After David Adams and Nanci Holley divorced in 1969, Nanci voluntarily left their young son, David Christopher, in David's custody. The divorce decree named David managing conservator but imposed no child-support obligation on Nanci. David later remarried, and the child thrived in the stable home he shared with David and his stepmother.
Nanci moved to Seattle after the divorce. Over the following years, she visited her son three times, communicated through calls and letters, sent gifts and about $100 in cash, and maintained health insurance for him. She earned more than $500 per month beginning in 1972 but also experienced bankruptcy, loan repayments, and limited household resources. David testified that the child enjoyed seeing Nanci and that continued visits were appropriate, although David sought termination partly because he wanted his wife to adopt the child and feared that Nanci might obtain custody if he died.
The trial court terminated Nanci's parental rights under Texas Family Code section 15.02, finding that she failed to support the child according to her ability, engaged in conduct endangering his emotional well-being, and that termination served the child's best interest. The court of civil appeals affirmed on the failure-to-support ground and the best-interest finding, without reaching emotional endangerment. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment denying termination.
Issue #1
Whether termination may rest solely on a court's determination that termination is in the child's best interest under Family Code section 15.02.
Holding
No. The petitioner must prove both a statutory predicate act or omission under section 15.02(1) and that termination is in the child's best interest under section 15.02(2).
Reasoning
Parental-rights termination implicates substantial constitutional interests: the child's interest in a home and environment that promotes the child's welfare, and the parent's interest in raising the child under proper influences. Those interests require strict scrutiny of a termination order.
Under Wiley v. Spratlan, section 15.02 establishes a two-part test. A court must find at least one of the enumerated parental acts or omissions in subsection (1), and it must separately find that termination is in the child's best interest under subsection (2). Proof of best interest cannot excuse the absence of a statutory ground, and proof of a statutory ground cannot dispense with the best-interest requirement.
Issue #2
Whether Nanci Holley's conduct endangered her son's emotional well-being within the meaning of section 15.02(1)(D).
Holding
No. There was no evidence that her conduct brought the child's emotional well-being into danger or peril.
Reasoning
The Court reviewed the evidence in the light favorable to the trial court's finding, disregarding contrary evidence and inferences. Even under that deferential standard, the record contained no evidence connecting Nanci's conduct to emotional harm or danger to her son.
Nanci's infrequent visits did not establish emotional endangerment. The record did not show that the limited contacts themselves harmed the child, nor did it show that her actual visits endangered his emotional well-being.
Other evidence that might cast doubt on Nanci's circumstances or parental competence—her 1969 traffic arrest, brief mental-health hospitalization after the divorce, travel to Seattle, second divorce, and bankruptcy—also lacked any demonstrated effect on the child. Section 15.02(1)(D) requires evidence that the child's emotional well-being was endangered, not merely evidence of a parent's troubled history.
Issue #3
Whether Nanci Holley failed to support her child in accordance with her ability under section 15.02(1)(E).
Holding
Yes. The record adequately supported the finding that she failed to provide support commensurate with her ability during the statutory period.
Reasoning
Nanci sent only limited cash support over several years, although she had been employed since 1972 and earned gross wages exceeding $500 per month. The courts below therefore had an adequate evidentiary basis to find the statutory failure-to-support predicate.
The Court nevertheless distinguished the existence of this statutory predicate from the ultimate best-interest inquiry. A supported finding under section 15.02(1)(E) satisfies only one required element of termination; it does not itself establish that severing the parent-child relationship will serve the child.
Issue #4
Whether an excuse for a parent's failure to support is relevant under section 15.02.
Holding
Yes. Under the Family Code's termination scheme, an excuse does not negate the statutory failure-to-support finding but must be considered as a factor in deciding the child's best interest.
Reasoning
The Court distinguished Heard v. Bauman, an adoption-consent case under an earlier statute. That statute focused on whether a parent's blameworthy, unexcused conduct justified eliminating the need for consent to adoption. In contrast, section 15.02 asks both whether a listed act or omission occurred and whether termination is actually in the child's best interest.
This structure reflects a legislative shift away from treating parental fault as the decisive question. Thus, an excuse for non-support is properly weighed in the best-interest analysis rather than used to erase the statutory predicate.
Here, the evidence showed that Nanci agreed to David's custody so the child would receive adequate financial care; the divorce decree never ordered her to pay support; the child was well cared for by David and his wife; and they neither sought nor wanted financial assistance from Nanci. These circumstances excused her limited support and weighed against termination.
Issue #5
Whether the evidence showed that terminating Nanci Holley's parental rights was in David Christopher's best interest.
Holding
No. The record contained no evidence that termination would serve the child's best interest and instead indicated that preserving his relationship with his mother would be beneficial.
Reasoning
The Court identified a nonexclusive set of best-interest considerations, including the child's wishes; present and future emotional and physical needs and dangers; parental abilities; available assistance; plans for the child; home stability; the parent's relevant acts or omissions; and any excuse for those acts or omissions.
Nanci's failure to support was a relevant factor, but its force was reduced by the evidence that her lack of support was excused. The record also showed continuing emotional ties between the child and Nanci, as well as between the child and his maternal grandmother. Those relationships supported continued contact rather than permanent severance.
The child was also emotionally connected to his father and stepmother and was doing well in their stable home. But continued custody with David did not require eliminating Nanci's legal relationship with the child. The only reasons David gave for termination were his adoption plans and concern about what might happen if he died, not a present need to protect the child from Nanci.
Most importantly, there was no affirmative evidence that termination would benefit the child. The guardian ad litem's report did not recommend termination, and David himself testified that it would not be in the child's best interest never to see Nanci again. Because the record pointed against, rather than toward, termination, the best-interest requirement was not met.