Takeaway
In short, this case holds that an alleged Vienna Convention consular-notification violation does not bypass state procedural-default rules or justify habeas relief without a concrete showing of prejudice, even when an international tribunal has requested a stay.
Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan citizen, was convicted in Virginia of attempted rape and capital murder and sentenced to death. The evidence against him was overwhelming, including DNA and hair evidence. Breard testified in his own defense, admitted killing the victim, and claimed that a Satanic curse had compelled him to do so. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, and the Supreme Court previously denied certiorari.
In his first federal habeas petition, filed in 1996, Breard argued for the first time that Virginia had violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by failing to tell him that he could contact the Paraguayan Consulate after his arrest. The District Court and the Fourth Circuit held that he had procedurally defaulted the claim by not raising it in Virginia court and had not shown cause and prejudice.
Paraguay, its Ambassador, and its Consul General also sued Virginia officials, alleging violations of Paraguay's treaty rights and seeking to halt the execution. The lower courts rejected those suits on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Shortly before the scheduled execution, Paraguay initiated proceedings in the International Court of Justice, which requested that the United States take measures to prevent Breard's execution pending its decision. Breard and Paraguay then sought stays and further relief from the Supreme Court.
Issue #1
Whether Breard's failure to raise his Vienna Convention claim in Virginia court barred federal habeas review of that claim.
Holding
Yes. Breard procedurally defaulted the claim, and the Vienna Convention did not displace the ordinary procedural-default rules governing federal habeas review.
Reasoning
The Court explained that international treaties are generally implemented through the procedural rules of the forum state unless the treaty clearly provides otherwise. Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention itself says that treaty rights must be exercised in conformity with the receiving state's laws and regulations, so long as those rules permit the treaty's purposes to be given effect. Because Breard did not present his consular-notification claim in state court, he did not comply with the procedural route Virginia and federal habeas law required.
Treaty status as the supreme law of the land did not give the Vienna Convention priority over procedural rules. Constitutional claims, which likewise rest on supreme federal law, are subject to procedural default in habeas cases. In addition, a later federal statute may supersede an inconsistent treaty obligation, and the Court treated AEDPA's restrictions on evidentiary hearings as applicable to Breard's treaty claim.
AEDPA barred Breard from obtaining the evidentiary hearing needed to establish prejudice from the alleged violation. Without developing facts in state court, he could not prove what advice the Paraguayan consul would have given, how that advice would have differed from his lawyers' advice, or whether it would have changed his decision to reject the prosecution's plea offer. The Court also stated that, if the claim's novelty excused default, its novelty would instead create a separate habeas obstacle under Teague v. Lane.
Issue #2
Whether an alleged violation of Breard's Article 36 consular-notification rights justified overturning his conviction or death sentence.
Holding
No. Even assuming the Convention conferred an individually enforceable right and that Virginia violated it, Breard made no plausible showing that the violation affected the result of his case.
Reasoning
The Court viewed a treaty violation, like other trial error, as insufficient to upset a final criminal judgment without a showing that it had an effect on the trial or sentence. Breard's claim of harm was especially speculative because he chose to reject his attorneys' advice, take the stand, and confess at trial. His lawyers were likely better positioned than a consular official to explain the American criminal-justice system.
Breard asserted that consular advice might have led him to accept a plea agreement under which the Commonwealth would forgo the death penalty. The Court found that assertion weaker than the prejudice claims routinely rejected when defendants allege that attorney error affected a guilty plea. Thus, the claimed failure of consular notification could not support habeas relief even on the merits.
Issue #3
Whether the International Court of Justice's provisional order requesting measures to prevent Breard's execution required the Supreme Court to grant a stay or otherwise override domestic procedural rules.
Holding
No. The Court denied the requested stay and relief because existing domestic law did not authorize the Court to make that choice for Virginia's Governor.
Reasoning
The Court said that an international tribunal's treaty interpretation deserved respectful consideration, but it did not regard the ICJ proceeding or provisional order as displacing the domestic procedural rules that barred Breard's claim. The Court therefore resolved the applications under the governing law of federal habeas and state sovereign immunity.
The Court distinguished the judiciary's legal role from the Executive Branch's authority over foreign relations. The Secretary of State had asked Virginia's Governor to stay the execution, and the Court recognized that the Governor could choose to await the ICJ's decision. But it concluded that no existing precedent allowed the Court itself to compel that result.
Issue #4
Whether Paraguay could obtain judicial relief against Virginia to set aside Breard's conviction and sentence for the alleged Vienna Convention violations.
Holding
No. Paraguay did not establish a treaty-based private right of action, and its suit was independently barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Reasoning
The Court found no clear support in either the text or history of the Vienna Convention for a foreign nation to bring a private action in a United States court to overturn a state criminal conviction or sentence based on a breach of the treaty's consular-notification provisions.
The Eleventh Amendment supplied an additional barrier. States are generally immune from suits by foreign states without their consent. Paraguay could not fit within the exception for prospective relief from an ongoing violation because the alleged failure to notify the Paraguayan consul occurred at the time of Breard's arrest and did not constitute a continuing violation of federal law.
Issue #5
Whether Paraguay's Consul General could sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged Vienna Convention violation.
Holding
No. Neither Paraguay nor its Consul General acting solely in an official capacity could pursue a § 1983 action.
Reasoning
Section 1983 authorizes suit by a person within the jurisdiction of the United States. Paraguay was neither a statutory person nor a person within the United States's jurisdiction for purposes of that provision.
The Consul General could not avoid that conclusion by suing in his official role. Any relevant Vienna Convention rights belonged to Paraguay rather than to the Consul General personally, so his official-capacity claim rose no higher than Paraguay's own unavailable claim.