Caseflicks

Utah Supreme Court • 1979

Wiggill v. Cheney

597 P.2d 1351 | 1979 Utah LEXIS 870

Full access

Unlock the video and quiz

The written brief is free to read below. Subscribe to watch the video explainer and take the quiz.

Create an account Log in

Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a signed deed kept under the grantor's exclusive control until death is not delivered, so a later transfer of that deed cannot pass title.

Background

On June 25, 1958, Lillian W. Cheney signed a warranty deed naming Flora Cheney as grantee of Ogden real property. Lillian placed the deed in a sealed envelope and deposited it in a safety-deposit box held in the names of herself and Francis E. Wiggill. She told Wiggill that, after her death, he should obtain access to the box and give its contents—an envelope addressed “to all those concerned”—to the appropriate persons.

Lillian retained the box key and sole, complete control of the box throughout her life. Wiggill never received a key. After Lillian died, Wiggill accessed the box and manually delivered the deed to Flora. The lower court invalidated the deed for lack of valid delivery, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Wiggill's post-death delivery of the deed to Flora Cheney constituted a valid delivery that conveyed title.

Holding

No. Because Lillian Cheney retained sole possession and control of the deed until her death, no effective delivery occurred during her lifetime, and Wiggill's later manual transfer conveyed no title.

Reasoning

A deed does not transfer land merely because it has been signed. Delivery is an essential element of an operative conveyance, and a valid delivery ordinarily requires the deed to pass beyond the grantor's control or dominion.

A grantor's continued possession of a deed at death does not invariably defeat delivery. Earlier delivery may still be proved by facts showing that the grantor intended title to pass and explaining why the grantor later possessed the document. But an effective delivery still requires the grantor to give up possession of the deed or the right to retain it.

Here, Lillian never surrendered control. She kept the only key to the safety-deposit box, retained sole and complete control over the box and its contents, and never gave Wiggill the key. Thus, the evidence established that she remained in possession and control of the deed until she died.

Wiggill's authority to enter the box only after Lillian's death did not supply the missing lifetime delivery. Because there had been no actual delivery before the grantor died, his subsequent handoff of the deed to Flora could not convey the property.

Issue #2

Whether Lillian Cheney's apparent intention that Flora Cheney receive the property could validate the deed despite the absence of delivery.

Holding

No. Intent to convey cannot transfer title without delivery of the deed to the grantee or someone acting for the grantee during the grantor's lifetime.

Reasoning

The Court acknowledged the general principle that courts seek to carry out a grantor's intent when possible. But intent alone is legally insufficient where the essential act of delivery is absent.

An undelivered deed is a nullity even if the grantor wished the named grantee to receive the property. Since Lillian retained control of the deed throughout her life, any testamentary-looking intention expressed through the envelope could not substitute for delivery.