Caseflicks

Supreme Court of Rhode Island • 1969

Bailey v. West

249 A.2d 414 | 105 R.I. 61 | 1969 R.I. LEXIS 718

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Takeaway

In short, this case distinguishes implied-in-fact contract from restitution: without mutual assent, and where services are knowingly provided without a request amid disputed responsibility, the provider is a volunteer and cannot recover.

Background

After defendant West bought the racehorse Bascom’s Folly in April 1962, the horse was found lame. West’s trainer tried to return it to the seller at Belmont Park, but the seller refused delivery. The van driver then took the horse to plaintiff Bailey’s farm, where Bailey boarded and cared for it from May 3, 1962, until he sold it in July 1966.

Bailey regularly sent West bills for feed and board. West testified that he promptly returned the first bill, denying ownership and responsibility; Bailey testified that he received this disclaimer a month or two after the horse arrived. Bailey knew from the outset that ownership of the horse was disputed, initially billed both West and the seller, and had never previously done business with West.

After a bench trial, the Superior Court found that West’s trainer had told the van driver that the horse would not be boarded at West’s expense. Still, because Bailey did not know of that conversation when he accepted the horse, the trial judge concluded that a contract implied in fact existed until Bailey received notice that West would not pay. The court awarded Bailey five months of board and hoof-trimming expenses. Bailey appealed, and West cross-appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the circumstances established a contract implied in fact requiring West to pay Bailey for boarding and maintaining the horse.

Holding

No. The evidence did not establish the mutual assent or intent to promise necessary for a contract implied in fact.

Reasoning

A true contract implied in fact rests on the same essential elements as an express contract: mutual agreement, intent to contract, and a meeting of the minds. The difference is only that assent is inferred from conduct and circumstances rather than stated in words. It cannot arise from facts inconsistent with an actual agreement.

The record showed no mutual assent between Bailey and West. West and his trainer had never used Bailey’s farm or conducted business with him. The horse was originally shipped back to the seller, not sent to Bailey at West’s direction, and the trial judge credited the trainer’s testimony that West would not be responsible for boarding the horse on any farm.

Bailey also knew when he accepted the horse that ownership was contested. His inquiries into ownership and his initial practice of billing both West and the seller showed that he did not know who, if anyone, had agreed to pay him. These facts negated an inference that West intended to contract with Bailey.

Issue #2

Whether Bailey could recover under a quasi-contract or unjust-enrichment theory for the value of the horse's care.

Holding

No. Bailey acted as a volunteer and therefore could not require West to pay for the benefit conferred.

Reasoning

A quasi-contract does not depend on consent. It is an obligation imposed to prevent unjust enrichment when a plaintiff confers a benefit, the defendant appreciates and retains it, and equity makes retention without payment unjust. But the law ordinarily does not require payment for benefits voluntarily and officiously conferred without a request.

Bailey accepted the horse despite information showing that its ownership and disposition were disputed. The van driver told him that the horse had been refused at Belmont because it was lame, and Bailey signed a bill of lading showing that the horse had been consigned to the seller’s trainer at Belmont rather than to Bailey.

Given those facts, Bailey could not reasonably assume that West had requested the boarding or acquiesced in it. West also promptly disclaimed responsibility upon receiving Bailey’s first bill. Bailey thus chose to maintain the horse with notice that he might not be paid, making him a volunteer rather than a party entitled to restitution.