Caseflicks

California Supreme Court • 1970

Denham v. Superior Court

468 P.2d 193 | 2 Cal. 3d 557 | 86 Cal. Rptr. 65 | 1970 Cal. LEXIS 292

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Takeaway

In short, this case confirms that a two-year delay under former section 583 did not mandate dismissal: absent a clear abuse of discretion, appellate courts must uphold a trial court's decision to permit a merits trial.

Background

Plaintiffs sued Denham, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, and Glens Falls Insurance Company in June 1964 to recover money allegedly owed for construction work and to enforce a labor-and-material bond. The case involved early demurrers, an amended complaint, answers, a cross-complaint, bills of particulars, and litigation concerning a stop-notice release bond.

The case then moved slowly. Plaintiffs' original law firm dissolved; one lawyer left the firm, another became a municipal-court commissioner, and the lawyer principally handling the case later became a municipal-court judge. The remaining lawyer faced a substantial workload and initially believed that a memorandum to set for trial had already been filed. Once he discovered it had not, plaintiffs filed an at-issue memorandum and certificate of readiness in November 1967.

The superior court did not schedule a pretrial hearing until late 1968. At the February 1969 pretrial, the parties set trial for April 21, 1969. Denham nevertheless moved under former Code of Civil Procedure section 583, subdivision (a), to dismiss because the action had not been brought to trial within two years of filing. A temporary judge denied the motion. Although no courtroom was available on the initial trial date, both sides repeatedly announced ready, and the matter was assigned for trial two days later. Denham then sought mandate compelling dismissal.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether former Code of Civil Procedure section 583, subdivision (a), required dismissal of an action not brought to trial within two years unless the plaintiff made an adequate showing of diligence or excuse.

Holding

No. The statute gave the trial court broad discretion to dismiss or to retain the action; it did not create a presumptive requirement of dismissal after two years.

Reasoning

Section 583, subdivision (a), authorized, but did not compel, dismissal when an action had not been brought to trial within two years. The statute imposed no limitation requiring the trial court to grant dismissal unless the plaintiff affirmatively established diligence or a satisfactory excuse. The Court expressly disapproved appellate decisions that had read such a requirement into the statute.

A reviewing court may disturb the trial court's exercise of this discretionary authority only for a clear or manifest abuse of discretion. Mandamus compelling dismissal is appropriate only where the showing before the superior court contains an entire absence of good cause for allowing the action to continue. If any basis supports the ruling and no injustice appears, the refusal to dismiss must stand.

Issue #2

Whether the absence of a reporter's transcript of the dismissal hearing prevented the Supreme Court from presuming that the trial court had a sufficient factual basis for denying dismissal.

Holding

No. Because the record was silent as to the oral presentation at the hearing, the order was presumed correct and Denham bore the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error.

Reasoning

Plaintiffs' written opposition did not fully explain the delay, and no reporter recorded the hearing on Denham's motion. But appellate review starts from the presumption that the lower court's order is correct. On matters left silent by the record, reviewing courts indulge the presumptions and intendments necessary to support the order unless the party challenging it affirmatively shows error.

Accordingly, the Court presumed that plaintiffs' attorney explained the succession of changes in plaintiffs' counsel and law firm to the temporary judge. It also presumed that the judge could take judicial notice of those changes, especially the appointments of two lawyers from the firm to judicial office. Those circumstances supplied at least some good cause, rather than an entire absence of justification.

Issue #3

Whether the superior court clearly abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss this delayed action.

Holding

No. The record provided a reasonable basis for allowing a trial on the merits, and Denham did not show resulting injustice.

Reasoning

The superior court could consider the substantial procedural activity in the case, the repeated transitions in plaintiffs' representation, and the extraordinary workload placed on the attorneys who remained. Although extensive pleading alone would not necessarily excuse delay under the separate five-year mandatory-dismissal rule, it was a relevant consideration under the more flexible two-year discretionary rule.

After plaintiffs filed their certificate of readiness in November 1967, the court did not set a pretrial hearing for approximately one year. The superior court could be deemed aware of its own calendar congestion, and Judicial Council reports showed a severe and growing backlog of civil cases awaiting trial settings. In those circumstances, requesting an accelerated trial date would have been futile, so the delay attributable to court scheduling did not demonstrate a lack of reasonable prosecution.

The denial of dismissal meant that a case both parties had announced ready to try would be decided on its merits. While section 583 protects defendants against unreasonable litigation delay, California's policy favoring merits determinations is stronger in this setting. Denham also waited until shortly before the agreed trial date to seek dismissal, a practice that risked inconveniencing the court, parties, and witnesses and could itself be considered in ruling on the motion.