Caseflicks

Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals • 1986

State v. Dumlao

715 P.2d 822 | 6 Haw. App. 173 | 1986 Haw. App. LEXIS 44

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that Hawaii's extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter provision is broader than common-law provocation and requires a jury instruction whenever some evidence supports mitigation from the defendant's particular viewpoint.

Background

Vidado B. Dumlao was convicted of murder for shooting and killing his mother-in-law, Pacita Reyes, and of first-degree reckless endangering for shooting and injuring his brother-in-law, Pedrito Reyes. He appealed only the murder conviction.

At trial, Dumlao offered evidence that he had a longstanding paranoid personality disorder marked by pathological jealousy, unwarranted suspicion, hypersensitivity to perceived slights, and a perceived need to counterattack threats. He believed his wife was sexually involved with male relatives, including her brothers. On the night of the shooting, he testified that he thought the family was talking about him and that Pedrito rushed him with a knife while saying Dumlao would "pay" for his wife's suffering. Dumlao said he drew his gun to scare Pedrito, and it discharged, fatally striking Pacita.

The trial court instructed the jury on reckless manslaughter but refused Dumlao's requested instruction under HRS § 707-702(2), which reduces murder to manslaughter when the defendant acted under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation. The jury convicted Dumlao of murder. The Intermediate Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether HRS § 707-702(2)'s extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigation retains the common-law heat-of-passion and adequate-provocation limits or instead adopts the broader Model Penal Code approach.

Holding

HRS § 707-702(2) adopts the broader Model Penal Code approach: a murder charge may be mitigated where the defendant acted under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance with a reasonable explanation viewed from the defendant's situation and as the defendant believed the circumstances to be.

Reasoning

The statutory language was not self-defining, and its legislative history did not resolve whether Hawaii intended to preserve the older common-law provocation doctrine. The court therefore examined the history of manslaughter, Hawaii law before the Penal Code, and the Model Penal Code provision from which HRS § 707-702(2) was derived.

Common-law provocation doctrine focused on sudden heat of passion caused by legally adequate provocation, tested largely against an objective reasonable-person standard. That framework limited what could count as provocation, generally required that the victim provoke the defendant, and did not account for an accused's individual mental or physical characteristics.

The Model Penal Code deliberately broadened mitigation beyond the traditional heat-of-passion rule. Extreme mental or emotional disturbance refers to an intense emotional condition producing loss of self-control; it is distinct from insanity, although the inquiry may consider mental abnormalities that bear on the defendant's capacity and perceptions.

The statute requires a combined subjective and objective inquiry. The jury must consider the defendant's internal situation and the external circumstances as the defendant perceived them, even if those perceptions were inaccurate, and then decide whether there was a reasonable explanation for the disturbance from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation.

The court adopted the formulation from People v. Casassa because it gave practical effect to the statutory direction to judge reasonableness from the defendant's situation under circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Treating pre-Penal Code provocation limits as controlling would render the new statutory language meaningless.

Issue #2

Whether the evidence required an instruction on manslaughter based on extreme mental or emotional disturbance under HRS § 707-702(2).

Holding

Yes. There was some evidence from which a jury could find that Dumlao acted while under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance having a reasonable explanation under the statute's objective-subjective test.

Reasoning

A defendant is entitled to an instruction on every defense theory supported by any evidence, even if the evidence is weak, inconclusive, or contradicted. Whether the evidence is credible and whether it ultimately establishes the mitigating factor are questions for the jury, not the trial judge.

Dumlao's psychiatric expert diagnosed a paranoid personality disorder involving unwarranted suspiciousness, pathological jealousy, hypersensitivity, and a tendency to counterattack perceived threats. The expert testified that Dumlao perceived a substantial threat on the night of the shooting even though an ordinary person might not have done so.

Other witnesses, including Dumlao's wife and relatives, corroborated the existence and persistence of his extreme jealousy and irrational suspicions. They described his recurrent beliefs that his wife was involved with male relatives and his angry, violent reactions to otherwise ordinary events.

Dumlao's own testimony supplied evidence of his perceptions at the time of the shooting. He testified that he believed family members were discussing him, saw Pedrito's angry expression, and believed Pedrito rushed at him with a knife while threatening him. Under the statutory framework, the jury was entitled to consider those perceived circumstances together with Dumlao's personal condition.

Conflicts between Dumlao's account and the other evidence did not justify withholding the instruction. Nor did his testimony that he intended only to frighten Pedrito eliminate his entitlement to the instruction. The jury, applying the correct objective-subjective standard, had to decide whether the disturbance existed and whether its explanation was reasonable.