Caseflicks

Court of Appeals of Washington • 1980

State v. Jimerson

618 P.2d 1027 | 27 Wash. App. 415 | 1980 Wash. App. LEXIS 2351

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that when any credible evidence supports a lesser assault theory, the jury—not the trial judge—must decide whether to accept it.

Background

After his car spun out on ice and snow near two off-duty police officers, Raymond Jimerson exchanged insults with the officers and began to leave his car, apparently ready to fight. The officers identified themselves and forced him back into the car. Jimerson drove away, then turned around, accelerated toward the officers, and swerved in their direction as they attempted to climb an embankment. One officer fired at the car; no one was hurt.

Jimerson testified that he did not intend to hit the officers. He said he meant only to drive past them and splash them with slush, and that he swerved away reflexively when he saw an officer draw a gun. Charged with first-degree assault, Jimerson was convicted by a jury of second-degree assault. The trial court instructed on second-degree assault as a lesser offense but refused Jimerson's requested instruction on simple assault, finding insufficient supporting evidence. It also barred defense counsel from asking the officers about their knowledge of the legal elements of the various degrees of assault. Jimerson appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Jimerson was entitled to a jury instruction on simple assault as a lesser included offense.

Holding

Yes. Simple assault was a lesser included offense, and Jimerson's testimony supplied sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he committed only simple assault.

Reasoning

Under State v. Workman, a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction when two requirements are met: every element of the lesser offense is necessarily included in the charged offense, and the evidence supports an inference that the lesser offense was committed. The first requirement was satisfied because simple assault is included within second-degree assault.

Washington's assault statutes did not separately define the common-law term “assault,” which generally means an attempted unlawful application of force accompanied by the apparent present ability to carry it out. Simple assault covers an assault that lacks the heightened intent, harmful result, or other aggravating circumstance required for first-, second-, or third-degree assault.

The evidence supported a rational inference of simple assault. Although the State characterized the car itself as a dangerous instrument used to assault the officers, Jimerson testified that he intended only to splash them with slush rather than strike them with the vehicle. A car can be used to create a simple assault when it is used to set nondeadly force, such as slush or water, in motion rather than to inflict bodily harm directly.

The trial court improperly weighed Jimerson's testimony and effectively rejected it as unconvincing. At the instruction stage, the question was not whether the judge believed his account, but whether any evidence would permit a reasonable person to find the lesser offense. Credibility was for the jury. The refusal to give the simple-assault instruction was therefore prejudicial error requiring a new trial.

Issue #2

Whether the trial court improperly restricted cross-examination of the police officers about their knowledge of the legal elements of assault offenses.

Holding

No. The trial court acted within its discretion because the proposed questions were irrelevant to the officers' mental states or possible motive to fabricate.

Reasoning

Jimerson sought to show that the officers may have exaggerated the event into a felony assault to justify one officer's decision to fire his service weapon. The scope and relevance of cross-examination are generally committed to the trial court's sound discretion.

The specific proffered questions asked the officers to identify the legal elements of the various degrees of assault. That knowledge did not tend to prove the officers' state of mind, bias, or motive to falsify their testimony; it concerned legal definitions rather than the facts they observed or their reasons for acting.

The ruling did not foreclose inquiry into whether the officers were concerned with justifying the shooting. It barred only questions about their knowledge of assault-law elements. Because that line of questioning was irrelevant under ER 401, the court did not abuse its discretion.