Padilla v. Kentucky

The Kentucky court relied on the distinction between direct and collateral consequences of a conviction. But the Supreme Court had never used that distinction to define the constitutional scope of reasonable professional assistance under Strickland. The Court found the distinction particularly unsuitable for deportation claims.

Although removal proceedings are formally civil, deportation is tightly connected to the criminal process. For nearly a century, criminal convictions have triggered immigration consequences, and modern immigration law makes removal nearly automatic for many noncitizens convicted of specified offenses.

Deportation is an especially severe consequence—often the equivalent of banishment or exile—and may matter more to a noncitizen defendant than the prison sentence. The Court therefore treated deportation as an integral part, and sometimes the most important part, of the penalty flowing from a guilty plea to a deportable offense.

Strickland measures deficient performance against an objective standard of reasonableness informed by prevailing professional norms. Professional standards from defender organizations, bar associations, and criminal-practice authorities supported a duty to advise noncitizen clients about deportation risks before a guilty plea.

Padilla's case was straightforward. The immigration statute expressly made a noncitizen deportable for a controlled-substance conviction, except for a narrow exception involving a single small possession offense. Counsel could determine the consequence by reading the statute, yet allegedly assured Padilla that his long residence in the United States meant he need not worry about immigration status.

The Court recognized that immigration law is often complex and that criminal defense lawyers are not necessarily immigration specialists. Accordingly, when the consequence is uncertain, counsel need only advise that a pending charge may carry adverse immigration consequences. But when removal is truly clear, as it was for Padilla's plea, the duty to provide accurate advice is equally clear.

The Court rejected the Solicitor General's proposed rule that only affirmative misadvice could support a Sixth Amendment claim. Under Strickland, courts assess identified acts or omissions against the range of professionally competent assistance, and there is no relevant distinction here between misleading advice and silence.

A rule protecting only against misadvice would create perverse incentives. Lawyers who knew a plea could cause removal would have an incentive to say nothing rather than give their clients readily available, crucial information about the advantages and disadvantages of pleading guilty.

The Court also stressed that defendants least able to discover immigration consequences on their own would be denied basic advice. A lawyer's duty in plea negotiations includes providing available advice on a consequence as serious as deportation.

Strickland requires both deficient performance and prejudice: a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, the result would have been different. In the plea context, Padilla had to show that rejecting the plea and proceeding to trial would have been rational under the circumstances.

The Court held only that, accepting Padilla's allegations as true, he adequately alleged deficient performance. Because the Kentucky Supreme Court had rejected the claim categorically and had not addressed prejudice, the Supreme Court left that issue for the state courts in the first instance.

The Court rejected the fear that recognizing this duty would destabilize guilty pleas. Strickland's prejudice requirement is demanding, defendants who undo pleas risk losing the benefit of their bargains, and informed discussion of immigration effects can improve plea negotiations by allowing the parties to seek dispositions that satisfy criminal-justice interests without unnecessarily producing mandatory removal.