Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

At step five, the Commissioner bore the burden to show that Bray could perform other substantial gainful work. The vocational expert stated generally that Bray had transferable clerical-type skills, perhaps including computer exposure, customer service, and data entry from jobs she had performed years earlier. But the ALJ's written decision merely stated that Bray had "previous skilled work experience" and did not identify any actual skills, explain how she acquired them, or state why they transferred to the proposed clerk positions.

SSR 82-41 unambiguously requires written factual findings whenever skills and transferability are material. A finding of transferable skills must identify both the acquired skills and the occupations to which those skills transfer. The ruling applies even when the ALJ consults a vocational expert. Indeed, SSR 82-41 anticipates that vocational-expert consultation may be needed, but it assigns the responsibility for making findings to the ALJ rather than to the expert.

The court rejected the Commissioner's argument, accepted by the Sixth Circuit in Wilson, that detailed findings are unnecessary when a vocational expert supplies the evidence. That interpretation conflicted with the ruling's text and would make its written-findings requirement disappear whenever expert testimony is used. The court instead followed the Second Circuit's approach in Draegert, which requires the ALJ to make the prescribed findings even after hearing vocational-expert testimony.

The omission was consequential because Bray was close to advanced age at the hearing and was 58 by the time of appeal. For a claimant aged 55 or older who is limited to light work, skills must be readily transferable with very little, if any, vocational adjustment. Neither the ALJ nor the vocational expert assessed whether skills from insurance underwriting more than fifteen years earlier remained current or would permit Bray to move to the proposed work with the required minimal adjustment.

A reviewing court may assess an agency decision only on the rationale the agency actually gave. The district court improperly supplied its own inference that Bray had some computer skill and treated that inference as an adequate basis for affirmance. Under Chenery, courts cannot uphold an administrative decision through post hoc rationalizations. Because the missing findings prevented meaningful review of a potentially dispositive issue, the proper course was a remand for record development and explicit findings.

Once a claimant supplies objective evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject subjective symptoms merely because objective evidence does not fully corroborate them. But the ALJ may evaluate inconsistencies between the claimant's statements, conduct, daily activities, work history, and the medical record, so long as the credibility determination rests on specific findings.

The ALJ identified several supported reasons for discounting Bray's account of disabling limitations. Bray remained active enough to clean, cook, walk her dogs, drive to appointments, work as a caregiver for two years, and seek other work. Medical reports also indicated that she became wheezy with heavy exertion and at times reported that her COPD was doing well. Those facts reasonably conflicted with her hearing testimony that she could not walk more than half a block or carry ten pounds very far.

The ALJ also cited Bray's smoking despite her respiratory complaints. The court acknowledged that reliance on continued smoking may be questionable because nicotine addiction can explain such behavior. But even if that reason were improper, the ALJ supplied four other independent, adequately supported reasons for the credibility finding, making any error harmless.

A treating physician's opinion ordinarily receives substantial weight. When it is contradicted by another medical opinion, however, the ALJ may discount it by providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. The state Disability Determination Service physician concluded that Bray could lift at light-work levels and stand, walk, and sit for six hours of an eight-hour day, directly conflicting with the four-hours-per-day limitation.

The ALJ reasonably concluded that the treating physician's brief prescription note was entitled to little weight because it was written at Bray's request after a COPD flare-up, was based on Bray's subjective account of symptoms, and was inconsistent with the broader medical record. The record indicated severe shortness of breath primarily after heavy exertion rather than routine daily activity, and Bray did not seek further treatment for eight months after the note. Since the ALJ permissibly found Bray's symptom reports less than fully credible, he could likewise discount a restriction resting on those reports.

A severe impairment found at step two must be considered in the later stages of the disability analysis. And a hypothetical question to a vocational expert must include all of the claimant's limitations; otherwise, the expert's response cannot support a finding that other work exists.

The ALJ did account for Bray's adjustment disorder by limiting her to work involving no more than all but the most detailed and complex tasks. The fact that the impairment was deemed severe at step two did not itself establish that Bray had additional restrictions on basic work activities beyond those included in the RFC.

Substantial evidence supported the selected limitation. The ALJ relied on a psychiatric evaluation concluding that Bray could accept instructions, interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public, work consistently without special supervision, maintain regular attendance, complete a normal workday and workweek, and handle ordinary workplace stress. Bray offered no evidence undermining that assessment, so the RFC and vocational hypothetical reasonably reflected her mental impairments.

The regulations caution against mechanical use of age categories in borderline cases, and Bray was less than a month from turning 55 when the ALJ issued the decision. By the time the Ninth Circuit decided the appeal, however, she was 58, eliminating the immediate borderline question.

The court explained that, on remand, the ALJ should consider Bray in the 55-to-60 advanced-age category for purposes of determining present disability, while also determining whether she became disabled before age 55. At that age and with a light-work RFC, Bray would generally be disabled if she could not perform past relevant work and lacked skills readily transferable to a significant range of semiskilled or skilled work. That made the missing transferability findings dispositive.