The Court decided two consolidated domestic-violence cases involving unavailable complainants’ statements to law enforcement.
In Davis, Michelle McCottry called 911 while her former boyfriend, Adrian Davis, was assaulting her. During the call, she identified Davis, described his assault, and reported that he had fled. Officers arrived within minutes and observed her injuries and distress, but McCottry did not testify at Davis’s trial. Over his Confrontation Clause objection, the trial court admitted the 911 recording. Davis was convicted of violating a domestic no-contact order, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the identification was nontestimonial and that any error in admitting later portions was harmless.
In the companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, officers responded to a reported domestic disturbance at the Hammons’ home. Amy Hammon initially said nothing was wrong, but officers found evidence of a damaged furnace and separated her from her husband, Hershel. In response to an officer’s questions, Amy described Hershel’s earlier assault and signed a battery affidavit. She did not appear at trial. The trial court admitted both her statements and affidavit, and Hershel was convicted. The Indiana Supreme Court held that her oral statements were nontestimonial but that the affidavit was testimonial; it deemed admission of the affidavit harmless. The Supreme Court granted review in both cases to clarify when police questioning produces testimonial statements under Crawford v. Washington.
Issue #1
Whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay rather than to all out-of-court statements admitted against a criminal defendant.
Holding
Yes. The Clause’s central and limiting concern is testimonial statements; nontestimonial hearsay remains governed principally by ordinary evidentiary rules.
Reasoning
Crawford held that testimonial statements by an unavailable witness are inadmissible unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that witness. The Court explained that the constitutional text protects against statements by “witnesses,” meaning persons who bear testimony—solemn declarations made to establish or prove facts.
History and precedent confirmed that the Clause targets testimonial evidence, not every form of hearsay. The historical abuses that gave rise to the confrontation right involved ex parte examinations and similar substitutes for live testimony, rather than casual remarks or ordinary nontestimonial statements.
The Court rejected any rule that would confine testimonial statements only to sworn depositions or prior courtroom testimony. A government officer’s recounting of an unsworn statement taken to establish facts about a crime can be the functional equivalent of testimony and cannot evade confrontation merely because it was not reduced to a formal deposition.
Issue #2
Whether statements made during police questioning are testimonial when their primary purpose is to address an ongoing emergency.
Holding
No. Statements are nontestimonial when, viewed objectively, the primary purpose of the questioning is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
Reasoning
The Court adopted an objective primary-purpose test. Statements are testimonial when the circumstances objectively show that no ongoing emergency exists and that the questioning’s primary purpose is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later prosecution.
The inquiry considers the circumstances surrounding the exchange and the nature of the questions and answers. Relevant considerations include whether events are unfolding or over, whether the declarant faces an immediate threat, whether the information is needed to resolve that threat, and the degree of formality in the interaction.
A single exchange may change character over time. Questions initially aimed at ending an emergency may later become directed toward creating evidence of past criminal conduct. Trial courts may therefore redact or exclude the portions of a statement that become testimonial.
Issue #3
Whether McCottry’s early statements identifying Davis during the 911 call were testimonial.
Holding
No. Her early 911 statements were nontestimonial and were properly admitted without prior cross-examination.
Reasoning
McCottry described events as they were occurring and made a genuine call for help while she apparently faced an immediate physical threat. Unlike the declarant in Crawford, she was not calmly recounting completed events to investigators after the fact.
The operator’s questions, including the question identifying Davis, were necessary to provide effective emergency assistance. Officers needed to know the alleged assailant’s identity in order to assess the danger they might encounter and respond to the victim’s immediate need for protection.
The exchange was informal and frantic: McCottry spoke by telephone from an unsafe and unstable situation rather than in a station-house interview. Objectively, she was seeking aid, not acting as a witness or creating a substitute for trial testimony.
The Court did not decide whether every later portion of the call remained nontestimonial. Because Davis challenged only the early identification statements and did not contest the Washington Supreme Court’s harmless-error ruling as to any later statements, the Court affirmed his conviction.
Issue #4
Whether Amy Hammon’s statements to police at her home, recounting Hershel Hammon’s earlier conduct, were testimonial.
Holding
Yes. The statements were testimonial, and their admission violated the Confrontation Clause absent a valid forfeiture-by-wrongdoing finding.
Reasoning
When the officer questioned Amy for the second time, there was no ongoing emergency. The officers had arrived, Amy was physically separated from Hershel, no violence was occurring in their presence, and the officer was investigating what had already happened.
The questioning objectively sought an account of past potentially criminal events, not information needed to end an immediate threat. The officer asked, in substance, “what happened,” and Amy provided a narrative describing how the argument and assault unfolded.
Although the interview was less formal than the custodial, recorded interrogation in Crawford, it was sufficiently formal to function as a substitute for direct examination. Police separated Amy from Hershel, prevented him from participating, and elicited her account for use in an investigation.
The fact that officers were conducting initial inquiries at a crime scene did not itself make the answers nontestimonial. Initial questions can be necessary to address a threat, but Amy’s statements here were neither a cry for help nor information needed immediately to neutralize danger.
Issue #5
Whether the special difficulties of prosecuting domestic violence permit admission of testimonial statements without confrontation, and whether forfeiture by wrongdoing remains available.
Holding
No special domestic-violence exception permits admission of testimonial statements. However, a defendant who wrongfully procures a witness’s absence forfeits the right to confront that witness.
Reasoning
The Court recognized that domestic-violence victims may be intimidated or coerced into refusing to testify, but it held that constitutional confrontation protections cannot be relaxed simply because enforcing them may make prosecution more difficult.
The established equitable doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing prevents a defendant from benefiting from conduct that caused a witness’s absence. Crawford preserved that doctrine, and it can extinguish a confrontation claim when its requirements are met.
The Court did not decide whether Hershel Hammon had forfeited his confrontation right. It reversed and remanded so the Indiana courts could determine, if the issue was properly raised, whether forfeiture by wrongdoing applied.