Valentine v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

ALJs are presumed unbiased. That presumption is overcome only by a conflict of interest or another specific basis for disqualification; ordinary displays of impatience, skepticism, dissatisfaction, or even anger do not suffice.

Valentine identified pointed questions and expressions of disbelief, but he did not show actual bias. An ALJ’s decision to question a claimant’s arguments or the views of treating providers is part of adjudication and does not, without more, prove that the ALJ prejudged the claim.

Dr. LeBray’s fuller mental RFC assessment found moderate limits in carrying out detailed instructions, maintaining attention and concentration, and interacting with the public, with no significant limitation in most other categories. Those limitations appeared almost verbatim in the ALJ’s RFC, so his reference to simple, paced tasks did not establish that Valentine was confined to simple work in the SSA’s technical sense.

Dr. Storzbach’s testing showed average baseline cognitive ability, many normal or better test results, and variable impairment in attention, working memory, and complex psychomotor functioning. The ALJ’s limitation to moderate restrictions in concentration, public interaction, and detailed instructions was consistent with those findings.

Dr. Storzbach’s statement that Valentine would be less likely to experience difficulty with highly routinized, overlearned, low-demand tasks was a recommendation for coping with PTSD symptoms, not an opinion that he could work only under those conditions. The report also noted cognitive strengths and an ability to compensate at least partly for deficits.

Valentine did not demonstrate that his old cervical and lumbar injuries caused relevant limitations after his alleged onset date. Although the ALJ found his knee and shoulder conditions severe and included physical limits in the RFC, Valentine did not explain what further work-related restrictions the record required.

A contradicted treating physician’s opinion may be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. Drs. Storzbach and LeBray offered conflicting assessments that supported moderate, rather than disabling, functional limitations.

The ALJ identified an internal tension in Dr. Van Male’s opinion: she repeatedly described Valentine as unemployable while acknowledging that he continued to work full time. The ALJ also relied on Dr. Van Male’s own progress reports and employer feedback showing improved functioning and encouraging workplace performance.

Those treatment and employment records were consistent with the opinions of the other psychologists. The ALJ therefore permissibly resolved the medical conflict in favor of the evidence indicating that Valentine retained greater functional capacity than Dr. Van Male asserted.

An ALJ who rejects a claimant’s symptom testimony without evidence of malingering must identify the testimony found unpersuasive and provide clear and convincing reasons. Here, the ALJ found that Valentine’s demonstrated abilities exceeded the degree of limitation he described.

The ALJ acknowledged that Valentine had struggled in his former job, but also cited evidence that he improved and rallied at work. She further relied on his post-retirement activities, including exercise, gardening, projects, and community activities, as inconsistent with his account of wholly debilitating fatigue.

This evidence did not establish that Valentine could return to his old Cummins job. It did, however, directly undermine his assertion that his symptoms were so severe that he could not perform any work, and thus supported the ALJ’s credibility determination.

A lay witness’s testimony may be discounted only for reasons germane to that particular witness. Because Mrs. Valentine’s account of her husband’s fatigue closely tracked Valentine’s own subjective complaints, the valid reasons for discounting his testimony also provided a germane basis for discounting hers.

The ALJ erred to the extent she relied simply on Mrs. Valentine’s status as an interested spouse and on her lack of firsthand knowledge of his work performance. Family members are competent witnesses to symptoms and daily activities, and an ALJ must identify witness-specific reasons rather than invoke characteristics common to all spouses. The error was harmless, however, because the ALJ had already supplied a valid, germane reason based on the overlap with Valentine’s discredited allegations.

Anthony’s later letter claimed that his favorable employee reviews were untruthful and written out of pity. The ALJ reasonably preferred the contemporaneous reviews, reasoning that Anthony had a workplace duty to report accurately when he wrote them, whereas his later sympathy for Valentine could explain his attempt to portray Valentine more favorably at the benefits hearing. That was a witness-specific and germane reason.

Under McCartey, an ALJ ordinarily must give great weight to a VA disability determination because the VA and SSA disability programs are markedly similar. The ALJ could not discount the rating merely by generally asserting that the two agencies apply different disability standards.

But the ALJ also explained that the VA’s rating was not based on a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence before her. The Ninth Circuit understood that explanation to refer to the VA’s reliance on Dr. Van Male’s opinion and Dr. Carter’s evaluation; the ALJ had properly rejected Dr. Van Male’s opinion, and Dr. Carter’s evaluation rested on inaccurate information about why Valentine left his job.

The ALJ also had evidence that the VA did not: the agency psychologists’ assessments, employment records, evidence of post-retirement activities, and vocational-expert input. New evidence, or a properly justified reevaluation of the evidence underlying a VA decision, may constitute a persuasive, specific, and valid reason to assign the VA rating less weight.