Barbara Fowler worked as a janitor/housekeeper at UPMC Shadyside Hospital. After suffering an on-the-job injury in April 2002, she took family-medical and short-term disability leave. When her doctor released her for sedentary work, UPMC placed her in a light-duty clerical job. UPMC eliminated that job on August 29, 2003, and terminated Fowler on September 24, 2003. Fowler alleged that, before her job was eliminated, she applied for a telephone-operator position and sought information about other vacant sedentary jobs, but UPMC never contacted her about any opening or transferred her.
Fowler asserted that UPMC, a recipient of federal financial assistance, violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to transfer or reassign her because of her disability. Her claims first appeared in an amended complaint in related litigation in late 2006; after the district court severed plaintiffs from that litigation, she refiled an individual complaint on June 14, 2007. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice before discovery. It held that a borrowed two-year limitations period made the claim untimely, that a restriction to sedentary work did not adequately allege a disability, and that Rehabilitation Act claims were unsuitable for class treatment. Fowler appealed.
Issue #1
Whether Fowler's Rehabilitation Act failure-to-transfer claim was governed by Pennsylvania's borrowed two-year limitations period or the federal four-year period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
Holding
The four-year federal limitations period applied, so Fowler's claim was timely.
Reasoning
Section 1658 supplies a four-year limitations period for claims arising under an Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990. Under Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., the statute applies not only to wholly new statutes, but also to claims made possible by a post-1990 amendment to an existing statute. The relevant question is whether the later enactment created the right of action or corresponding liability at issue.
Although the Rehabilitation Act's general ban on disability discrimination predates 1990, it did not originally require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant job as a reasonable accommodation. The ADA made reassignment to a vacant position a reasonable accommodation, and Congress incorporated the ADA's employment-discrimination standards into the Rehabilitation Act through 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) in 1992.
Because Fowler's asserted right to transfer or reassignment exists under that 1992 incorporation of ADA standards, her failure-to-transfer claim arises from a post-1990 enactment. It is therefore subject to § 1658's four-year period rather than Pennsylvania's two-year personal-injury period.
Using Fowler's September 24, 2003 termination as the accrual date, the limitations period did not expire until September 2007. Her June 2007 individual filing was timely. The court also noted that her claim had actually been asserted in the earlier, severed Tish litigation in 2006; severance under Rule 21 preserves the original filing date. Either date fell within four years.
Issue #2
What pleading standard governs Fowler's Rehabilitation Act employment-discrimination complaint after Twombly and Iqbal.
Holding
Fowler had to plead sufficient nonconclusory facts to make relief plausible, but she was not required at the pleading stage to prove a prima facie case.
Reasoning
The court held that Iqbal extends Twombly's facial-plausibility standard to all federal civil actions, including employment-discrimination suits. A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must first separate factual allegations from legal conclusions, accept well-pleaded facts as true, and then determine whether those facts plausibly show an entitlement to relief.
Bare labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of legal elements do not suffice. In light of Twombly and Iqbal's rejection of Conley's former "no set of facts" test, Swierkiewicz could no longer be read to preserve a less demanding pleading rule insofar as it relied on Conley. But plausibility is not a demand for evidentiary proof or detailed factual pleading.
A plaintiff need not establish every element of a prima facie discrimination case in the complaint. The proper inquiry is whether the pleaded facts create a reasonable expectation that discovery may reveal evidence supporting the necessary elements. The court emphasized that standards of pleading and standards of proof remain distinct.
Issue #3
Whether Fowler plausibly alleged a Rehabilitation Act claim based on UPMC's failure to transfer or reassign her.
Holding
Yes. Her factual allegations plausibly stated a failure-to-transfer claim.
Reasoning
Fowler alleged that she was injured at work, that UPMC regarded her as disabled, and that UPMC placed her in a light-duty clerical job after her physician restricted her to sedentary work. These allegations provided factual context for her claimed need for accommodation.
She further alleged that a telephone-operator opening existed before UPMC eliminated her clerical position, that she applied for it, and that UPMC never contacted her. She also alleged that she contacted a senior human-resources consultant about several vacant sedentary jobs but was not contacted about any opening or transferred to another position.
Those allegations identified how, when, and where the alleged discrimination occurred and tied UPMC's failure to transfer her to her eventual termination. They gave UPMC fair notice of the factual basis of the claim and moved the claim from merely conceivable to plausible.
Issue #4
Whether Fowler failed to plead a disability because her complaint alleged only a restriction to sedentary work.
Holding
No. At the pleading stage, Fowler adequately alleged that she was an individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.
Reasoning
The District Court improperly treated the disability question as though Fowler had to prove a prima facie case at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Its reliance on cases deciding the evidence at summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law was misplaced, because those procedural stages apply materially different standards.
Fowler identified an impairment known to UPMC, alleged that it constituted a disability, and alleged that she was restricted to sedentary work. Those facts plausibly suggested that she might be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, even though she had not yet specified every life activity affected or detailed every substantial limitation.
Fowler would ultimately have to prove that her impairment substantially limited a recognized major life activity. But her complaint need only plausibly allege disability and notify UPMC of the claimed impairment; it was not required to establish the evidentiary case before discovery.
Issue #5
Whether Fowler could pursue the case as a class action.
Holding
No. The District Court properly denied class treatment because Fowler did not timely seek a class-action determination under the applicable local rule.
Reasoning
The court declined to decide whether Rehabilitation Act claims are categorically incompatible with class-action litigation. That broader conclusion was unnecessary because Fowler failed to comply with Western District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 23.1(c).
The local rule required a motion seeking a determination of class status within ninety days after filing the complaint. Fowler did not file such a motion; instead, she raised class certification only in a sur-reply to UPMC's dismissal motion, after the deadline had passed.
The District Court therefore acted within its discretion in denying class treatment as untimely. The remanded case could proceed only as Fowler's individual action.