Caseflicks

Utah Supreme Court • 1977

State v. Mitcheson

560 P.2d 1120 | 1977 Utah LEXIS 1057

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a guest may invoke the defense of habitation and may present that defense alongside an accident theory; when evidence supports the defense, the jury must be instructed on it.

Background

Gary Alfred Mitcheson was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to five years to life for fatally shooting Richard Herrera at about 3:30 a.m. on February 7, 1976. The shooting occurred at the home of Mitcheson’s sister, Debbie, after a dispute over “Mag Wheels” and tires that Herrera had claimed were only loaned, not sold, with a van purchased by Mitcheson’s father.

Earlier that evening, Herrera struck and threatened Mitcheson. Mitcheson later obtained a rifle and went to his sister’s home for a poker game. Herrera and several companions then arrived at the sister’s house intending to remove the wheels from the van. Debbie told them to leave, but they remained on the property amid a loud disturbance. Mitcheson came to the doorway holding the rifle; it discharged, striking Herrera in the neck and killing him.

At trial, Mitcheson maintained that he had the rifle to protect the peace and security of the place where he was staying and that the fatal discharge was accidental. The trial court refused his requested instruction on the statutory defense of habitation, apparently because the house belonged to his sister and because the court viewed the defense as inconsistent with his accident theory. Mitcheson appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a defendant staying as a guest in his sister’s home may invoke Utah’s defense-of-habitation statute.

Holding

Yes. A peaceful guest in another person’s home may treat that place as his habitation for purposes of the statutory defense.

Reasoning

Utah Code section 76-2-405 permits a person to use force when reasonably necessary to prevent an unlawful entry into or attack on that person’s habitation. Deadly force is justified only when the entry is violent and tumultuous and the person reasonably believes the intruder intends to assault or offer personal violence to someone in the dwelling.

The statute reflects the common-law principle that a home is a place of security protected against unlawful intrusion. Because that principle is meant to preserve peace and order, the court interpreted “habitation” broadly rather than limiting it to property formally owned or leased by the defendant.

A habitation includes not only a person’s permanent residence, but also a place peacefully occupied as a substitute home, such as a hotel or motel. The same protection extends to a guest in another person’s home. Therefore, Mitcheson’s status as a guest in his sister’s house did not bar him from seeking a habitation-defense instruction.

Issue #2

Whether Mitcheson’s claim that the rifle discharged accidentally prevented him from also relying on defense of habitation.

Holding

No. A criminal defendant may rely on inconsistent defenses, and Mitcheson’s accident theory was not necessarily inconsistent with his claim that he possessed the rifle to defend the habitation.

Reasoning

Mitcheson’s assertion that he brought or held the rifle as protection during an apparent intrusion did not necessarily conflict with his claim that the gun discharged accidentally. The jury could consider both the circumstances in which he armed himself and his account of how the fatal shot was fired.

Even if the two defenses had been inconsistent, the inconsistency would not have deprived Mitcheson of either one. A plea of not guilty requires the State to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant may rely on any defense supported by the evidence or by deficiencies in the State’s proof that could create reasonable doubt.

Unlike a system requiring a criminal defendant to elect a single theory of defense, Utah’s criminal practice allowed Mitcheson to present alternative explanations. The trial court therefore could not reject the requested instruction merely because Mitcheson also claimed the shooting was accidental.

Issue #3

Whether the refusal to instruct on defense of habitation required reversal of the murder conviction.

Holding

Yes. Because the omitted instruction could reasonably have affected the verdict, the conviction had to be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

Reasoning

There was evidence from which the jury could have considered the statutory defense: Herrera and his companions arrived at the house in the early morning, remained after Debbie ordered them to leave, and created a substantial disturbance. Mitcheson was entitled to have the jury instructed on a defense reasonably supported by that evidence.

The court concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood the habitation-defense instruction could have affected the jury’s verdict. Its omission was therefore prejudicial rather than harmless.

Reversal for instructional error did not entitle Mitcheson to an acquittal. The proper remedy was a new trial at which the jury could consider the defense under a proper instruction.