Felder v. Fleming Case Brief

Felder v. Fleming

295 S.E.2d 640 | 278 S.C. 327 | 1982 S.C. LEXIS 430

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a cotenant does not lose title merely because another cotenant exclusively occupies, farms, rents, or pays taxes on common land; there must be a clear hostile ouster, followed by the full limitations period.

Background

Joseph Mack died in 1913 and devised a tract of land to his five children as tenants in common: York Mack, Sr., John Mack, Peter Mack, Henry Mack, and Rosa Mack Felder. Before 1935, York, John, and Peter lived in separate homes on portions of the land. John later died without issue, and Peter moved to New York and never returned. Rosa lived nearby with her husband.

After Peter left, York Mack, Sr. occupied and farmed the entire tract. He did so until his death in 1945. His widow, Louvenia, and their descendants continued to occupy or manage the land, rent portions of it, collect the proceeds, and pay the taxes. The property was left vacant after the family home burned in the mid-1960s. In 1968 or 1969, Louvenia and eight of her children purported to convey part of the land to Society Hill AME Church; later, eight York Mack heirs purported to convey part to Billie S. Fleming. Those deeds referred to adjoining property of the “heirs of Joseph Mack.”

Mack Felder, a descendant of Rosa Mack Felder, sought partition. The Special Referee and Circuit Judge denied partition, finding that York Mack, Sr. and his descendants had possessed the tract exclusively for more than thirty-seven years and had therefore ousted the other cotenants through adverse possession. Felder appealed in this equitable action.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether York Mack, Sr. and his descendants acquired sole title against the other tenants in common by adverse possession through an implied ouster.

Holding

No. Their exclusive possession, farming, rental activity, and payment of taxes did not establish an ouster, and the later purported conveyances came too late to satisfy the required period of adverse possession.

Reasoning

A cotenant's possession is ordinarily treated as possession for all cotenants. Thus, a cotenant claiming title by adverse possession bears a heavy burden to overcome the presumption that possession continues in recognition of the shared ownership.

To establish adverse possession against another cotenant, the possession must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and hostile enough to amount to an ouster. The acts relied on must be unequivocal and so plainly hostile to the other cotenants' rights that an intent to dispossess them is clear and unmistakable.

York Mack, Sr. began sole occupancy only after one brother died and another moved away. Nothing in the record showed that, when he began farming and occupying the entire tract around 1935, he asserted a claim hostile to the remaining cotenants. His exclusive possession, collection of rents, and farming of the land were insufficient by themselves to imply an ouster; South Carolina recognizes such an implication only in rare and extreme circumstances.

The purported deed to Society Hill AME Church in 1968 or 1969, along with later dealings with the property, could indicate a hostile claim only from the time of those acts. They could not retroactively transform the family’s earlier possession into an adverse possession beginning in the 1930s or 1940s. Because this action was filed in 1975, fewer than the necessary years had elapsed after any evidence of an adverse claim. The lower court's finding of an earlier ouster was therefore against the clear preponderance of the evidence.