Takeaway
In short, this case holds that accidental vehicle movement is not necessarily "driving," and that a defendant cannot be left convicted under a general verdict that may rest on an unsupported count.
Burl H. Taft was indicted in Monongalia County on two counts arising from an automobile incident. The first count charged him with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The second charged him with driving while under the influence of drugs or narcotics to a degree that made him incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
At trial, some prospective jurors had been present during portions of Taft's related earlier trial and had heard some of the State's evidence. The circuit court denied Taft's request for a continuance and his request to discharge a juror. After deliberations began, the jury asked for a legal definition of "driving." The court answered that a vehicle had to be in motion for the offense to be committed, and it refused Taft's proposed instruction explaining that accidental rolling of his parked car would not constitute driving.
The court also denied Taft's motion to strike the evidence on the drug-and-narcotics count, despite the absence of evidence supporting that charge, and refused an instruction directing an acquittal on that count. The jury returned a general verdict finding Taft "guilty as charged," and the circuit court sentenced him to six months in jail, consecutive to the sentence imposed in the related case. Taft appealed.
Issue #1
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying a continuance and refusing to discharge a juror because some jurors had heard evidence during Taft's related trial.
Holding
No. The Supreme Court found no prejudicial error or abuse of discretion in those rulings.
Reasoning
Decisions concerning a continuance and the qualification or discharge of jurors ordinarily rest within the trial court's discretion. Although certain jurors had been in the courtroom during portions of Taft's earlier related trial, the record did not show that the circuit court exercised its discretion improperly or that Taft suffered prejudice from the rulings.
Issue #2
Whether any movement of a vehicle constitutes "driving" under the statute prohibiting driving while under the influence.
Holding
No. The vehicle must be in motion, but motion alone is not enough; driving requires an affirmative or positive act by a driver or operator.
Reasoning
The statute criminalized driving a vehicle on a highway while under the influence of liquor or narcotics. Movement is an essential part of driving, but the ordinary meaning of driving also requires a driver who affirmatively operates the vehicle.
A vehicle can move through forces outside the driver's control or by accident. When movement occurs without an affirmative act by the defendant, it is not driving within the statute's meaning. Thus, if Taft's parked car rolled two or three feet because its brakes accidentally released, that accidental movement would not itself establish that he drove the car.
The court's supplemental instruction stated only that a vehicle must be in motion for the offense to occur. In light of the evidence, that instruction effectively allowed the jury to treat any accidental movement as driving. The instruction was therefore prejudicial, and the court compounded the error by refusing Taft's proposed instruction that correctly presented his accidental-movement theory.
Issue #3
Whether the drug-and-narcotics count could be submitted to the jury when the record contained no evidence supporting it, followed by a general verdict of guilty on both counts.
Holding
No. The trial court should have removed the unsupported second count from the jury's consideration and directed a not-guilty finding on that count.
Reasoning
The record contained no evidence from which the jury could find that Taft drove while under the influence of drugs or narcotics. Because that count alleged a separate statutory offense, it required sufficient supporting evidence before it could properly be submitted to the jury.
By denying Taft's motion to strike the evidence on the second count and refusing his requested instruction directing an acquittal on that count, the court allowed the jury to believe that the charge had evidentiary support. The general verdict of "guilty as charged" did not reveal whether the jury convicted Taft of the liquor offense, the drug offense, or both.
A criminal defendant is entitled to know the offense of which he has been convicted. Allowing a general verdict to stand where one of the alternative charges was wholly unsupported would risk punishing Taft for an offense the State had not proved. This error independently required reversal.