Caseflicks

Wyoming Supreme Court • 1988

Wood v. Board of County Commissioners

759 P.2d 1250 | 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 108 | 1988 WL 86622

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Takeaway

In short, this case shows that a stated purpose for a land conveyance does not create a future interest or forfeiture right unless the deed clearly says that title ends—or may be terminated—when that purpose fails.

Background

In 1948, Cecil and Edna Wood conveyed a 2.1-acre Riverton tract to Fremont County by warranty deed. The deed stated that the tract was conveyed “for the purpose of constructing and maintaining thereon a County Hospital in memorial to the gallant men of the Armed Forces of the United States of America from Fremont County, Wyoming.” The county built and operated a hospital on the site until 1983, when it sold the land and the original hospital building to a private company. That company operated a hospital there until 1984, then moved its operations to a new facility and offered the old premises for sale.

The Woods sued in 1986, seeking the value of the land. They argued that the deed language gave the county either a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, so that the county's estate ended, or could be ended by the Woods, when the site ceased serving as a county hospital. The district court granted summary judgment for the county, concluding that the Woods retained no interest in the land. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the 1948 deed created a fee simple determinable that automatically ended if the land was no longer used for a county hospital.

Holding

No. The deed conveyed a fee simple estate, not a fee simple determinable.

Reasoning

Wyoming law provides that a real-estate conveyance passes the grantor's entire estate unless an intent to convey a lesser estate expressly appears or is necessarily implied. The court therefore read the deed as a whole and looked to its plain language to determine whether the Woods clearly imposed a limitation on the estate conveyed.

A fee simple determinable requires a special limitation: language identifying the event that will automatically end the grantee's estate if it occurs. Deeds creating that estate commonly use terms such as “so long as,” “until,” or “during,” and must clearly state the circumstances that trigger expiration.

The statement that the land was conveyed “for the purpose of constructing and maintaining” a county hospital described the purpose of the conveyance, but did not say that the county's title would automatically expire if that purpose ceased to be served. Nor did the deed specify when the hospital had to be built or how long it had to be maintained.

The reference to a hospital “in memorial” to local armed-forces members did not supply the missing limitation. Although a memorial preserves memory, the deed did not state how long that memory had to be preserved. The absence of a definite terminating event showed no intent to create an automatically defeasible estate.

Issue #2

Whether the 1948 deed created a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, giving the Woods a right to terminate the county's estate after the land ceased to be used for a county hospital.

Holding

No. The deed did not clearly reserve in the Woods a power to reenter or terminate the county's estate.

Reasoning

A fee simple subject to a condition subsequent differs from a fee simple determinable because the grantee's estate does not end automatically. Instead, the grantor retains a discretionary power to terminate the estate after a stated event occurs. But the deed must clearly express an intent to reserve that power.

Language commonly used to create a condition subsequent includes phrases such as “upon express condition that,” “upon condition that,” “provided that,” or “if.” The Woods' deed contained no comparable language and did not state that they could reenter, reclaim, or terminate the county's title if hospital use stopped.

Conditions subsequent are disfavored because they work to destroy estates. Courts strictly construe them and will not infer one when the language reasonably bears another interpretation. Here, the hospital-purpose language could reasonably be read as explaining why the county received the land rather than as reserving a forfeiture power to the Woods.

Because the deed neither expressly nor unequivocally created a right of reentry or termination, the court would not construct such a condition roughly forty years after the conveyance. With no retained property interest, the Woods could not recover based on the county's sale of the property or the later discontinuance of hospital operations at the site.