Caseflicks

Supreme Court of North Carolina • 1986

State v. Mann

345 S.E.2d 365 | 317 N.C. 164 | 1986 N.C. LEXIS 2781

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that soliciting another person to commit violent common-law robbery is an infamous crime punishable as a felony, while also confirming that noncoercive supplemental jury deliberations and sentencing based on related conduct supported by the evidence are permissible.

Background

Charlie Mann was convicted of soliciting Richard Lockamy to commit common-law robbery of Richard Braxton. The State's evidence showed that Mann repeatedly urged Lockamy and his fiancée, Penelope Dawkins, to rob Braxton, an elderly man whom Mann said carried substantial cash. Mann described where Braxton lived and suggested a method for carrying out the robbery. Keith Barts later carried out a robbery at Braxton's home; Braxton was severely beaten and died from blunt-force head injuries.

The jury acquitted Mann of several related charges, including conspiracy and solicitation of Dawkins, but found him guilty of soliciting Lockamy to commit common-law robbery. The trial court treated the offense as a Class H felony under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-3(b) and imposed a seven-year sentence. The Court of Appeals found no trial error but held that solicitation of common-law robbery was not an infamous crime, so it remanded for resentencing as a misdemeanor. The State obtained discretionary review in the North Carolina Supreme Court.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether solicitation to commit common-law robbery is an “infamous” offense punishable as a Class H felony under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-3(b).

Holding

Yes. Solicitation to commit common-law robbery is an infamous crime under § 14-3(b), and Mann was properly sentenced as a felon.

Reasoning

North Carolina recognizes common-law solicitation as an indictable offense even when the person solicited does not commit the requested crime. Section 14-3(b) elevates an otherwise unclassified misdemeanor to a Class H felony if the offense is infamous, done in secrecy and malice, or committed with deceit and intent to defraud. An offense need satisfy only one of those categories.

Under State v. Surles, an infamous crime is one involving depravity or moral turpitude that shows a heart devoid of social duty and a mind bent on mischief. The Court explained that whether an offense is infamous must be assessed in light of the nature of the offense and the totality of circumstances, rather than by a mechanically fixed list of crimes.

The Court looked to the crime Mann solicited. Common-law robbery is a felony and a crime against the person: it is the taking of property from a person or in that person's presence by violence or intimidation. Asking, inducing, or counseling another person to commit such a violent theft demonstrates the requisite depravity and moral turpitude.

The Court also viewed solicitation as especially blameworthy because the solicitor originates or advances the criminal plan while attempting to act through another person. A solicitor may plan, encourage, and manipulate the crime while keeping himself removed from the immediate risk. Thus, solicitation to commit common-law robbery falls within § 14-3(b)'s category of infamous crimes.

Issue #2

Whether the trial judge coerced the jury's guilty verdict by directing further deliberations after learning that the jury was divided eight to four on the solicitation charge.

Holding

No. In the full context of the deliberations, the judge's instructions and actions were not coercive and did not prejudice Mann.

Reasoning

After the jury first reported that it had reached verdicts on all charges except the solicitation charge, the trial judge gave the instruction authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235(b). The instruction emphasized both the jurors' duty to deliberate and their obligation not to surrender honest convictions merely to reach a verdict. Mann conceded that this instruction complied with the statute.

A trial judge may, within sound discretion, ask a deadlocked jury for its numerical division so long as the inquiry and ensuing instructions do not improperly pressure jurors to agree. Here, the judge asked only for the numerical split, not which side had the majority, and then asked the jurors to discuss the evidence again and see whether they could reach a verdict.

The Court evaluated the judge's statements in their entire setting. The jurors had received repeated cautions against abandoning conscientious views, asked for additional instructions on solicitation and intent, deliberated further after lunch, and unanimously confirmed the verdict when it was returned. Those circumstances gave no reasonable basis to conclude that the judge's actions misled the jury or probably changed the result.

Issue #3

Whether the sentencing court could aggravate Mann's sentence by finding that he set in motion criminal conduct that led to Braxton's robbery, death, burglary, and related offenses, even though Mann had been acquitted of or had charges dismissed for those offenses.

Holding

Yes. The aggravating factor was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and did not improperly rely on a conviction for a joinable offense.

Reasoning

At sentencing, aggravating factors need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. The testimony of Lockamy and Dawkins showed that Mann originated the plan to rob Braxton, described the victim and proposed method, and persistently encouraged others to carry out the crime. This evidence supported the finding that Mann set in motion the later criminal events.

The aggravating finding did not rest on convictions for joinable offenses, which would be prohibited by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(o). Instead, it rested on evidence that Mann's own solicitation initiated a course of conduct culminating in the robbery, killing, burglary, breaking or entering, and larceny.

State v. Lattimore did not control because it concerned aggravation based on a conviction for a joinable offense. Under State v. Abee, the sentencing court could consider evidence supporting an aggravating circumstance even though Mann had been charged with, but not convicted of, some of the related offenses.

Concurrences

Justice Billings

Reasoning

Justice Billings concurred because existing precedent, especially State v. Surles, and the legislature's failure to amend § 14-3 compelled the Court's interpretation. He nevertheless believed Surles had departed from the original statutory meaning of “infamous crime,” which in his view incorporated the more definite common-law category of infamous offenses.

In Justice Billings's view, the Surles approach leaves the felony treatment of general misdemeanors dependent on judicial assessments of an offense's depravity. That standard makes the statute's reach difficult for citizens to anticipate, particularly where some solicitations are deemed infamous and others are not.

He did not decide that § 14-3 was unconstitutionally vague because Mann had not raised a constitutional challenge. But he urged the General Assembly to provide clearer legislative limits on the statute's scope.