Takeaway
In short, this case confirms that Michigan's age-based third-degree criminal sexual conduct offense is a strict-liability offense as to the complainant's age: a reasonable mistake that the complainant was old enough is not a defense.
A 30-year-old defendant met the complainant, who was one month short of her sixteenth birthday, at a Detroit bus station while she was running away from home. After speaking with her for several hours, he drove her to a Marshall motel, where two acts of sexual intercourse occurred. The complainant later left the room after the defendant fell asleep, alerted the motel manager, and police were called.
The complainant had told the defendant that she was seventeen, and the defendant told police that he believed her. Before trial, he sought either a jury instruction recognizing a reasonable mistake-of-age defense or dismissal based on the complainant's prior statement about her age. The trial court denied both requests, limited proposed cross-examination about the complainant's purportedly “street-wise” lifestyle, and instructed the jury that belief that she was sixteen or older was not a defense. A jury convicted him of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under MCL 750.520d(1)(a), and he received a five-to-fifteen-year sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam decision.
Issue #1
Whether a reasonable, good-faith mistake about a complainant's age is a defense to third-degree criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration of a person at least thirteen but under sixteen years old.
Holding
No. The statute imposes liability based on the complainant's actual age, and neither the statute nor due process recognizes a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense.
Reasoning
The Court reaffirmed People v. Gengels, which had held that a defendant's belief that an underage complainant had reached the age of consent is no defense to statutory rape. Although the criminal-sexual-conduct code replaced the former statutory-rape statute, the Legislature was presumed to know Gengels when it enacted the new code and did not add a mistake-of-age defense.
The statutory text and structure supported that conclusion. In another third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct provision involving a mentally ill or physically helpless victim, the Legislature expressly required that the actor know or have reason to know of the victim's condition. Its omission of comparable language from the age-based provision showed that actual age, rather than apparent age, controls.
The Legislature carefully calibrated offenses and penalties by the victim's age, the nature of the sexual conduct, and certain relationships of authority. It retained criminal liability for sexual penetration of thirteen- to fifteen-year-olds while reducing the offense from the former statutory-rape penalty. Those deliberate choices did not permit the Court to add a mens rea requirement the Legislature had omitted.
Due process does not constitutionally require a mistake-of-age defense. Legislatures may create strict-liability offenses under their police power, and statutory-rape laws protect minors whom the Legislature regards as unable to appreciate the consequences of sexual conduct. The majority followed the prevailing state and federal view that the risk of a partner's age may be placed on the person engaging in intercourse.
The Court also reasoned that litigating a mistake-of-age defense could improperly shift attention to the young complainant's appearance and apparent maturity. Evidence bearing on a defendant's claimed mistake may instead be considered in sentencing as mitigation, rather than as a complete defense to guilt.
Issue #2
Whether the trial court violated the defendant's confrontation rights or abused its discretion by barring cross-examination about the complainant's alleged lifestyle.
Holding
No. The proposed lifestyle evidence was irrelevant to consent, credibility, or bias.
Reasoning
A trial judge has broad discretion to limit cross-examination, and the defendant was allowed to examine the complainant and her mother on relevant matters. The limitation applied only when the questioning turned to the complainant's character and supposed lifestyle.
Consent was not an issue in this age-based offense because a person below the statutory age of consent is legally incapable of consenting to intercourse. Thus, evidence that the complainant was sexually experienced or “street-wise” could not support a consent defense.
The proposed evidence also did not bear on truthfulness under Michigan Rule of Evidence 608 and had no logical connection to a claimed bias against the defendant. Because it was irrelevant on each asserted ground, its exclusion was not an abuse of discretion.
Issue #3
Whether the prosecutor's references to coercive or forcible-rape circumstances denied the defendant a fair trial when he was charged only with age-based third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Holding
No. Any impropriety was either cured, admissible as part of the surrounding events, or harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reasoning
The prosecutor's opening reference to the complainant as an “unwilling partner” did not warrant reversal because the trial court immediately sustained the defendant's objection. Likewise, the court sustained the objection to asking the examining physician whether he was an expert in sexual-assault matters.
Testimony about bullet holes in the defendant's car, a razor blade, and the complainant's statement that the defendant claimed to have a gun was improvident to the extent it suggested forcible rape. But it was also part of the res gestae: it helped the jury understand the events leading to the intercourse, the complainant's covert departure from the motel, and her summoning of police.
Given the overwhelming evidence of the elements actually charged, any error from those brief references was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor's closing reference to the gun and knife likewise did not require reversal because it was brief, the prosecutor ultimately argued only the charged elements, the defendant did not timely object, and a cautionary instruction could have cured any minimal prejudice.