Caseflicks

Utah Supreme Court • 1979

State v. Howard

597 P.2d 878 | 1979 Utah LEXIS 909

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a negligent-homicide instruction is unwarranted where the evidence shows the defendant deliberately aimed and fired at an intended victim, even though the shot instead killed another person.

Background

A dispute between Marilyn Rust and Tammy Johnson escalated into threats, vandalism, and hostility involving their friends. Howard, Rust's friend, had brought loaded firearms to Rust's apartment on earlier occasions and, anticipating trouble after he had slashed tires belonging to Tammy Johnson and her husband Danny, brought a loaded 12-gauge shotgun there on January 14, 1978.

Near midnight, Tammy and Danny Johnson and two companions came to the apartment. After an hour-long argument, they began to leave. An exchange of obscenities between Tammy and Howard prompted Danny to return to the door, demand that Howard come outside to fight, and threaten to enter if Howard did not emerge by the count of five. When Danny lunged through the doorway, Howard aimed and fired the shotgun. Stan Crager, who was in front of Howard, moved between Howard and Danny in an attempt to stop the confrontation and was struck in the back. Howard then pumped the shotgun and fired again at Danny, hitting him in the back as he moved toward the kitchen. Crager and Danny both died.

Howard was charged with two counts of first-degree murder. He claimed self-defense at trial. The trial court instructed the jury on second-degree murder and manslaughter as lesser included offenses, but refused Howard's requested instruction on negligent homicide. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder for Danny's death and manslaughter for Crager's death. Howard appealed solely on the refusal to give the negligent-homicide instruction.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the trial court was required to instruct the jury on negligent homicide as a lesser included offense for Danny Johnson's death.

Holding

No. No reasonable view of the evidence supported a finding that Howard acted with criminal negligence rather than at least recklessness when he fired at Danny Johnson.

Reasoning

A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense only when the evidence, including rational inferences from it, provides a reasonable basis for a conviction of that lesser offense. Although a defendant may present his theory of the case to the jury, that right depends on evidentiary support for the requested theory.

Criminal negligence applies when an actor should have perceived a substantial and unjustifiable risk but did not. Recklessness, by contrast, requires awareness and conscious disregard of that risk. The evidence concerning the second shot did not permit a conclusion that Howard failed to recognize the risk of death: he pumped the shotgun, aimed it at Danny, and fired as Danny moved across the room.

Howard offered no evidence that he was unaware that shooting Danny with a shotgun created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of killing him. On this record, the jury could not reasonably find the lesser mental state required for negligent homicide.

Issue #2

Whether the accidental shooting of Stan Crager provided a reasonable basis for a negligent-homicide instruction on the count arising from Crager's death.

Holding

No. Under Utah's transferred-victim statute, the relevant mental state was Howard's state of mind toward Danny Johnson, the intended victim, not toward Crager, the person actually killed.

Reasoning

Howard argued that he did not know Crager would step into the line of fire and that the jury therefore could find he was unaware of the risk to Crager. The court held that this framing focused on the wrong person for purposes of determining criminal liability.

Utah Code section 76-5-204 provides that causing the death of someone other than the intended victim is not a defense in a criminal-homicide prosecution. Accordingly, the court assessed whether Howard was unaware, but should have been aware, of the risk that Danny would die when Howard fired at him.

The evidence foreclosed criminal negligence as to Danny. Howard admitted that he aimed at Danny and testified, “I usually hit what I aim at.” His self-defense claim likewise rested on the premise that he intentionally shot Danny because he believed the shooting necessary to protect himself. The jury could find recklessness or an intentional or knowing shooting undertaken under a mistaken belief of justification, but it could not reasonably find mere criminal negligence.

Because Crager's substitution for Danny as the actual victim did not alter the applicable mens rea, and because the jury was instructed on the transferred-victim rule, the trial court properly declined to instruct on negligent homicide.