Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2003

Gratz v. Bollinger

539 U.S. 244 | 123 S. Ct. 2411 | 156 L. Ed. 2d 257 | 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4801 | 2003 D.A.R. 6783

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Takeaway

In short, this case held that diversity may be a compelling interest in higher education, but Michigan’s undergraduate policy failed strict scrutiny because its automatic 20-point racial preference did not provide the individualized consideration the Constitution requires.

Background

Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, white Michigan residents, were denied admission to the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) in 1995 and 1997. They brought a class action alleging that the University’s use of race in undergraduate admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

The LSA used several admissions systems during the relevant period. Beginning in 1998, it used a 150-point selection index. The system assigned points for grades, test scores, curriculum, residency, alumni connections, essays, achievements, and other factors. It automatically awarded every applicant from an “underrepresented minority” group—African American, Hispanic, or Native American—20 points. Applicants scoring 100 or more were generally admitted. A later-created Admissions Review Committee could consider some flagged applications individually, but it reviewed only a portion of the applicant pool.

The District Court held that the earlier 1995–1998 policies, including protected seats for underrepresented minority applicants, were unlawful because they operated like quotas. But it upheld the 1999–2000 point-based policy, concluding that its 20-point racial preference was not a quota and was narrowly tailored to achieve the educational benefits of diversity. Both sides pursued review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari before the Sixth Circuit entered judgment so it could consider this case alongside Grutter v. Bollinger.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Hamacher had Article III standing to seek prospective relief against the University’s use of race in undergraduate admissions.

Holding

Yes. Hamacher had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief and to represent the certified class.

Reasoning

The injury asserted in an equal-protection challenge to a race-conscious admissions policy is the denial of an equal opportunity to compete, not the ultimate failure to gain admission. Hamacher alleged that he was denied equal treatment when he applied as a freshman and that he was able and ready to apply as a transfer student if the University ended its racial preferences.

The District Court specifically found that Hamacher intended to transfer to the University once the challenged policy was eliminated. That finding, together with his request for transfer admission, showed a sufficiently concrete prospective interest.

The Court rejected the argument that freshman and transfer admissions were too different for Hamacher to represent the class. The University used race in both processes to advance the same stated interest in diversity, and the transfer guidelines incorporated criteria used in freshman admissions. Thus, the policies implicated the same basic legal question.

Issue #2

Whether student-body diversity can be a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify some consideration of race in university admissions.

Holding

Yes. Diversity in higher education can be a compelling interest, as the Court held the same day in Grutter v. Bollinger.

Reasoning

The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that race may be used only to remedy identified discrimination. Under Grutter, a university has a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.

Recognition of diversity as a compelling interest did not end the inquiry. Because the University used an express racial classification, strict scrutiny required it to show that its particular admissions method was narrowly tailored to further that interest.

Issue #3

Whether the LSA’s automatic award of 20 points to every underrepresented minority applicant was narrowly tailored to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.

Holding

No. The policy was not narrowly tailored and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause.

Reasoning

Strict scrutiny applies to all governmental racial classifications, regardless of which race receives the preference or burden. The University therefore had to establish an exact connection between its asserted interest in educational diversity and its use of race.

Justice Powell’s controlling rationale in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke permitted race to function as a possible “plus” factor in an individualized assessment of each applicant. That approach requires consideration of the applicant’s full background, experiences, and potential contributions to diversity; it does not permit race alone to predetermine an identifiable benefit.

The LSA policy automatically gave 20 points—one-fifth of the score ordinarily guaranteeing admission—to every applicant in an underrepresented racial or ethnic group. The only review accompanying that award was verification of the applicant’s racial or ethnic classification. Race consequently became decisive for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.

The system did not treat other diversity-related qualities comparably. An applicant with extraordinary artistic talent, leadership, or service could receive far fewer points than an applicant who received the automatic racial bonus. The point allocation therefore failed to assess the differing ways individual applicants might contribute to a diverse educational environment.

The Admissions Review Committee did not cure the constitutional defect. Its review occurred only for a limited subset of applicants, after the automatic award of racial points, while the bulk of admissions decisions were made through the selection-index score. Administrative convenience and the volume of applications could not justify abandoning individualized consideration where strict scrutiny required it.

Issue #4

Whether the unconstitutional admissions policy also violated Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Holding

Yes. The policy violated both statutes as well as the Equal Protection Clause.

Reasoning

An institution receiving federal funds violates Title VI when it engages in race discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause. Because Michigan’s admissions policy failed strict scrutiny, it also violated Title VI.

Section 1981 prohibits purposeful racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, including contracts for educational services. The University’s intentional use of an unconstitutional racial classification therefore also violated § 1981.

Concurrences

Justice O'Connor

Reasoning

Justice O'Connor joined the Court's result, but justice O’Connor stressed the contrast between the undergraduate program and the law-school program upheld in Grutter. The law school considered race as one factor in a holistic, case-by-case review; the LSA instead relied primarily on a mechanical point system that automatically assigned every underrepresented minority applicant the same 20-point bonus.

The selection index prevented admissions officers from making nuanced judgments about the particular diversity contribution of each applicant. The fact that other nonacademic factors also received points did not save the system, because leadership, service, and other personal accomplishments were capped far below the automatic racial award.

The Admissions Review Committee was too limited and insufficiently developed in the record to supply the individualized consideration missing from the ordinary admissions process. The University remained free to redesign its system, but the policy before the Court was constitutionally deficient because it was essentially nonindividualized.

Justice Thomas

Reasoning

Justice Thomas joined the Court because the decision correctly applied the precedents, including Grutter. But he maintained the broader view expressed in his separate Grutter opinion: the Equal Protection Clause categorically forbids a state from using racial discrimination in higher-education admissions.

He added that the LSA policy did not share the separate defect of treating racial groups within the University’s “underrepresented minority” category differently, because it awarded the same preference to all such groups. It still failed, however, because it did not permit adequate consideration of nonracial differences among individual applicants within either side of the racial classification.

Justice Breyer

Reasoning

Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment and did not join the Court’s opinion. He agreed with Justice O’Connor that the undergraduate plan lacked meaningful individualized review, but he did not adopt the majority’s full analysis.

He also joined the portion of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent emphasizing that constitutional equality may distinguish race-conscious measures designed to include historically excluded groups from measures designed to exclude or subordinate them. In his view, policies of inclusion are more likely to be consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to equal respect for individuals.

Dissents

Justice Stevens

Reasoning

Justice Stevens would have dismissed the case for lack of standing. Although Gratz and Hamacher could seek damages for past admissions decisions, neither had a sufficiently concrete, imminent injury from the current freshman admissions policy to seek prospective injunctive relief.

Hamacher’s asserted intention to apply as a transfer student was too speculative, particularly because he never applied to transfer. More importantly, the transfer-admissions policy differed from the freshman policy challenged before the Court, including because it did not use the same point system.

A named plaintiff in a class action must personally have standing for each form of relief sought. Hamacher could not rely on the possible injuries of unidentified future freshman applicants to establish his own standing to obtain forward-looking relief.

Justice Souter

Reasoning

Justice Souter agreed that Hamacher lacked standing to challenge the freshman policy. Even accepting the majority’s view that Hamacher could challenge transfer admissions because both policies invoked diversity, Grutter defeated his only challenge to the transfer policy: the claim that diversity could never be compelling. The Court therefore should not have reached the distinct narrow-tailoring question presented by freshman admissions.

On the merits, Justice Souter concluded that the LSA plan was closer to the individualized consideration approved in Bakke than to the quota struck down there. All applicants competed for all seats, and the University evaluated grades, test scores, school quality, curriculum, geography, leadership, essays, socioeconomic disadvantage, athletics, and race.

Assigning numerical values to relevant qualities was not inherently inconsistent with individualized consideration. Race necessarily has some positive value in any permissible diversity program, and the 20-point preference did not itself prove that every minority applicant automatically ranked above every nonminority applicant.

The record was too undeveloped to determine whether the Admissions Review Committee supplied sufficient individualized review. Justice Souter would have remanded for further factual development rather than invalidating the policy on the existing record.

Justice Ginsburg

Reasoning

Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority’s application of a uniform, undifferentiated strict-scrutiny framework to all racial classifications. In her view, constitutional analysis should distinguish between classifications that perpetuate racial hierarchy and inclusionary measures intended to overcome the enduring effects of historical discrimination.

The country remained marked by racial disparities in education, wealth, employment, housing, and opportunity. A university’s effort to expand access and inclusion for groups historically subjected to legal and social discrimination should therefore not be equated with laws that impose racial subordination.

The LSA did not reserve seats by race, exclude nonminority applicants from competition, or admit unqualified students. Every admitted applicant was qualified, all applicants competed for every place, and there was no showing that the policy unduly burdened nonminority applicants.

Justice Ginsburg also argued that openly acknowledging race was preferable to supposedly race-neutral alternatives that depend on racial segregation or conceal their purpose. In her view, Michigan’s candid effort to pursue diversity was constitutionally permissible and more honest than achieving similar results through indirect proxies.