Caseflicks

California Supreme Court • 1970

Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.

474 P.2d 689 | 3 Cal. 3d 176 | 89 Cal. Rptr. 737 | 44 A.L.R. 3d 615 | 1970 Cal. LEXIS 199

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a breaching employer cannot reduce damages by pointing to substitute employment that is materially different from or inferior to the employee’s original job.

Background

Twentieth Century-Fox contracted to pay actress Shirley MacLaine Parker $750,000 to star in “Bloomer Girl,” a musical to be filmed in California. Before performance began, Fox canceled the film and expressly repudiated the agreement. It then offered Parker the female lead in “Big Country, Big Man” at the same pay. That film was a dramatic western to be made in Australia, and the proposed agreement eliminated or reduced Parker’s contractual rights to approve the director and screenplay.

Parker declined the substitute role and sued for the guaranteed compensation. Fox admitted the valid contract, its anticipatory breach, and Parker’s readiness to perform, but asserted that she unreasonably failed to mitigate damages by rejecting “Big Country.” The trial court granted Parker summary judgment for $750,000 plus interest. Fox appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether summary judgment was proper when Fox asserted that Parker failed to mitigate her damages by refusing the substitute role.

Holding

Yes. Fox failed to present facts creating a triable issue on its sole defense.

Reasoning

On summary judgment, the court decides only whether a genuine factual dispute exists; it may not weigh competing evidence. The moving party’s evidence is strictly construed, doubts are resolved against summary judgment, and the opposing party must nevertheless produce admissible facts—not merely pleadings or conclusory assertions—showing a triable issue.

Fox admitted the contract, Parker’s readiness to perform, and Fox’s anticipatory breach. Its only asserted defense was mitigation through Parker’s refusal of the “Big Country” offer. Thus, summary judgment turned on whether that offer could legally reduce Parker’s recovery.

Fox’s declarations merely asserted the conclusion that the new role was comparable and not inferior. Those assertions did not create a factual dispute because the material differences between the two jobs and contracts were undisputed. The legal consequence of those undisputed differences could therefore be resolved on summary judgment.

Issue #2

Whether Parker’s refusal to accept Fox’s offer to star in “Big Country, Big Man” could mitigate her damages for Fox’s breach of the “Bloomer Girl” contract.

Holding

No. The substitute role was both different from and inferior to the promised employment, so Parker had no obligation to accept it or suffer a reduction in damages.

Reasoning

A wrongfully discharged employee generally recovers the promised salary less amounts the employer proves the employee actually earned or could reasonably have earned through other work. But the employer bears the burden to show that the alternative work was comparable or substantially similar to the lost employment.

An employee need not seek or accept employment that is different or inferior in kind. The court treated that rule as categorical: once the substitute employment is different or inferior, the employee’s refusal is not unreasonable for mitigation purposes, and possible earnings from that work cannot be offset against contract damages.

The two proposed roles were different in kind. “Bloomer Girl” was a California-based musical production that would use Parker’s talents as both dancer and actress. “Big Country” was a dramatic western set in an Australian opal mine. A lead role in a straight western drama was not the equivalent of, or substantially similar to, the lead in a song-and-dance musical.

The substitute job was also inferior because Fox removed or impaired Parker’s rights to approve the director and screenplay. The loss of rights secured by the original employment contract made the alternate offer inferior as a matter of law. Parker therefore was entitled to the full guaranteed compensation without any mitigation offset based on “Big Country.”

Dissents

Chief Justice Sullivan

Reasoning

Chief Justice Sullivan agreed that a discharged employee need accept only substantially similar, comparable work rather than employment of a different or inferior kind. But he believed the central question remained whether Parker acted reasonably in rejecting the proposed role, and that question required a factual assessment rather than a per se rule.

In his view, the majority simply listed differences between the films—a musical versus a western drama and California versus Australia—without explaining why those differences made the employment different in kind. Differences exist between nearly any two jobs; the relevant inquiry is whether the differences are substantial enough to make the alternate work noncomparable or inferior to this employee.

Sullivan also rejected the majority’s rule that any removal of a contractual right automatically makes substitute employment inferior. The importance of Parker’s director and screenplay approval rights depended on factual context, including industry practice, their significance to Parker, and the competing benefits of the offered job. Those matters should have been developed and weighed at trial.

He further criticized the trial court’s use of judicial notice to treat the approval rights as critical without giving the parties the procedural opportunity required by the Evidence Code to challenge the propriety or content of the noticed matters. Because the evidence did not conclusively establish that “Big Country” was noncomparable, he would have reversed the summary judgment and allowed a trial on mitigation.