Caseflicks

Wyoming Supreme Court • 1979

Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Co.

598 P.2d 20 | 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 435

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Takeaway

In short, an employer is not vicariously liable for an employee's accident during an authorized but purely personal errand merely because the employer permits the time off and expects the employee to return to work afterward.

Background

James W. Grandpre, a carpenter employed by Reiman-Wuerth Company, received permission to leave a Cheyenne construction site during work hours to deposit his paycheck before 3:00 p.m. He wanted to avoid overdrawing his bank account and potentially harming his former wife's employment at the bank. Reiman-Wuerth allowed employees unpaid time for personal errands, expecting them to take only the time necessary and then return to work.

Grandpre drove his own car to the bank, completed the deposit, and was involved in a multi-vehicle collision while returning to the jobsite. Although Reiman-Wuerth provided him a company vehicle for company business, Grandpre had never used his own car for the company's business. The plaintiffs sued several defendants, including Grandpre and Reiman-Wuerth, asserting that the company was vicariously liable for Grandpre's conduct.

The district court granted summary judgment to Reiman-Wuerth, found no genuine dispute of material fact, and entered a final judgment under its determination that there was no just reason for delay. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that Grandpre's trip benefited and was controlled by his employer and therefore presented a jury question on scope of employment.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Grandpre was acting within the scope of his employment when the collision occurred while he was returning from his personal bank errand.

Holding

No. Grandpre's bank trip was a personal errand and was not within the scope of his employment with Reiman-Wuerth.

Reasoning

The Court applied the established scope-of-employment standard: the employee's conduct must be of the kind he is employed to perform, occur substantially within authorized time and space limits, and be actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer. The Restatement also provides that conduct is outside the scope of employment when it is done with no intention to perform a service for the employer or as an incident of that service.

Grandpre's purpose was entirely personal. He sought time off to protect his own bank account and to avoid possible consequences for his former wife. At the time of the accident, he was returning from that errand in his own car, not performing carpentry work, using a company vehicle, or carrying out any task for Reiman-Wuerth.

The company's general policy of permitting unpaid personal time did not turn a personal errand into company business. Although such a policy may promote employee happiness and indirectly benefit an employer, that broad and incidental benefit does not show that the particular trip was undertaken, even partly, to serve the employer's business.

Likewise, the instruction that employees use only the time needed for a personal errand and return promptly to work did not establish employer control over the errand itself. Accepting the plaintiffs' theory would improperly make employees act within the scope of employment during lunch, vacations, weekends, and other authorized personal time merely because they were expected to return to work afterward.

Issue #2

Whether the scope-of-employment question presented a genuine issue of material fact requiring submission to a jury rather than summary judgment.

Holding

No. Although scope of employment is ordinarily a jury question, summary judgment was proper because only one reasonable inference could be drawn from the undisputed facts.

Reasoning

The Court distinguished between defining the legal standard and applying disputed facts to that standard. The definition of scope of employment is a legal question for the court. Ordinarily, a jury decides whether the facts satisfy that standard, but the issue becomes one of law when the record permits only one reasonable inference.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and giving them all favorable inferences, the undisputed facts still established that Grandpre was not furthering Reiman-Wuerth's business and had no intent to perform a service for the company. His conduct therefore failed the legal requirements for vicarious liability as a matter of law.

Because no reasonable jury could find that the bank trip was actuated in any part by a purpose to serve Reiman-Wuerth, there was no genuine dispute over a material fact. The district court properly entered summary judgment for the company.