Caseflicks

Supreme Court of Kansas • 1983

State v. Deskins

673 P.2d 1174 | 234 Kan. 529 | 1983 Kan. LEXIS 430

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Takeaway

In short, this case upheld a DUI checkpoint because it stopped all motorists under supervisory, neutral, and safety-conscious procedures, while warning that roadblocks without comparable safeguards remain unconstitutional.

Background

Police agencies in Topeka established a late-night roadblock at a well-lighted four-lane intersection. Although described as a driver's-license check, the State conceded that its primary purpose was to detect drunk drivers. About thirty-five to forty officers, briefed by supervisory personnel, stopped every vehicle traveling in either direction. Marked police cars with flashing lights were positioned at the intersection.

At about 1:20 a.m., Rick Deskins was stopped in the checkpoint line. His driver's license was valid, and the trooper had neither observed Deskins driving nor possessed individualized suspicion before the stop. But while speaking with him, the trooper smelled alcohol and saw that Deskins's eyes were bloodshot and watery. Deskins performed sobriety tests unsatisfactorily, was arrested for DUI, and was placed in a patrol car. An officer then searched the passenger compartment of Deskins's car and found marijuana in the glove box.

The district court suppressed the DUI evidence and the marijuana. It concluded that the roadblock violated § 15 of the Kansas Bill of Rights and the Fourth Amendment because it was in substance a DUI checkpoint rather than a genuine license check. The State brought an interlocutory appeal.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the DUI roadblock, which stopped every approaching vehicle without individualized suspicion, was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and § 15 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.

Holding

No. On the particular facts of this checkpoint, the brief stop was constitutionally reasonable.

Reasoning

The court began with the premise that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants, even briefly for a license check, is a Fourth Amendment seizure. Section 15 of the Kansas Bill of Rights has the same scope as the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the checkpoint could be sustained only if the public interest served by it outweighed the intrusion on individual liberty and privacy.

Delaware v. Prouse prohibited random, discretionary stops of individual vehicles to inspect licenses and registrations without reasonable suspicion. But Prouse also recognized that a roadblock stopping all oncoming traffic could be a constitutional alternative because it avoids leaving the choice of whom to stop to an officer in the field. The constitutional concern is arbitrary or unconstrained official discretion, not the mere absence of individualized suspicion in every checkpoint setting.

Applying Brown v. Texas, the court identified the relevant balance: the gravity of the public concern, the degree to which the seizure advances that concern, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Drunk driving presents an exceptionally serious danger to the public, and checkpoints can both remove impaired drivers from the road and deter potential drunk drivers from driving in the first place.

The court listed factors relevant to the reasonableness of a DUI checkpoint, including officers' discretion, the location and duration of the roadblock, supervisory standards, notice and warnings, safety measures, the anxiety created, detention time, available alternatives, and effectiveness. The factors are not a rigid checklist, but a means of assessing whether the checkpoint has adequate safeguards against arbitrary intrusion.

This checkpoint contained sufficient safeguards. Supervisory personnel selected the site and briefed the officers; every vehicle in both directions was stopped; officers had no discretion to select particular motorists; the officers were uniformed and clearly identifiable; the intersection was well lighted; marked police cars used flashing lights; and sufficient personnel were available to keep the detention brief. These facts distinguished the operation from the random, discretionary stops condemned in Prouse.

The court stressed that its ruling was limited to this roadblock's facts. It did not approve blanket or arbitrary checkpoint practices. A roadblock lacking adequate standards, guidelines, and protections against unfettered field-officer discretion would violate the Fourth Amendment and § 15. The court also suggested that statewide minimum standards adopted by the legislature or attorney general would be preferable to leaving checkpoint rules solely to local officials.

Issue #2

Whether the officers could lawfully arrest Deskins for DUI and search his automobile after the checkpoint stop.

Holding

Yes. The officer had probable cause to arrest Deskins for DUI, and the ensuing search of the passenger compartment was lawful incident to that arrest.

Reasoning

Once the initial checkpoint stop was held valid, the trooper could rely on observations made during that lawful encounter. The strong odor of alcohol, Deskins's bloodshot and watery eyes, and his poor performance on sobriety and coordination tests gave the officer sufficient reason and probable cause to believe that Deskins was driving under the influence.

Because the DUI arrest was lawful, the search of the passenger compartment of Deskins's automobile was lawful under the court's then-applicable search-incident-to-arrest rule, as recognized in State v. White. The marijuana found in the glove compartment therefore was not the product of an unconstitutional seizure or search, and the suppression order had to be reversed.

Dissents

Justice Prager

Reasoning

Justice Prager agreed that the drunk-driving problem is grave and that an automobile stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure. But he concluded that the majority gave insufficient weight to the constitutional protection against government intrusion and failed to apply its own balancing framework to the actual record. In his view, the State bore the burden of proving this warrantless checkpoint reasonable and did not carry that burden.

The dissent emphasized that this was admittedly a DUI checkpoint, not a neutral license-inspection program. Unlike illegal-alien transportation or license violations, DUI often can be detected by observing a driver's conduct. Officers trained to recognize impaired driving can identify erratic or suspicious operation without stopping every vehicle. That made conventional patrol enforcement a less intrusive alternative deserving substantial weight in the constitutional balance.

The checkpoint's results did not demonstrate sufficient effectiveness. During four hours, thirty-five officers stopped between 2,000 and 3,000 vehicles, producing only fifteen DUI arrests. Justice Prager believed the trial court reasonably could infer that distributing those officers throughout the city to observe driving behavior might have produced as many or more DUI arrests without imposing a seizure on thousands of lawful motorists.

Justice Prager also found the procedural safeguards inadequate. The State had not shown governing standards that meaningfully limited police authority to create checkpoints, the location was temporary rather than permanent, and approaching motorists received little advance warning beyond police cars with flashing lights. In his view, these facts left too much room for arbitrary use of the checkpoint power.

Finally, the dissent warned that the majority's rule invited widespread and repeated checkpoint intrusions. Without legislative standards limiting when, where, and how local agencies may establish roadblocks, motorists could face repeated stops across Kansas. Justice Prager would have affirmed the suppression order to prevent that erosion of the right to be left alone.