Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1999

Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.

526 U.S. 344 | 119 S. Ct. 1322 | 143 L. Ed. 2d 448 | 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2346 | 99 Daily Journal DAR 3237 | 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 183 | 1999 Colo. J. C.A.R. 1917 | 67 U.S.L.W. 4238 | 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2474 | 43 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1

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Takeaway

In short, Murphy Brothers holds that a defendant's removal deadline does not start merely because it receives an informal copy of a complaint; formal service of process, or a post-service receipt of the complaint, is required.

Background

Michetti Pipe Stringing filed a state-court action in Alabama against Murphy Brothers, alleging breach of contract and fraud. Three days after filing, but before formally serving Murphy, Michetti faxed a file-stamped “courtesy copy” of the complaint to a Murphy vice president. The parties discussed settlement, and Michetti later served Murphy by certified mail on February 12, 1996.

Murphy removed the case to federal district court on March 13—30 days after formal service but 44 days after the fax. Michetti sought remand, arguing that the fax started the 30-day removal period in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The District Court denied remand, holding that the clock did not begin until formal service. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, ruling that receipt of the faxed complaint triggered the removal period. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among lower courts.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)'s 30-day period for removing a state-court action begins when a defendant receives an informal copy of a filed complaint before formal service of process.

Holding

No. The removal period begins upon formal service of the summons and complaint, or upon receipt of the complaint through service or otherwise after service of the summons; mere receipt of an unserved courtesy copy does not trigger the period.

Reasoning

The Court began with the basic procedural principle that a person named as a defendant has no obligation to participate in litigation until brought under the court's authority through formal service of process or a waiver of service. A summons performs that authority-asserting function: it directs the defendant to appear and defend and warns of the consequences of failing to do so. Removal should not be the unusual procedural right that expires before the defendant is formally made a party to the action.

The statutory history supported this reading. Before 1948, removal deadlines depended on state-law response periods. Congress adopted § 1446(b) to create a more uniform federal deadline, then amended it in 1949 because some States allowed an action to begin with service of a summons before a complaint was filed or made available. The amendment ensured that defendants would have the complaint before their removal time expired; it did not indicate that Congress meant to eliminate service of process as the event that imposes litigation obligations.

The phrase “through service or otherwise” therefore accommodates differing state procedures without allowing informal notice alone to start the clock. If the summons and complaint are served together, the period begins then. If the summons is served first, the period begins when the complaint is later received. If state procedure does not require service of a filed complaint, the period begins when the complaint is made available. And when a complaint has been filed before service, the period begins with service of the summons. Under each arrangement, the defendant receives at least 30 days after formal service to decide whether to remove.

The Court also read identical language in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c) consistently. That rule establishes the deadline for a defendant in a removed case to answer or raise defenses, and it has been understood to preserve at least the ordinary period after service of process. There was no reason to treat the same language in § 1446(b) as silently stripping defendants of the service prerequisite.

Finally, an informal-receipt rule could work unfairly, especially against foreign defendants. A plaintiff could fax a complaint immediately while formal international service took much longer, effectively forcing the defendant to decide on removal before it was properly subject to the court's authority. Congress would need to speak far more clearly to produce that result.

Dissents

Chief Justice Rehnquist

Reasoning

Chief Justice Rehnquist would have affirmed the Eleventh Circuit. In his view, the statute's plain language starts the removal period upon the defendant's “receipt” of a copy of the initial pleading “through service or otherwise.” Because Murphy received a faxed copy of the file-stamped complaint, it received the pleading within the ordinary meaning of the statute and its 30-day period began at that point.

He faulted the majority for adding a service-of-process condition that Congress did not place in § 1446(b). In his view, that judicially created requirement conflicted with the Court's usual practice of strictly construing removal statutes and similar jurisdictional provisions.