expenditures, unlike direct contributions coordinated with candidates, do not create that danger. Influence, access, and political responsiveness were not corruption.

The shareholder-protection rationale also failed. The statute was underinclusive because it regulated only some corporate communications at certain times, and overinclusive because it covered nonprofits and single-shareholder corporations. The Court concluded that shareholder concerns could be addressed through corporate governance rather than censorship of political speech.

Stare decisis did not require retaining Austin. The Court held that Austin was poorly reasoned, conflicted with Buckley and Bellotti, had produced a difficult and unstable doctrine, and created no substantial reliance interests because it had restricted rather than enabled political expenditures.

Issue #5

Whether BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure requirements were constitutional as applied to the advertisements for Hillary and to the video-on-demand film itself.

Holding

Yes. The requirements were constitutional as applied.

Reasoning

Disclaimer and disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, requiring a substantial relation to a sufficiently important governmental interest. Unlike an expenditure ban, they do not impose a ceiling on speech or prevent a speaker from communicating.

The Government's informational interest was sufficient. Identifying who funds communications mentioning a candidate shortly before an election helps voters evaluate the message, prevents confusion over whether a candidate or party authorized it, and permits citizens and shareholders to hold speakers and officials accountable.

The Court rejected Citizens United's argument that disclosure must be limited to express advocacy or its functional equivalent. Disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to banning speech, and precedent permits it for election-related communications even when the underlying speech cannot be prohibited.

Citizens United had not shown a reasonable probability that disclosure would expose its contributors to threats, harassment, or reprisals. It had disclosed donors for years without identifying such harm. The same analysis sustained application of the requirements to both the promotional ads and the film.

Concurrences

Chief Justice Roberts

Reasoning

Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court's opinion in full but wrote to defend its approach to judicial restraint. In his view, the Court first considered and correctly rejected each narrower statutory and constitutional ground before reaching the broader challenge to Austin. Judicial restraint requires adopting a narrow ground only when that ground is legally correct; it does not permit a court to accept an unsound argument merely to avoid a constitutional question.

He also explained why stare decisis did not preserve Austin. Austin had departed from Buckley and Bellotti, remained deeply contested, threatened broader First Amendment doctrine, and was defended by the Government on new rationales rather than on its own antidistortion reasoning. Stare decisis preserves established reasoning and law; it does not require the Court to invent new justifications for an earlier constitutional error.

Justice Scalia

Reasoning

Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion and responded to the dissent's originalist argument. He maintained that the First Amendment protects “speech,” not only certain favored speakers, and its text contains no exception for corporations or other associations.

In his view, the relevant constitutional right belongs to individuals acting together as well as individuals speaking alone. The historical record showed that corporations and voluntary associations petitioned government and participated in public debate; the dissent offered no evidence that their speech was understood to fall outside the First Amendment.

He further rejected the suggestion that corporations' legal status deprives them of speech rights. An authorized corporate spokesperson is a person speaking for an association of persons, much as a spokesperson for a political party speaks for its members. A documentary critical of a presidential candidate remains core political speech regardless of its corporate funding.

Justice Thomas

Reasoning

Justice Thomas joined the Court's invalidation of the corporate-expenditure restriction. He agreed that BCRA § 203 was incompatible with robust First Amendment protection for political speech and that the Court properly overruled the contrary precedent.

Dissents

Justice Stevens

Reasoning

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, agreed that the disclosure provisions were valid but dissented from the invalidation of the corporate-expenditure limits. He argued that Citizens United could have used its PAC to finance the film and therefore had not been silenced; the case concerned the source of funds for electioneering during a limited pre-election period, not a complete ban on corporate speech.

He maintained that the Court improperly converted an as-applied challenge into a facial challenge after Citizens United had dismissed its facial claim. In his view, the Court should have resolved the case through a narrower statutory interpretation, an expanded nonprofit exemption, or an ordinary as-applied ruling rather than overturning Austin and McConnell without a developed factual record.

Justice Stevens argued that corporations differ materially from natural persons in elections. They cannot vote or hold office; may be controlled by foreign interests; enjoy perpetual life, limited liability, and special capacity to aggregate wealth; and often pursue economic rather than political objectives. Those features, he argued, allow legislatures to regulate corporate electoral spending more carefully without treating corporations as second-class speakers.

He rejected the majority's narrow definition of corruption. In his view, corruption includes not only explicit quid pro quo bargains but also undue influence, access, dependency, and public perceptions that officeholders are responsive to large financial supporters rather than constituents. The congressional record supporting BCRA showed that corporate electioneering could generate precisely those political debts and appearances.

He defended Austin's antidistortion rationale as an anticorruption and democracy-protecting measure, not as an unconstitutional effort to equalize voices. Corporate general-treasury funds may reflect commercial success rather than public support for political ideas, and unregulated spending can drown out other voices, foster cynicism, and impair voters' confidence in self-government.

He also emphasized shareholder protection. General-treasury election spending can use shareholders' investments to advance political views they reject. PACs protect both willing supporters and dissenters by tying election expenditures to voluntary political contributions, while ordinary corporate-governance remedies are often too weak or impractical to protect individual investors.

Justice Thomas

Reasoning

Justice Thomas dissented from the Court's decision to uphold BCRA's disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting requirements. He concluded that mandatory disclosure burdens the First Amendment right to anonymous political speech and that the Government's general informational interest was insufficient to justify that burden.

He relied on evidence that publicly disclosed donors to controversial ballot measures and political causes had faced threats, harassment, property damage, professional consequences, and retaliation by private actors and public officials. In his view, those risks were not speculative and demonstrated that disclosure can deter political participation.

Justice Thomas found the majority's reliance on future as-applied challenges unpersuasive. Speakers should not have to disclose first, suffer retaliation, and then litigate for protection; the same concern about chilling speech that justified facial invalidation of the expenditure ban, he reasoned, should have led the Court to invalidate the disclosure provisions as well.