Caseflicks

Supreme Court of Iowa • 1999

State v. Schminkey

597 N.W.2d 785 | 1999 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 175

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that an Alford plea to vehicle theft requires record evidence supporting an intent permanently to deprive the owner; unauthorized use and a subsequent crash alone are not enough.

Background

After drinking at a party and a bar, William Schminkey drove a pickup truck belonging to Dale Kimm, a man he did not know and who had not given him permission to use it. Schminkey drove erratically and at high speed through an intersection in Van Horne, Iowa, striking two stopped vehicles. Jason Kray, the driver of one vehicle, died. Schminkey continued briefly and then crashed the pickup into a fence. His blood-alcohol level was .189.

The State charged Schminkey with vehicular homicide, involuntary manslaughter, and theft of a motor vehicle. Under a plea agreement, Schminkey entered Alford pleas to vehicular homicide and motor-vehicle theft; the State dismissed the manslaughter charge and agreed to recommend concurrent sentences. The district court found a factual basis and accepted the pleas, then imposed consecutive ten-year and five-year prison terms.

On appeal, Schminkey argued that counsel was ineffective for permitting a plea to theft without a factual basis for an intent permanently to deprive the owner of the truck. He also argued that counsel failed to object when the prosecutor did not expressly recommend concurrent sentences. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Iowa Supreme Court granted further review.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether trial counsel was ineffective for allowing Schminkey to enter an Alford plea to motor-vehicle theft when the plea record did not establish an intent permanently to deprive the owner of the truck.

Holding

Yes. The record lacked a factual basis for the intent element of theft, so counsel breached an essential duty by allowing the plea; prejudice was inherent.

Reasoning

A district court may not accept a guilty plea unless it first determines that the plea has a factual basis. That requirement applies equally to an Alford plea, even though the defendant does not admit committing the charged acts. When counsel permits a plea without a factual basis, counsel fails an essential duty, and prejudice is presumed.

The court examined the entire record available at the plea hearing: the defendant's statements, the prosecutor's factual statements, the minutes of testimony, and any presentence report. Here, Schminkey made no incriminating admissions because he entered an Alford plea, the prosecutor made no factual presentation, and no presentence report yet existed. The minutes of testimony were therefore the only meaningful source for a factual basis.

Theft under Iowa Code section 714.1(1) requires taking possession or control of another's property with the intent to deprive the owner of it. The required intent is an intent permanently to deprive the owner. Iowa's separate offense of operating a vehicle without the owner's consent expressly covers unauthorized use without an intent permanently to deprive, and is a lesser-included offense of theft.

Intent ordinarily may be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances because it is rarely proved directly. But the minutes showed only that Schminkey, after drinking, drove a truck without permission, drove recklessly, and crashed it shortly afterward. Those facts did not support an inference that he meant to keep the truck permanently rather than use it temporarily to travel home or to another bar.

The mere unauthorized taking of a vehicle does not, standing alone, establish an intent permanently to deprive its owner. The court relied on Iowa decisions requiring evidence directed to the defendant's intent, and distinguished cases involving possession of recently stolen property because those cases did not actually confront whether the defendant intended a permanent deprivation.

There was no evidence that Schminkey tried to conceal, sell, abandon, alter, or otherwise dispose of the truck in a way suggesting permanent deprivation. The crash itself did not establish the required intent because the record did not show that Schminkey deliberately wrecked the vehicle. Thus, the record could support unauthorized operation, but not the greater offense of theft.

Issue #2

What remedy applies when the plea record lacks a factual basis for theft but additional evidence might establish one.

Holding

The theft sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings, allowing the State an opportunity to supplement the record and establish a factual basis.

Reasoning

When the record establishes that a defendant was charged with the wrong crime, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the conviction and sentence and dismiss the charge. But when a factual basis may be capable of being shown through additional facts, the proper course is to vacate the sentence and remand so the State may attempt to establish the factual basis.

This case fell into the latter category. The minutes of testimony did not establish permanent-deprivation intent, but additional facts outside those minutes might do so. On remand, if the State cannot establish a factual basis for motor-vehicle theft, Schminkey's plea to that charge must be set aside.

Issue #3

Whether the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by failing expressly to recommend concurrent sentences, and whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object.

Holding

The court did not decide the issue because vacating the theft sentence made it unnecessary to reach it.

Reasoning

Because the theft sentence was vacated and the theft plea proceedings were remanded, the court found it unnecessary to resolve whether the prosecutor had breached the agreement at the original sentencing hearing. The court stated that, if a factual basis for theft is established on remand, the county attorney should expressly comply with the agreement by recommending concurrent sentences at any future sentencing hearing.

Dissents

Justice Carter

Reasoning

Justice Carter concluded that the minutes of testimony adequately established a factual basis for motor-vehicle theft. In his view, a guilty plea requires only enough evidence to establish a prima facie case—evidence sufficient to survive a directed-verdict motion—not strong proof of actual guilt. That standard is especially appropriate for an Alford plea and for intent, which ordinarily must be inferred rather than directly proved.

Under the traditional inference applied in theft cases, possession of property recently taken without permission supports an inference that the possessor committed theft. The minutes showed that the truck was taken without permission and that Schminkey was found alone in it immediately after the fatal collision. Justice Carter reasoned that this evidence supported a prima facie case of every element of vehicle theft, including the intent to steal.

Justice Carter rejected the majority's reading of earlier Iowa cases. He understood Brainard and Fluhr principally as cases about inadequate plea colloquies, rather than as decisions rejecting the usual inference of theft from recent unauthorized possession. Because Schminkey disclaimed any memory of the event and made an Alford plea, Justice Carter believed the State could properly establish the factual basis through the minutes rather than through a personal admission from Schminkey.

Finally, Justice Carter warned that the majority's heightened factual-basis requirement would harm defendants by making plea bargains unavailable even where the State had made a prima facie showing of guilt. He would have found the theft plea valid and proceeded to address Schminkey's separate claim that the prosecutor failed to honor the sentencing recommendation. Chief Justice McGiverin and Justices Harris and Larson joined his dissent.