Caseflicks

California Supreme Court • 1964

People v. Hernandez

61 Cal. 2d 529 | 393 P.2d 673 | 8 A.L.R. 3d 1092 | 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 | 1964 Cal. LEXIS 228

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that statutory rape in California is not strict liability as to age: an honest and reasonable mistake that the complainant was at least 18 can negate the criminal intent required for conviction.

Background

The defendant was charged with statutory rape under Penal Code section 261, subdivision 1, after having consensual sexual intercourse with a girl who was 17 years and 9 months old. The two had been companions for several months, and they were not married. The defendant sought to introduce evidence that he honestly and reasonably believed that she was at least 18 years old.

The trial court, sitting without a jury, refused to allow that evidence, convicted the defendant of statutory rape, and determined the offense to be a misdemeanor. On appeal, the defendant argued that Penal Code sections 20 and 26 required an opportunity to show that a reasonable mistake about the girl's age negated criminal intent.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a defendant charged with statutory rape may defend by showing that he honestly and reasonably believed the complainant had reached the age of consent.

Holding

Yes. Absent a contrary legislative direction, a reasonable, good-faith mistake that the complainant was at least 18 years old is a defense to statutory rape because it negates criminal intent.

Reasoning

Penal Code section 20 provides that a crime ordinarily requires a union of act and intent or criminal negligence, and section 26 excuses a person who acts under a mistake of fact that disproves criminal intent. The statutory-rape provision did not expressly eliminate those general requirements.

The court rejected the premise of earlier California cases that a person who has intercourse with an underage female always acts at his peril as to her age. A person who proceeds with disregard for her age, or without reasonable grounds to believe she is of age, possesses the requisite culpable intent. But a person who reasonably and in good faith believes that she is old enough has sought to ensure that his conduct is lawful rather than consciously accepted the risk of criminality.

The court drew support from People v. Vogel, which recognized a good-faith mistake-of-fact defense to bigamy. As with a person who reasonably relies on what appears to be a valid divorce, a person who reasonably believes his sexual partner has reached the age of consent does not become morally blameworthy merely because the underlying fact later proves otherwise.

Protecting sexually naive minors remains an important public policy, but allowing the defense does not abandon that protection. A claimed mistake concerning a child whose plainly tender appearance makes the belief unreasonable will fail. The rule also does not make a minor's consent a defense when the defendant knows she is underage; it applies only when the defendant lacked criminal intent because of a reasonable factual mistake.

The court overruled People v. Ratz and People v. Griffin, and disapproved People v. Sheffield to the extent those decisions imposed strict liability for the complainant's age in statutory-rape prosecutions.

Issue #2

Whether the defendant's offer of proof concerning his belief about the complainant's age was sufficient to require admission of the evidence.

Holding

Yes. The offer of proof was sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that the defendant reasonably and in good faith believed the complainant was at least 18.

Reasoning

The Supreme Court did not decide as a factual matter that the defendant's belief was reasonable. It held only that his proposed evidence supplied an adequate basis on which the factfinder, if the evidence were fully developed and credited, could find in his favor.

Because the trial court categorically refused to permit evidence bearing on a now-recognized defense, the exclusion prevented the defendant from contesting an essential element of criminal liability. That error was reversible, requiring reversal of the conviction.