Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2009

Bartlett v. Strickland

556 U.S. 1 | 129 S. Ct. 1231 | 173 L. Ed. 2d 173 | 2009 U.S. LEXIS 1842 | 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 705 | 77 U.S.L.W. 4187 | 51 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709

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Takeaway

In short, Bartlett holds that § 2 does not require crossover districts: a vote-dilution claim ordinarily begins only when a compact minority group can form more than 50 percent of a potential single-member district’s voting-age population.

Background

After the 2000 census, North Carolina redrew its State House districts. The State constitution’s Whole County Provision generally prohibited the General Assembly from splitting counties when drawing legislative districts. Yet the General Assembly split Pender and New Hanover Counties to create House District 18, which had an African-American voting-age population of 39.36 percent. If Pender County had remained whole, the comparable district would have had an African-American voting-age population of 35.33 percent.

State officials defended the county split on the ground that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act required it. They argued that the district gave African-American voters a realistic opportunity to elect their preferred candidate with support from white crossover voters. Pender County and several county commissioners sued, alleging that the split violated the Whole County Provision.

The state trial court accepted the State’s § 2 defense. It treated District 18 as a de facto majority-minority district because African-American voters could elect their preferred candidate with crossover support. It found minority political cohesion, and the plaintiffs stipulated that the third Gingles precondition, majority bloc voting, was met. The court then held, under the totality of the circumstances, that § 2 required the county split.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed. It held that the first Gingles precondition requires the minority group to be a numerical majority of the voting population in a potential single-member district. Because African-American voters were not a majority of District 18’s voting-age population, § 2 did not require the district. The United States Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a racial minority that makes up less than 50 percent of a proposed district’s voting-age population can satisfy the first Gingles precondition and compel the creation of a crossover district under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Holding

No. Absent intentional discrimination, a § 2 vote-dilution claimant must show that the minority group exceeds 50 percent of the voting-age population in a reasonably compact potential single-member district.

Reasoning

Section 2 protects equal political opportunity, including an equal opportunity to elect representatives of choice; it does not guarantee minority voters the best available opportunity to assemble a favorable political coalition. A minority group constituting only 39 percent of a district cannot elect a candidate by its own voting strength. It needs votes from other voters, and § 2 does not grant a special right to preserve or improve the group’s ability to attract those allies.

The Court read its Gingles precedent as establishing a majority-minority threshold. Gingles requires a minority group to be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, and that threshold shows the group could elect its preferred candidate in the absence of the challenged practice. Without that independent potential to elect, the Court concluded, there is no cognizable dilution injury and no judicial remedy.

A crossover-district theory also conflicts with the third Gingles precondition. That condition asks whether the majority usually votes as a bloc to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. In a district that depends on substantial white crossover support to elect that candidate, it is difficult to reconcile the needed crossover voting with a finding that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc. Although the parties stipulated to bloc voting here, the tension confirmed that crossover claims do not fit the established Gingles framework.

The majority-minority rule supplies an objective and administrable line: courts can ask whether minority voters exceed 50 percent of the voting-age population in a potential district. A crossover rule, by contrast, would force courts to make uncertain predictions about future turnout, candidate appeal, incumbency, partisan alignment, and the durability of racial crossover voting in elections across the Nation.

The Court also invoked constitutional avoidance. Requiring crossover districts would substantially expand the occasions on which legislatures and courts would have to use race-based predictions in redistricting. Because that interpretation would raise serious Equal Protection concerns, the Court chose the plausible interpretation of § 2 that avoids unnecessarily injecting race into districting decisions.

The holding was limited. The Court did not decide how intentional discrimination would affect the Gingles analysis, and it stated that its majority-minority requirement does not apply to cases involving intentional discrimination against a racial minority. No intentional discrimination was alleged or proved in this case.

Issue #2

Whether § 2 forbids States from voluntarily creating or retaining crossover districts, and whether § 5’s treatment of such districts changes the § 2 rule.

Holding

No. States may choose to create crossover districts where otherwise lawful, but § 2 does not require their creation or preservation; § 5’s different retrogression inquiry does not alter that conclusion.

Reasoning

The Court distinguished a statutory mandate from legislative discretion. A State may decide that crossover districts are desirable because they can encourage minority and majority voters to cooperate and may reduce racial isolation. But that policy choice does not establish that § 2 compels States to draw such districts.

Crossover voting may still matter in § 2 litigation. It can be evidence that majority bloc voting is insufficient under the third Gingles condition, or evidence under the totality of the circumstances that minority voters already enjoy equal political opportunity. Thus, States may defend against a § 2 claim by pointing to effective crossover districts and actual crossover voting patterns.

Section 5 and § 2 ask different questions. Section 5’s former preclearance regime examined whether a voting change caused retrogression from an existing level of minority electoral opportunity, so crossover or influence districts could be relevant to that inquiry. Section 2, by contrast, does not require States to create crossover districts in the first instance simply because such districts may count in assessing retrogression under § 5.

Concurrences

Justice Thomas

Reasoning

Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment. He maintained his view from Holder v. Hall that § 2’s text authorizes challenges to voting qualifications, prerequisites, standards, practices, or procedures that limit access to the ballot, but does not authorize vote-dilution claims at all.

On that view, the Gingles framework lacks a textual basis and has led courts into improper judicial policymaking. Justice Thomas therefore agreed that North Carolina was not required to create the crossover district, but he rejected both the plurality’s majority-minority rule and the broader premise that § 2 supports any vote-dilution remedy. Justice Scalia joined his concurrence.

Dissents

Justice Souter

Reasoning

Justice Souter argued that § 2’s text calls for a functional inquiry: whether minority voters have an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice under the totality of the circumstances. Nothing in the statute makes a numerical majority the exclusive means by which minority voters may obtain that opportunity. A cohesive minority can in fact elect its preferred candidate while comprising less than half of a district’s voting-age population if it receives reliable crossover support.

In his view, the Gingles conditions are threshold screens, not the ultimate statutory test. The first condition should ask whether a reasonably compact district could be drawn in which the minority has a practical opportunity to elect its preferred candidate. A crossover district can meet that condition just as a majority-minority district can; whether the overall plan violates § 2 still depends on the totality of circumstances, including whether minority electoral opportunity is roughly proportional statewide.

Justice Souter rejected the plurality’s claim that crossover districts necessarily conflict with the majority-bloc-voting requirement. A minority group near 50 percent can require only modest crossover support, while the overwhelming remainder of white voters may still vote as a bloc against the minority-preferred candidate. Thus, limited crossover voting does not logically defeat the third Gingles condition.

He also thought the plurality’s administrability rationale overstated the difference between the two approaches. Courts already evaluate voter cohesion, bloc voting, turnout, electoral history, and real-world political conditions under Gingles and the totality-of-circumstances inquiry. A rigid 50 percent cutoff excludes districts that demonstrably enable minority voters to elect their preferred candidates.

Finally, Justice Souter warned that the ruling perversely encourages packing minority voters into majority-minority districts. If effective crossover districts cannot count as minority-opportunity districts under § 2, States seeking to avoid liability will have greater incentive to rely on race-conscious majority-minority districts rather than districts that foster cross-racial coalitions. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined this dissent.

Justice Ginsburg

Reasoning

Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter’s dissent and emphasized that the plurality’s interpretation severely undermined the Voting Rights Act’s aim of securing equal electoral opportunity. She stated that the decision left Congress with cause to clarify § 2’s proper meaning beyond debate.

Justice Breyer

Reasoning

Justice Breyer joined Justice Souter’s dissent and separately challenged the plurality’s claim that a 50 percent rule is an effective administrative gateway. In real elections, a bare numerical majority may not be enough for minority voters to elect their preferred candidate because of unequal turnout, registration, and imperfect voting cohesion, while a minority below 50 percent may succeed with a small, reliable amount of crossover support.

He suggested that a more useful threshold would account for minority population, minority cohesion, and the amount of crossover voting needed for the minority’s preferred candidate to win. As an illustration, he proposed considering whether the minority voting-age population is at least twice the percentage of majority crossover votes needed for victory. He did not claim that this particular ratio was perfect, but argued that it tracked electoral reality more closely than a categorical 50 percent rule.