Carmickle v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

The district court incorrectly treated the clear-and-convincing standard as inapplicable because Carmickle had not claimed symptoms that were unusually disabling compared with those of other people. Under the Ninth Circuit's Smolen line of cases, once objective medical evidence shows an impairment that could reasonably produce the alleged symptoms, those symptoms are medically related for credibility purposes. The claimant need not produce objective evidence proving the severity of the pain or a medically proven causal link between the impairment and each asserted symptom.

Swenson v. Sullivan did not alter that rule. Swenson addresses testimony that a claimant experiences symptoms to a greater-than-normal degree; it does not establish the general standard for evaluating symptom testimony. Carmickle's documented back impairment could reasonably cause pain and reduced mobility, so the heightened clear-and-convincing standard governed.

The ALJ could reasonably find tension between Carmickle's claim that he had to change positions constantly while sitting and his full-time college attendance. Carmickle acknowledged that he could sit for about fifteen minutes in one position, and the ALJ incorporated that limitation into the RFC. The court would not second-guess that rational interpretation of the evidence.

The ALJ also permissibly discounted Carmickle's assertion that he could lift ten pounds only occasionally because Dr. Patton opined that he could lift ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally. A contradiction between a claimant's symptom testimony and medical evidence can support an adverse credibility finding.

The record did not show whether Carmickle represented himself as available for full-time rather than part-time work when he received unemployment benefits. Only an assertion of availability for full-time work would conflict with his disability allegations, so this reason lacked substantial evidentiary support.

Carmickle's relatively limited pain-treatment regimen was not a valid reason to discredit him. He reported adverse effects from other medications and difficulty obtaining insurance coverage for Relafen, and Dr. Patton's notes corroborated both explanations. Conservative treatment does not undermine allegations of disabling pain when the claimant has a good reason not to seek more aggressive treatment.

The majority nevertheless deemed the two errors harmless. The ALJ did not reject Carmickle's testimony wholesale; the RFC largely accommodated it. The remaining valid findings directly concerned vocational functions—his ability to remain seated for fifteen minutes and to lift ten pounds frequently—and provided substantial evidence for the ALJ's limited credibility determination.

Tucker said that Carmickle often appeared uncomfortable, reclined with his feet elevated in class, and at times seemed confused. The ALJ found those descriptions inconsistent with Carmickle's successful completion of ongoing full-time coursework. Because an ALJ need only give a reason germane to the particular lay witness, this explanation was sufficient.

The ALJ reasonably gave substantial weight to Dr. Patton's November 2002 RFC report, which the medical expert considered generous, while resolving conflicts among Patton's several reports and contrary reviewing-physician opinions. But the ALJ improperly excluded Dr. Patton's later opinion that tendonitis significantly limited Carmickle's ability to perform rotary movements.

An RFC must account for all limitations caused by medically determinable impairments, including limitations from impairments that are not themselves severe. A non-severe impairment may matter when combined with other restrictions. Because the ALJ omitted the rotary-motion limitation entirely, the RFC was incomplete.

The ALJ did not err by declining to classify carpal tunnel syndrome as severe. The pertinent medical evidence was from 1996, before the alleged disability onset, and indicated that Carmickle's arm symptoms had largely improved. The record did not establish work-related limitations caused by carpal tunnel syndrome.

Dr. Kane's statement that Carmickle could not tolerate sedentary or light work was made shortly after the accident and accompanied a temporary two-week work excuse. Kane released Carmickle to full-time work two months later. That later release substantially supported the ALJ's decision to give the earlier statement little weight regarding long-term functioning.

Dr. Horowitz recommended a reclinable desk chair. The ALJ rationally relied instead on Dr. Patton's more specific functional descriptions, which emphasized alternating sitting, standing, and walking and did not consistently require a particular type of chair. Although Patton generally agreed with Horowitz's recommendation, Horowitz had offered it as a recommendation rather than an absolute requirement.

Dr. Nilaver's opinion predated Carmickle's claimed onset of disability and was rendered while Carmickle was working two jobs without reporting difficulty performing them. Pre-onset medical opinions have limited relevance, particularly where the claimant attributes disability to a discrete later event.

Because the RFC omitted the tendonitis-related rotary-motion limitation, the hypothetical question to the vocational expert omitted a relevant limitation. Vocational testimony based on an incomplete hypothetical has no evidentiary value, requiring the ALJ to reassess the RFC and the step-four finding on remand.

The vocational expert improperly classified Carmickle's construction-supervisor job as the purely supervisory Dictionary of Occupational Titles occupation of Construction Superintendent. Carmickle spent only about twenty percent of his time supervising and the rest performing physically demanding construction labor. An ALJ may not classify a past occupation according to its least demanding function.

Treating Carmickle's supervisory skills as transferable to a purely supervisory job would also improperly blend step four with step five. At step four, the question is whether the claimant can perform his actual past work or that work as generally performed; transferable skills become relevant only after a proper finding that he cannot perform past relevant work and the analysis proceeds to step five.

The vocational expert also offered only a generic label for Carmickle's counter-sales work and did not identify a specific Dictionary of Occupational Titles occupation or explain why it was light work. Generic occupational classifications ordinarily cannot establish that a claimant can perform past relevant work. The ALJ likewise gave only a conclusory statement, leaving the court without the necessary factual findings for meaningful review.