Whether the landlord had to consent to an assignment or sublease to National City Bank even though the bank would not comply with the lease's law-office use restriction and law-library rider.
Holding
No. The restrictive-use clause and law-library rider were obligations under the lease that a proposed assignee or subtenant had to assume before the landlord's duty to withhold consent only reasonably arose.
Reasoning
The assignment clause made the landlord's promise not to unreasonably withhold consent conditional. Before that promise applied, the proposed transaction had to satisfy all three stated provisos, including the requirement that the assignment or sublease not relieve the original lessee of any obligation under the lease. Because the bank would not undertake the law-office use and library obligations, that condition was not met, and Marquette could refuse consent regardless of whether its refusal otherwise seemed reasonable.
The lease drew no distinction between obligations that were supposedly personal to the original law-firm tenant and obligations that would bind a successor. Nor did the assignment clause create such a distinction. Treating certain duties as personal after the fact would invite recurring disputes over which lease provisions survive assignment and would undermine the parties' negotiated contract terms.
An assignee cannot receive greater rights than the assignor possessed. Leonard, Street & Deinard itself had no right under the lease to use the premises for banking rather than practicing law. It therefore could not transfer to the bank a right to make that nonconforming use. Minnesota precedent likewise recognizes that a lessor may prevent a lessee and those claiming under the lessee from using leased property in a manner inconsistent with the lease.
The tenants' authorities involved materially different assignment clauses, because those clauses did not require a subtenant or assignee to assume all obligations of the original lease. By contrast, the court found persuasive a Georgia decision enforcing a restrictive-use clause against a subtenant where the lease, as here, required the successor to take on the tenant's obligations.